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Abstract (English) 
Despite the fact that Chinese migration to Lesotho is not an entirely new phenomenon, we 
still know little about these migrants and their economic activities in general, and their 
influence on the reproduction or altering of Lesotho’s employment and business 
opportunities in particular. To allow for a better assessment of this process, I conducted a 
survey among 86 Chinese migrants in seven towns in Lesotho in November 2011 and 
February 2012. My analysis of the economic activities of Chinese migrants shows that 
Chinese migrants in Lesotho, by establishing mainly small retail shops and supermarkets, 
appear to give in to structural constraints (low demand and high entrance barriers into the 
large-scale wholesale and retail sector) and are thereby reproducing existing business 
opportunities. However, by being economically rather successful and employing mainly 
Basotho, they are at least partially altering existing employment opportunities. Yet, at the 
same time, they are also outcompeting Basotho businesses by engaging in different business 
practices (different setups of the businesses and sourcing strategies). I conclude that for the 
local population, this has negative as well as positive implications: on the negative side it 
leads to an exposure of Basotho to the (fierce) competition from Chinese migrants. On the 
positive side, Basotho are responding to the fierce competition by adapting several aspects of 
Chinese business practices, thus at least partially increasing the Basotho’s overall economic 
competitiveness. 
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Abstract (German) 
Obwohl chinesische Migranten in Lesotho kein neues Phänomen sind, wissen wir allgemein 
relativ wenig über sie und ihre wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten sowie ihren Einfluss auf die 
lokalen Beschäftigung- und Geschäftsmöglichkeiten. Um die Datenlage zu verbessern, habe 
ich eine Umfrage mit 86 chinesischen Migranten in sieben Städten in Lesotho im November 
2011 und Februar 2012 durchgeführt. Meine Analyse der wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten der 
chinesischen Migranten zeigt, dass diese eher die bestehenden lokalen Geschäftschancen 
reproduzieren, da sie hauptsächlich kleine Geschäfte betreiben und den strukturellen 
Randbedingungen wie der schwachen Nachfrage nach größeren Geschäften und hohen 
Markteintrittsbarrieren nachgeben. Dennoch kann man auch beobachten, dass die 
chinesischen Migranten teilweise bestehende Wirtschaftsfelder verändern. Dies zeigt sich 
zum einen darin, dass sie sich sehr erfolgreich im Wettbewerb mit bestehenden Geschäften 
durchsetzten. Zum anderen zeigt sich dies an den neuen Geschäftspraktiken, die sie in 
Lesotho einführen. Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass dies sowohl positive wie auch 
negative Auswirkungen auf die lokale Bevölkerung hat: Negativ ist, dass es durch die 
wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten der chinesischen Migranten zu einem verschärften 
Wettbewerbsdruck auf die Basuto kommt. Positiv ist jedoch, dass es so schein, als ob die 
Basuto sich erfolgreich an Geschäftspraktiken der Chinesen anpassen und sich damit 
zumindest teilweise die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der Basuto erhöht. 
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1. Introduction 
Having lived and studied in China for two years, and having made many good Chinese friends, 
both in China and aboard, I was always puzzled by the fact that many Chinese are willing to 
give up secured jobs and businesses in China, to venture out into the world, and to take up 
jobs or to open up small shops, restaurants or other types of businesses which meet local 
demand. I was particularly fascinated by the seemingly large numbers of Chinese that 
decided to go to Africa. While I had occasionally met some Chinese who were directly or 
indirectly involved with Africa during my time in China, and had read books and articles 
about Chinese in Africa, it was not until 2011―the year of my exchange semester at the 
University of Stellenbosch (South Africa) and travels through Lesotho, Namibia, Tanzania, 
Zambia and South Africa―that I was really able to witness the growing presence of Chinese 
businesses in Africa. Out of all the African countries I have been to, Lesotho struck me as an 
extreme case: on walks through the urban areas or on minibus rides through the remote 
areas of Lesotho, I came across small Chinese-owned shops or supermarkets with names like 
“Friendly Supermarket” or “Happy Fashion Store“. In fact, small-scale business ventures of 
Chinese migrants have become a common feature of Lesotho’s urban and rural settings. 
While it is generally accepted that Chinese migrants “are changing the social and economic 
landscape of many African countries” (Alden and Large, 2010:34), there is still relatively little 
known about how exactly these migrants reproduce and alter businesses and employment 
opportunities in African countries in general, and in Lesotho in particular. Holding that the 
topic is important and fascinating, I decided to write my master thesis about the economic 
activities of Chinese migrants in Lesotho. In this introductory chapter I provide a detailed 
description of the background of my thesis, its problem statement, aim and objectives, its 
research questions, methodology, scope and limitations, as well as an outline of the 
remainder of the thesis. 
1.1 Background 
For centuries, Chinese people have voluntarily or involuntarily decided to leave their country 
to seek their fortunes elsewhere (Wang, 1993; Hamilton, 1999). Although some have 
returned to their homeland, many remained in the new countries, often forming large 
Chinese communities. These communities were established and maintained by Chinese 
networks, i.e. “an invisible empire that knows no borders” (Callahan, 2003:482). The local 
communities in turn are part of a larger “fluid and flexible global network” (Liu, 2006:150). 
Historically speaking Chinese migration followed four different migration patterns: (i) the 
trade pattern1, which is characterized by “merchants and artisans and, their colleagues and 
members of their extended families, going abroad and eventually setting up businesses 
                                                          
1 In Mandarin: 华商 huashang. 
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(Poston et al., 1994:631); (ii) the coolie pattern2, involved short term “contract laborers who 
returned to China after their contract came to an end” (Poston et al., 1994:632); (iii) the 
sojourner pattern3, which “included all types of migrants, and was strongly comprised of 
well-educated professionals” (Poston et al., 1994:632); and (iv) the migration of persons of 
Chinese decent who were migrating from “one foreign country to another foreign country” 
(Poston et al., 1994:632). 
While many of the early Chinese migrants had the image of “small shopkeepers and clannish 
ethnic minorities” (Mckeown, 2009:317), they are now increasingly considered as 
“astronauts” (Mckeown, 2009:317), who are “in constant movement around the globe, 
seeking out property, education, citizenship, and market opportunities in myriad nations, 
feeling comfortable anywhere as long as it is near an airport” (Mckeown, 2009:317). 
Traditionally, Chinese migrant communities could be found in South East Asia, North America 
and Europe (Wang, 1993; Hamilton, 1999; Callahan, 2003; Liu, 2006; Cheung, 2005; Ahlstrom 
et al., 2010). However, by the end of the 20th Century, Chinese migrant communities “have 
become both much larger and ethnically more diverse than in the past, while areas―or even 
whole continents such as Africa―that previously had only few Chinese quite suddenly 
became home to vibrant Chinese communities” (Pieke, 2004:5). 
The origins of the first Chinese to arrive to Africa can be traced back to the 17th century (Park, 
2009:2). While Chinese migration to Africa displays characteristics of all four migration 
patterns, the two most pattern were the trade and coolie migration pattern. For example, 
Park (2009:2) points out that there have always been some Chinese who arrived as traders to 
open up small shops. Nevertheless, the majority of the early Chinese migrants followed the 
coolie migration pattern: they came as part and parcel of government projects. e.g. as 
indentured labor under the British Colonial regime, as technical specialists under Mao, and 
recently as skilled labor for various development projects under the Sino-African cooperation 
theme (Park, 2009:2f.). 
In the 21th century, Chinese migration to African countries has undergone significant changes 
both in terms of quantity and purpose of migration. Government project workers no longer 
account for the single, most dominant source of migrants (Mung, 2009:97). They are 
increasingly replaced by individuals, families and other networks who migrate to African 
countries to engage in a broad range of economic activities (Park, 2009:5; Mung, 2009:95), 
These activities range from small-scale farming, petty trade, and small-scale businesses to 
large scale direct investment (Broadman, 2007; Song, 2011). As a result, Chinese migrants 
have become a highly visible part of people’s everyday’s life in countries like Angola (Center 
                                                          
2 In Mandarin: 华工 huagong. 
3 In Mandarin: 华侨 huaqiao. 
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for Chinese Studies, 2008; McNamee et al., 2012), Cape Verde (Haugen and Carlin, 2005; 
Carlin, 2009), Ghana (Center for Chinese Studies, 2009; Giese and Thiel, 2012), Lesotho (The 
Economist, 2010; Park, 2009; Tanga, 2009; McNamee et al., 2012), Namibia (Dobler, 2009), 
Nigeria (Center for Chinese Studies, 2008), South Africa (Park, 2009), Sudan (Center for 
Chinese Studies, 2008), Zambia (Center for Chinese Studies, 2008), and Zimbabwe (Center for 
Chinese Studies, 2008; Brautigam, 2009; Park, 2009). 
With a few exceptions (see e.g. Haugen and Carlin, 2006 Park 2009; Park, 2010; McNamee et 
al., 2012), most research on Chinese migrants in Africa has concentrated on the economically 
and geopolitically “important” countries like Angola, Ghana, South Africa and Zambia. In 
addition, research has tended to focus on the study of single cities. This in turn makes intra- 
and interstate comparisons difficult and limits―to a certain extent―the explanatory power 
regarding the impact of Chinese economic activities on business and employment 
opportunities in the respective countries. More importantly, small African countries like 
Lesotho have attracted little attention. Yet, as already indicated above, it is exactly in 
countries like Lesotho that Chinese migrants and their businesses have expanded even into 
the most remote and rural areas. Considering the country’s size, its small population, its 
strong dependency on one industry sector (i.e. textile and garment industry), its reliance on 
remittances, and its considerably large Chinese population - estimates ranging from 5,000 
(Park, 2009:4) to 10,000 (unofficial estimates) - , Lesotho provides an excellent case to study 
the impact of Chinese migrants’ economic activities on business and employment 
opportunities across a broader range of cities. 
1.2 Problem statement 
Since 2002, Lesotho has experienced a continuous influx of Chinese migrants who set up 
small wholesale or retail businesses or seek short-term employment in one of the Chinese-
run businesses (Park, 2009; SAMP, 2010; The Economist, 2010; McNamee, 2012). These 
developments have not gone unnoticed among Basotho4, and many worry that the presence 
of Chinese migrants will have negative consequences for the country and its people (IRIN, 
2008:2; The Lesotho Times, 2011:1). Basotho, who are engaged in the small-scale wholesale 
and retail sector, view Chinese migrants as biggest source of competition and as an 
immediate danger for their business prospects (Tanga, 2009:113; SAMP, 2010:67). Basotho 
employees likewise complain about the growing numbers of Chinese working in “China 
shops”, and the huge status and wage differences between Basotho and Chinese employees 
(Tanga, 2009:113). The perception that Chinese sell low quality and expired goods is equally 
wide held (Maama, 2012a:1). However, Chinese migrants in Lesotho frequently disagree with 
                                                          
4 Although the name of the country is Lesotho, its people are called Basotho (Mosotho is the singular). 
The language is Sesotho.  
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this assessment. They feel that they are doing Basotho people a favor, not only by selling 
“cheap and beautiful”5 products, but also by employing Basotho (Tanga, 2009:114). Many of 
these migrants complain about the hostility of local people and about a lack of safety (IRIN, 
2008:2; McNamee et al., 2012:34). Since several Chinese migrants have been killed during 
robberies or have been victims of other assaults6 (Maama, 2010:1; Maama, 2012a:1; Maama, 
2012c:1), these claims are not totally ill-founded. 
The perceptions of Basotho and Chinese in Lesotho are in line with findings from the above 
mentioned studies on Chinese migrants in African countries. In these studies, Chinese 
migrants are assessed as a phenomenon which has a negative, at best neutral influence on the 
country’s business and employment opportunities (Alden and Large, 2011:34). Underlying 
these assessments are at least four implicit assumptions. The first assumption is that there 
are “simply” too many Chinese migrants in these countries and that the countries cannot 
absorb them without harming the local population (Mohan, 2009:6). Building on the fact that 
more and more Chinese are opening businesses and are bringing their own Chinese 
employees, the second assumption asserts that Chinese migrants are providing few business 
and employment opportunities for locals (Haugen and Carling, 2005:650; Mohan, 2009:16 
Giese and Thiel, 2012:5). Turning to Chinese products, the third assumption is that Chinese 
migrants are flooding African markets with cheap, low quality products, and are harming or 
even destroying business opportunities for locals (McNamee et al., 2012:24; Mohan, 
2009:16f.). Finally, the fourth and probably most important assumption is that Chinese 
migrants are flexible and feel no obligations towards any particular country (apart from 
China), thus are at any time ready to relocate to the country where they can gain most 
(Haugen and Carling, 2005:447). 
While these assumptions tell us something about the perceived reality, it remains 
questionable whether the directly or indirectly implied casual relation between “Chinese 
migrants” and the perceived deterioration of the business or employment opportunities in 
Lesotho and other African countries can indeed be established. Thus far, we have little 
reliable data on which basis we could draw meaningful conclusions about the influence of 
Chinese migrants in African countries, and especially in Lesotho. On the one hand, local 
ministries have only partially monitored the influx and economic activities of Chinese 
migrants. On the other hand, existing academic research has likewise made little attempts to 
                                                          
5
 Cheap and good products: 价廉物美 jialian wumei. 
6 This includes also police violence against Chinese migrants. On 19 March 2012, a Chinese migrant 
filed a complaint with the High Court of Lesotho claiming that he had been “arrested by the police with 
respect to a charge […], detained in custody and tortured with suffocation, beatings and other 
‘atrocities’ during which he fainted several times and in which case he would be revived by being 
splashed with water all over his body.” (High Court of Lesotho, 2012a:2). 
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systematically collect data on the demographics, migration patterns, lives in the host 
community and economic activities of Chinese migrants. 
Related to the problem of lacking data on Chinese migrants in Lesotho is the broader problem 
of lacking attempts to connect the phenomenon of Chinese migrants in Africa to existing 
migration theories or concepts. The reasons for this are twofold: first, Sino-African relations 
are a relatively young research field, and it is only since 2006, the year of the China-Africa 
Summit7, that we can speak of a notable academic interest in this topic. The early works were 
pioneered mostly by economists like Broadman (2007), and development scholars such as 
Kaplinsky et al. (2007), which focused mainly on macro-level developments (i.e. Chinese FDI 
and aid), but did not specifically focus on micro-level developments (i.e. Chinese migration). 
As a result, Chinese migration tended to be treated as a natural, albeit worrisome, side 
product of growing flows of Chinese aid, foreign direct investment and trade (Goldstein et al., 
2006; Tull, 2006; Broadman, 2007; Kaplinsky et al., 2007; Asche and Schüller, 2008), which 
required no further theorizing or embedding into existing migration concepts such as 
migration systems, migration configurations and migrant economy. Second, Chinese 
migration to Africa does not (yet) have an established place on the migration research agenda. 
Research on migration still tends to focus on explaining South-North migration, and its 
implications for the welfare states of the North (Castles and Miller, 2009:50). Likewise the 
focus of literature on Chinese migration is largely on Chinese migration to America (i.e. Voss, 
2005; Wickberg, 2007), Australia (i.e. Sun, 2005; Bagnall, 2011) and Europe (i.e. Pieke et al., 
2004; Pieke, 2004a; Pieke, 2004b; Nyíri, 2005; Wu and Sheehan, 2011). Interestingly, despite 
the growing importance of South-South migration (Ratha and Shaw, 2007:5), Chinese 
migration to Africa is rarely considered within this context. For example, among Ratha and 
Shaw’s “Top 20 Migration Corridors” (2007:8), the most important cases of South-South 
migration were migration between (i) Bangladesh-India, (ii) Afghanistan-Iran and (iii) 
Pakistan-India (Ratha and Shaw, 2007:8). 
Given the paucity of reliable data on Chinese migrants’ demographics, migration patterns, 
migrants’ lives in the host community, and economic activities in Lesotho, as well as the 
lacking connection between Chinese migration to Lesotho and existing migration concepts, 
we currently still lack both the data and theoretical foundation on which it would be possible 
to draw meaningful conclusions about the relationship between Chinese migrants’ economic 
activities and the reproduction and altering of business and employment opportunities in 
Lesotho. 
                                                          
7
 The China-Africa summit marked for many Western observers a symbolic turning point in China’s 
engagement in Africa: for the “first” time China showed the rest of the world that it was willing to be a 
major player in Africa. 
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1.3 Aim and objectives 
Considering that the stream of Chinese migrants to Lesotho is likely to continue, it is 
important to provide a more comprehensive explanation of direction, dynamics and impact of 
Chinese migration to Lesotho. From my point of view, such an explanation has to be built on 
actual data gathered from both, Chinese migrants and local ministries in Lesotho, as well as 
on an adequate theoretical foundation. The objectives of this thesis were therefore: 
1. To collect and analyze data on Chinese migrants’ demographic characteristics, 
migration patterns, their image of Lesotho as well as their economic activities. 
2. To demonstrate how Chinese migration to Lesotho is the result of a complex interplay 
of actor-level and structural factors. 
3. To explore how the Chinese migrant economy in Lesotho reproduces and alters 
business and employment opportunities in Lesotho. 
1.4 Research questions 
To achieve the above outlined aims and objectives, I developed a set of main and sub-
research questions (see below). These questions are grounded in interdisciplinary migration 
approaches, and built on three specific concepts from migration studies: migration systems, 
migration configuration and migrant economy8 (for more details see Chapter 2).  
1. Direction of migration: the role of migration systems for facilitating Chinese migration 
to Lesotho. 
1.1 Which historical links exist between China and Lesotho that facilitated the 
creation of the Sino-Basotho migration system? 
1.2 How did the Sino-Basotho migration system develop over time? 
2. Intra-migration system dynamics: the role of migration configurations for sustaining 
Chinese migration to Lesotho. 
2.1 What do the demographic characteristics of Chinese migrants in Lesotho tell us 
about the Chinese migration configuration? 
2.2 What do migration patterns of Chinese migrants in Lesotho tell us about the 
Chinese migration configuration? 
2.3 What do the problem solving strategies of Chinese migrants in Lesotho tell us 
about the Chinese migration configuration? 
3. Impact of migration: the role of the Chinese migrant economy for reproducing and 
altering employment and business opportunities in Lesotho. 
3.1. How do the economic activities of Chinese migrants in Lesotho reproduce 
employment opportunities in Lesotho? 
                                                          
8 I also employ insights from the New Chinese Migration Order (Pieke, 2007:83), which is closely 
connected to the three concepts of migration system, migration configuration and migrant economy. 
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3.2. How do the economic activities of Chinese migrants in Lesotho reproduce 
business opportunities in Lesotho? 
3.3. How do the economic activities of Chinese migrants in Lesotho alter employment 
opportunities in Lesotho? 
3.4. How do the economic activities of Chinese migrants in Lesotho alter business 
opportunities in Lesotho? 
1.5 Methodology 
To answer the above outlined research questions, I used both primary and secondary data. I 
collected primary data during two research trips to Lesotho in November 2011 and February 
2012. During these, I conducted a survey among 86 Chinese migrants in seven towns, 
interviewed eight stakeholders from local ministries in Lesotho, and had the opportunity to 
access data from Bureau of Statistics (BoS), the Ministry of Labor (MoL), the Ministry of Trade, 
Industry, Cooperatives and Marketing (MTICM), and the One Stop Business Facilitating 
Center (OSBFC). For the survey I developed a questionnaire (see attachments A1-A2). The 
survey was in Mandarin (Chinese), and I tested it in advance in Stellenbosch and Cape Town, 
South Africa. By conducting the survey and the interviews with Chinese migrants in Mandarin 
the possibilities for misunderstandings were significantly reduced. By using the native 
language of migrants communication barriers were lower and the readiness of the migrants 
to participate in the survey increased. Since the survey contained confidential information, 
such as the participant’s income, the survey was kept anonymous. For the qualitative 
interviews I developed interview guidelines. I conducted both the survey and the interviews 
myself.  
Building on assumptions and findings of earlier studies (Haugen and Carlin, 2006; Dobler, 
2009; Mohan, 2009; Park, 2009; Park 2010), two sets of questionnaires were developed. The 
first set (Category 1) was given to all those migrants who considered themselves as the boss9 
of a business, or at least did not consider themselves as “simply” working there10. The second 
set (Category 2) was given to all those migrants who considered themselves as working in the 
businesses (see footnote 10), or those who directly affirmed that they were personnel or 
staff11. The first two sections of the two questionnaires contained similar questions about 
demographics characteristics, migration patterns, image of Lesotho and problem solving 
strategies. However, they differed slightly in the questions about economic activities. For 
example, Category 1 included questions about the number of businesses owned, the wage 
level of Basotho, and income of the business owner. Category 2 included questions about 
migrants’ living costs, and the location of their boss. 
                                                          
9 Boss: 老板 laoban. 
10 Working(there): 打工 dagong. 
11 I am an employee: 我是职工 wo shi zhigong. 
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While Category 2 at least theoretically implies that the respective migrants were “employed”, 
Category 1 does not necessarily imply that migrants were self-employed. After all, migrants 
from Category 1 can be employed or self-employed. Although this complicates a clear 
distinction between “employed” and “self-employed” migrants, the two categories were 
chosen in this way because the “practical” ownership structure of many businesses is often 
fuzzy: close family members of a shopkeeper might neither neatly fit categories like 
“employed” or “self-employed”. Also, a shop might not officially be owned by a certain person, 
but practically be run on own or partly own account. Considering this, the distinction 
between Category 1 and Category 2 was an attempt to take into account the complexity of the 
businesses and social positions of participants rather than solely their positions de jure. 
Two things are important to note here. First of all, my approach to gather information on 
Chinese migrants in Lesotho differs from earlier research in that I decided to employ a 
standardized questionnaire instead of in-depth interviews12. This allowed me to have a 
higher degree of comparability of answers as well as to have a greater number of 
participants13. Since I conducted the survey myself, there was still room for participants to 
share their personal views and experiences, i.e. to gather information about issues which 
were too complex to be included in the standardized questionnaire. Moreover, this method 
allowed me to cover a larger number of towns. Second, the final number of participants in the 
survey was 86. This is considerably more than the 22 interviews McNamee et al. (2012) 
conducted. However, with the number of Chinese migrants in Lesotho estimated to be around 
5,000 to 10,000 people, my survey is not representative of Chinese migrants in Lesotho (i.e. 
only approximately one and two percent coverage). Nevertheless, it is still possible to deduce 
indications about broader trends and phenomena of Chinese migrants in Lesotho, which 
future research can further specify. 
The guidelines for the interviews with the stakeholder from local ministries were divided 
into six thematic parts: (i) profile of Chinese in Lesotho, (ii) migration patterns of Chinese in 
Lesotho, (iii) relation of Chinese with their host community, (iv) impact of the Chinese on 
local economy, (v) impact of Chinese migrants on employment opportunities, and (vi) 
regulatory response to the activities of Chinese in Lesotho. The interviews were conducted in 
English and in one case in German. Depending on the professional background of the 
interviewee, priorities for the interview were set and key questions were sent out in advance 
in order to collect more detailed information on certain topics. In this thesis, parts of the 
                                                          
12 For example, Park (2010) and McNamee et al. (2012) used in-depth interviews as the primary 
method to collect information. 
13
 Park and her research team conducted “thirty in-depth interviews, fourteen shorter interviews, and 
several key informant interviews in Johannesburg, as well as selected places in Free State and Lesotho 
throughout a period of three years” (Park, 2010:461). 
18 
 
interviews are used to indicate if and how Chinese migrants’ economic activities reproduce or 
alter businesses and employment opportunities in Lesotho. 
To provide a better theoretical foundation for understanding the relationship between the 
economic activities of Chinese migrants and the reproduction and altering of business and 
employment opportunities, I developed a five stage model of migration, which combines both 
actor-level and structural elements (see Section 2.3). In doing so, it tries to capture some of 
the key dynamics of migration in general and Chinese migration to Lesotho in particular. The 
model builds on four key concepts from interdisciplinary migration studies: migration system, 
migration configuration, migrant economy and new Chinese migration order. I chose these 
concepts because migration systems are useful for describing the context in which migration 
takes places and develops. Since migration systems tend to focus on larger structures and 
process, the concept of migration configuration was employed to supplement the broad 
insights derived from migration systems (Pieke, 2004:20). To provide a theoretical 
background for dealing with a central phenomenon of migration and the prime concern of my 
thesis, i.e. the dynamics and influence of migrants’ economic activities, I included the concept 
of migrant economy, i.e. the sum of all economic activities of migrants and migrant networks 
in a particular migration system (Author’s own definition). By including migration 
configurations and migrant economy, it is possible to highlight intra-migration system 
differences and ways in which Chinese migrants’ economic activities reproduced or altered 
business and employment opportunities in Lesotho. Together with the model, they provide a 
theoretical foundation in turn will be important for understanding the context of Chinese 
migrants’ economic activities (see Section 2.3).  
1.6 Scope & limitations 
The survey was limited to seven cities in Lesotho (Butha Buthe, Mafeteng, Maputsoe, Maseru, 
Mokhotlong, Roma and Teyateyaneng). A total of 86 questionnaires was collected in Lesotho 
during November 2011 and February 2012. Additional data on Chinese migrants in Lesotho 
was obtained during personal visits to different ministries (see 1.5), as well as from 
qualitative interviews with representatives of the Delegation of the European Union, 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für International Zusammenarbeit14 (GIZ), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
MoL, MTICM, and the Lesotho Business Development Project in Lesotho. The Chinese 
Embassy and the Chinese Ministry of Trade and Commerce (MOFCOM) in Lesotho were 
inquired, but refused to give interviews or to answer questions in written form. Although the 
local ministries in Lesotho were well aware of the growing presence of Chinese migrants and 
businesses, it was difficult to obtain specific data on Chinese and their activities in Lesotho. 
                                                          
14  GIZ, formerly Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), is the German 
development agency. Since there is no official translation of their name (according to their website) I 
only provide the German name. 
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For example, the Bureau of Statistics conducts a quarterly survey on employment, wages and 
profits in the manufacturing sector15, but does not conduct a similar survey for the wholesale 
and retail sector. A similar situation is found for the registration of new enterprises. While 
there are clear procedures, records are only available for selected years, thus long-term 
changes in type and number of Chinese businesses cannot be easily deduced. Finally, there is 
no coherent database on the numbers and nationality of foreigners in Lesotho. The 
applications are stored only manually in an archive and it was not possible to get reliable 
numbers from the Ministry of Home Affairs. 
1.7 Outline 
The remainder of my thesis is structured as followed: in the second chapter, I will outline the 
key concepts and assumptions, which together constitute the basis for my five stage model of 
migration as well as the theoretical foundation for the subsequent chapters. In the third 
chapter, I will apply this model to Chinese migration to Lesotho and highlight how a 
configuration of historical links between China, Taiwan and Lesotho paved the way for the 
development of the Sino-Basotho migration system and defined key structural dynamics 
within this particular migration system. I then move on to describe two migration 
configurations (i.e. non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migration configuration) within the Sino-
Basotho migration system in the fourth chapter. This description is based on the findings of 
my survey among Chinese migrants in Lesotho. The fifth chapter looks at the economic 
activities of Chinese migrants in Lesotho and how they reproduce or alter existing business 
and employment opportunities. The sixth and final chapter provides a detailed summary and 
discussion of the main findings. 
2. Theoretical considerations: implications for analyzing Chinese 
migration to Lesotho  
Migration is a complex process and phenomenon that is difficult to mold into a single static 
framework or model. Believing that it is nonetheless useful to capture some of the aspects 
and dynamics of migration in an abstract, more generalized manner, I chose to design a five 
stage model to describe the development and dynamics of migration. The model combines 
structural (i.e. migration system and configuration) and actor aspects (i.e. migrants and 
migrant networks), and focuses primarily on economic aspects. I start by providing a brief 
overview of the four key concepts (i.e. migration system, migration configuration, migrant 
economy and the new Chinese migration order) that form an important part of the five stage 
model. This is followed by a summary of the basic assumptions about the relationship 
between actors and structures in general, and migrants and structures in particular. Finally, I 
                                                          
15
 Unfortunately, the survey does not make a distinction between foreign owned operated and local 
enterprises. This in turn makes it difficult to estimate the aggregated effect of Chinese enterprises in 
Lesotho. 
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outline the five-stage model of migration, which will guide my analysis of the Sino-Basotho 
migration system (see Chapter 3). It should be noted that my aim is not to develop a general 
theory of migration. Rather, my aim is to outline analytical tools, which define a set of key 
concepts and mechanisms that can be applied to the study of particular migration systems, 
and allow for better understanding of key dynamics of migration (especially in the economic 
realm) by combining structural and individual factors. 
2.1 Key concepts 
In the last twenty years migration studies have moved away from strictly employing 
economic and historical-structural approaches to increasingly employing interdisciplinary 
approaches. This development is reflected in a growing number of papers that merge 
different theoretical approaches to arrive at a more holistic explanation for particular 
migration flows (Castles & Miller, 2009:27)16. But this development is also reflected in a 
whole array of concepts designed to supplement existing theories. These concepts include, 
for example, migration systems (Fawcett, 1989; Kritz et.al 1992, Bakewell & Haas, 2011), 
migration networks (Massey, 1987; Boyd, 1989), transnationalism (Glick et al., 1994; Portes, 
1999; Faist, 2000), and immigrant entrepreneurship (Light et al., 1989; Portes et al., 2002). 
Despite their specific nature, these new approaches and concepts are united by the desire to 
overcome the classical division between those researchers that focus on the “determinants, 
processes and patterns of migration” (Castles & Miller, 2009:20), and those that focus “on 
ways in which migrants become incorporated into the receiving societies” (Castles & Miller, 
2009:20). Instead of a single-level (i.e. macro, meso or micro level) analysis, the 
interdisciplinary analysis tries to provide an integrated, multi-level analysis of migratory 
movements and phenomena. 
Believing that this approach provides a fruitful avenue to study Chinese migration in Lesotho, 
I selected four concepts from interdisciplinary migration literature, i.e. migration systems, 
migration configuration, migrant economy and the new Chinese migration order. Despite 
some criticism17, migration system offers a good starting point for understanding migration 
contexts and the development of specific migration flows. It has the advantage of providing a 
contextual, historically informed framework for studying particular flows of migrants, 
information, goods and ideas (Boyd, 1989:642; De Haas, 2010:1593). Since migration 
systems tend to focus on larger structures and process, migration configuration is a good 
concept to supplement the broad insights derived from migration systems (Pieke, 2004:20). 
                                                          
16
 Examples include the merging of network approaches and systems approaches (Fawcett, 1989; 
Massey, 1994), and the inclusion of social and cultural capital (Massey, 1987; Faist, 2000; Haug, 2000). 
17
 Like other interdisciplinary approaches, migration system approaches have been criticized for being 
mainly “heuristic tools” (Haug, 2000:45). This criticism is not completely ill-founded. The majority still 
lack well-worked out hypotheses about the causal relationship between its elements (Faist, 2000). 
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By focusing on particular local places, intra-migration-system differences can be identified. 
This in turn is important because the country-level perspective frequently overlooks regional 
and spatial differences, and thus suggests that all inhabitants of a particular country have an 
equal share in the construction and maintenance of a particular migration system. To provide 
a theoretical background for dealing with a central phenomenon of migration and prime 
concern of my thesis, i.e. the dynamics and influence of migrants’ economic activities, I chose 
to include the concept of migrant economy. A common theme emerging from the first three 
concepts is that migratory flows and phenomena are strongly influenced by the particular 
context in which they developed. Therefore I included a brief review of changes of in Chinese 
migration during the last two decades, which Pieke (2007:83) termed the “new Chinese 
migration order”. This concept highlights a set of characteristics, which are not necessarily 
unique to Chinese migration, but are nevertheless important for understanding the 
development of the Sino-Basotho migration system. 
2.1.1 Migration systems 
The concept of migration system has its origin in Mabogunje’s (1970) seminal-work on rural-
urban migration in Africa, which in turn draws on insights from general social theory 
(Bakewell, 2011:7). His theoretical considerations were extended to international migration, 
by amongst others, Portes and Brocz (1989), Fawcett (1989) and Kritz et al. (1992). Together, 
they built the foundation for our current understanding of migration systems. Following this 
theory, a migration system is defined as “two or more countries linked together by flows of 
people, goods and information” (Castles and Miller, 2009:28). Unlike earlier Push-Pull-Factor 
models, migration systems theory provides a system-level explanation of migratory 
movements and phenomena by emphasizing the importance of the migration system as 
providing the context of actual movements, and influencing migrants’ decisions to move or to 
stay (Faist, 2000:51). 
Migration systems are broadly speaking “a product of past historical development” (Portes 
and Brocz, 1989:626). Since these developments are reflected in “linkages between countries 
other than people, such as trade and security alliances, colonial ties, and flows of goods, 
services, information and ideas” (Portes and Walton, 1981 cited in Faist, 2000:51) that often 
predate actual migration flows (Faist, 2000:51), historical links form the antecedent 
condition of migration systems. The internal structure of migration system is constituted by 
both structural and individual elements (Castles and Miller, 2009:28). Structural elements 
comprise the political, economic, social and demographic context of the involved countries, 
and linkages between them (Kritz et al., 1992). Individual elements refer to individual and 
collective actors, i.e. individual migrants, groups of migrants, and networks (Castles and 
Miller, 2009:28). Migrants are―broadly speaking―people who “transfer themselves and their 
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labor from one place to another” (Pieke et al., 2004:18). Networks are “sets of interpersonal 
ties that connect migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas 
through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin” (Massey et al., 1993:448). 
Within a migration system, migration networks fulfill two important functions: they “lower 
the costs and risks of movement” (Massey et al., 1993:448), and they “increase the expected 
net returns to migration” (Massey et al., 1993:448). 
The interaction of structures and actors in general, and the interaction of feedback 
mechanisms in particular, explain why migration systems are not static, but highly dynamic. 
Feedback mechanisms can be divided into (i) contextual and (ii) endogenous feedback 
mechanisms (De Haas, 2010:4). Endogenous feedback mechanisms refer to those 
mechanisms which stem from “the migration process itself” (De Haas, 2010:4), and include 
“intermediate, self-sustaining structures largely created or reinforced by migration processes 
themselves” (De Haas, 2010:4). Contextual feedback mechanisms are defined as those 
mechanisms which “affect changes in the migration pattern” (De Haas, 2010:5) by 
transforming “the broader social, cultural and economic contexts in sending and receiving 
communities and societies” (De Haas, 2010:4). Feedbacks can be either positive or negative 
(Mabogunje, 1970:12). In this context, positive means migration facilitating, and negative 
migration-undermining feedback mechanisms (Mabogunje, 1970:12). Examples of feedback 
mechanisms include the transfer of remittances, ideas, development of networks, migrant 
industry, but also mass migration and changes in the structure of country of origin or 
destination (De Haas, 2010:1952). In addition, transnational and global processes influence 
the dynamics and development of a particular migration system because (i) “immigration like 
other international processes does not so much take place between compartmentalized 
national units as within an overarching system” (Portes and Brocz, 1989:626), and (ii) 
“nation-states play an important, but not exclusive role within this system which includes the 
activities of multiplicity of private actors” (Portes and Brocz, 1989:626).  
2.1.2 Migration configuration 
Migration configuration is a particular useful, yet relatively new concept. It was first 
introduced by Pieke et al. (2004:19f.) and denotes “connections between the total sum of 
social institutions and practices in areas of origin, transit and destination that produce and 
sustain a particular flow of migrants” (Pieke et al., 2004:19). Like transnational spaces or 
fields, which “consist of combinations of social and symbolic ties and their contents, positions 
in networks and organizations, and networks of organizations that cut across the borders of 
at least two national states” (Pieke et al., 2004:19), migration configuration constitute “a field 
of interaction that is much more than just people living and moving between locations” (Pieke 
et al., 2004:19). Similar to migration systems, a migration configuration is assumed to be 
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embedded into a particular environment, and should therefore be “understood as an aspect 
of other institutions and communities, businesses and employment strategies, migration 
flows and discourses of exclusion and inclusion” (Pieke et al., 2004:19). 
However, a migration configuration in itself does not constitute a migration system, since it 
focuses on connections between particular local places (i.e. cities, villages) that are embedded 
into larger structures (i.e. migration systems). Although a migration configuration includes 
interactions in country of origin, transit and destination (i.e. includes transnational aspects), 
it is not just a special kind of transnational space or field. Transnational formations are 
“located in between the life-world of personal interactions, on the one hand, and the 
functional systems of differentiated spheres, such as the economy, polity, law, science and 
religion” (Faist, 2010:1673). Migration configuration on the other hand looks at connections 
between particular areas of origin and destination, and is primarily concerned with 
explaining the sustaining and creation of particular migration flows. Transnational 
interactions may constitute one, but not the only, part of these connections. 
2.1.3 Migrant economy 
The migrant economy is a “regime of accumulation” (Létourneau, 1994:63), which is directly 
or indirectly linked to the “internationalized process of capital reproduction” (Létourneau, 
1994:63). In this thesis, the migrant economy is defined as the sum of all economic activities 
of migrants and migrant networks in a particular migration system. The concept of migrant 
economy differs from the previous two concepts in that it is not a concept which is associated 
with a particular theory or theoretical approach. Alternative concepts to tackle this central 
phenomenon are “immigrant or ethnic economy” (Light, 1974; Waldinger, 1986; Light et. al,. 
1989,; Model, 1997; Light et al, 1999), “ethnic niches” (Zhou, 1992; Waldinger, 1996; Logan 
and Alba, 1999) and “immigrant entrepreneurship” (Light et al, 1989; Zhou, 2004). However, 
I would argue that the term “migrant economy” is better suited for grasping the complexities 
of the sum of migrants’ economy activities. Immigrant economy frequently limits its analysis 
to the destination country and somewhat neglects the connection between countries of origin, 
transit and destination. Ethnic economy likewise tends to focuses mainly on ethnic or cultural 
aspects (Waldinger, 2004:51). Immigrant entrepreneurship may provide important insights 
of why particular groups of migrants are more successful in creating a migrant economy. 
However, it somewhat neglects the role of structural constraints and opportunities.  
On a practical level, the migrant economy includes the creation of migrant businesses (Light 
et al, 1989:3), of self-employment, and employment opportunities for co-ethnics (Light et al, 
1989:3), as well as the creation of demand and supply for particular ethnic goods. Moreover, 
the migrant economy can supplement “the earnings opportunities available in the general 
labor market” (Light et al, 1989:3). According to Logan et al. (2003:347), four economic 
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sectors can be identified within the migrant economy in the country of immigration: (i) 
employment niche, (ii) enclave economy, (iii) entrepreneurial niche, and (iv) non-ethnic 
sectors. The migrant economy, like the national economy, is about supply and demand, and 
the creation of employment and business opportunities. What distinguishes the migrant 
economy from the national economy is that processes of reproduction of migrant capital are 
frequently not confined to a particular geographic location because they are parts of migrants’ 
larger risk-diversification strategies (Létourneau, 1994:64). This means that the focus of 
analysis shifts from the “economic relationships among nations” (Létourneau, 1994:63) to 
economic relationships among particular migrants and networks. 
The migrant economy in general, and migrants and their networks in particular play an 
important role for overcoming economic saturation and similar situations of structural 
constraints at both the country of origin and destination (Light et al., 1989:3). For example, 
Light et al. (1989:3) point out that migrants may overcome economic saturation at country of 
destination by shifting “capital from the non-immigrant entrepreneurs to immigrant-
receiving locality”, and by the “use of capital to create employment and business 
opportunities for the migrants” (Light et al., 1989:3). This means that migrants and migrant 
networks, through the migrant economy, may not only reproduce the local structures, but 
also modify and transform them. The modification of the economy of the host country has in 
turn important ramifications for the host community. 
While the migrant economy offers migrants a number of opportunities, it can at the same 
time curtail migrants’ individual scope of action (Light et al, 1989:2). When occupying 
particular niches of the economy of the country of origin or destination, migrant businesses 
may have difficulties to compete with already existing businesses over scare resources 
(Waldinger, 1996 cited in Logan and Alba, 2003:345). Also, migrant economies tend to 
enforce a dual-labor-market, particularly in developed countries (Haug, 2000:24), i.e. one 
sector for highly paid locals and one for low-paid migrants. This in turn means that the 
situation of migrants, regardless of having employment, may not improve dramatically. 
Another important aspect of the migrant economy stems from the double embeddedness of 
the economic, but also political and social actions (Baker and Faulkner, 2009). Double 
embeddedness “denotes the two-sided nature of communities, markets, and organizations—
where economic, political, and social actions are embedded in social structure and culture” 
(Baker and Faulkner, 2009: 1536). Depending on the interplay of structural and cultural 
embeddedness in a particular country, four macro states of double embeddedness can be 
identified: (i) “ a society united by social networks and by common values” (Baker and 
Faulkner, 2009:1538); (ii) “a multicultural society united by social networks” (Baker and 
Faulkner, 2009:1539); (iii) “society with fragmented networks but united by common values” 
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(Baker and Faulkner, 2009:1539) and (iv) “a society divided by networks and by values” 
(Baker and Faulkner, 2009:1540). This means that the migrant economy is not only shaped 
by market dynamics, but also by complex interactions between migrants, actors from their 
host community and their country of origin (Baker and Faulkner, 2009). Therefore, the 
overall effect of the creation of a migrant economy will vary across different migration 
systems and configurations as well as across time (i.e. from one generation of migrants to the 
next), and might not depend entirely on the conditions of the host economy. 
2.1.4 New Chinese migration order 
The new Chinese migration order (Pieke, 2007) is closely related to the previous three 
concepts, and directly linked to my analysis of Chinese migration to Lesotho. The new 
Chinese migration order refers to systematic changes in “types, origins and destination of 
Chinese migration” (Pieke, 2007:85) from the 1990s on. It stems from China’s accelerated 
economic growth and integration into the capitalist world market (Pieke, 2007:84). 
According to Pieke, (2006:85), the new Chinese migration order is characterized by a high 
degree of (i) commercialization of emigration, (ii) involvement of the local governments, and 
(iii) the rise and diversification of education and professional migration. I would add a high 
degree of transnational connectedness as a fourth characteristic to the list. 
The commercialization of emigration manifests itself in the development of a migration 
industry that legally or illegally offers migration related services (Pieke, 2007:86). Unlike 
earlier generations of Chinese migrants, potential migrants no longer have to rely on 
established overseas ties with family and kin. This means that outward migration has become 
an option for a much broader range of people (Pieke, 2007:86). Yet, with growing demand for 
these services, outward migration “has increasingly become a scarce commodity for sale in 
the market-place” (Pieke, 2007:85). In light of the growing competition, the migration 
industry has increased prices. At the same time it diversified its portfolio of possible 
migration destinations. Unfortunately, this increased competition also led to an increase in 
illegal activities of both migrants and migrant industry (Pieke et al., 2004:94f.; Pieke, 
2007:84;). These illegal activities range from acquiring false documents and buying visas, to 
forced human trafficking (Pieke et al., 2004:94). 
Since the benefits from the economic reforms in China were unevenly distributed (Goodman, 
2004:17) a number of local governments started to directly or indirectly support or facilitate 
migration (Pieke, 2007:85; Chen and Jian, 2009:3ff.). Local government initiatives have to be 
seen against the larger political incentive structure of China. From the beginning of the 
economic reforms, economic development became an important directive for local party 
leaders. Moreover, it became the benchmark for evaluating the success of local party leaders, 
and thus having a direct impact on career chances (Chen, 2005:422). Where the outlook for 
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local economic development was bleak, local party leaders pursued the policy of 
development through migration (Pieke et al., 2004:58f.). Examples for this include the 
initiative of local party leaders from Sichuan to encourage inner Chinese migration (Mobrand, 
2011), as well as the activities of local party leaders from the Northern Part of Fujian who 
encouraged migration to Europe (Pieke et al., 2004). Furthermore, efforts by local 
governments were directly or indirectly supported by the gradual relaxation of emigration 
and internal migration laws by the central government (Biao, 2003; Pieke, 2007; and Liu, 
2009).  
The rise and diversification of education and professional migration is most visible in the 
large amounts of Chinese students that enroll for “postgraduate degrees at a top-level 
research university, undergraduate degrees, high school diplomas or short-term certificate 
courses in English or other vocational skills” (Pieke, 2007:86). This type of migration is 
largely, but not exclusively, concentrated in Western countries. During my stay in South 
Africa, I encountered several Chinese migrants who had come to South Africa to send their 
children to a local high school or university. Also many showed an interest in going to local 
language schools to learn English. Migration of Chinese professionals is on the one hand a 
“by-product of educational migration” (Pieke, 2007:86), but on the other a reflection of a 
growing demand of globalized companies for highly skilled Chinese managers working in 
China and abroad (Pieke, 2007:86). These companies include Western multinationals, but 
also large state-owned and private Chinese companies. In the developing countries, this type 
of migration is mainly linked to China’s development projects. These development projects 
are frequently full set projects18 which rely on Chinese managers for the development, 
execution and supervision of these projects (MOFCOM, 2011:1). But it also linked to large 
private Chinese companies, like Huawei and ZTE, which seek to enter the markets of 
developing countries (Broadman, 2007:304). 
Chinese migrants have long been characterized as a particularly successful type of global 
migrants (Light, 1974; Liu, 1998; Mckeown, 2000; Khanna, 2001; Pieke et al, 2006; Liu-Farrer, 
2011). Large parts of their success have been attributed to their transnational connectedness 
which was reflected in their family and kin networks that engage in flexible, transnational 
business (Mckeown, 2000:319; Nyiri, 2005:660). Personally, I would argue that the nature of 
Chinese transnational connectedness has changed. The falling costs of communication and 
new communication technologies such as instant messengers (e.g. Skype, QQ and MSN 
Messenger) and social networks (e.g. Xiaonei19) have made it possible for Chinese migrants to 
establish and maintain contact with large numbers of people. This means that information 
                                                          
18
 Full-set or complete project: 全套项目 quantaoxiangmu. 
19
 Similar to Facebook or the German Studi VZ: 校内 (xiaonei). 
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about particular migration destination, particular goods and services can be obtained faster 
and at much lower costs. Contacts with friends, including former class mates and colleagues, 
can be easily maintained. Furthermore, successful migrants who wish to return to China, but 
keep their overseas business by assigning a Chinese manager, can do so more easily because 
modern communication technology enables them to receive daily updates on the situation 
and maintain a stronger degree of control. As a result, Chinese migrants’ transnational 
connectedness has become broader and more flexible. 
2.2 Basic assumptions 
From a meta-perspective, the majority of theories or approaches within social sciences use 
‘actors’, i.e. natural and legal persons, and ‘structures’, i.e. economic, political, and social 
contexts, as their key concepts for analyzing and understanding society and societal 
phenomena. This also applies to migration studies and the above outlined concepts: all 
include actors (i.e. migrants and migrant networks) and structures (i.e. the economic, 
political and social context) to analyze and understand migratory flows and phenomena. 
Problems arise when trying to specify the relationship between actors and structures20. On 
the extreme ends, we find those theories claiming that migrants exclusively determine 
migration21, and those claiming that structural imperatives determine migration22. Although 
the four above stated concepts are situated at neither end of these two extremes, it is still 
useful to provide a more detailed account of my general assumptions about the relationship 
between actors and structures, and how this relates to the four concepts. 
2.2.1 Relationship between actors and structures 
The relationship between actors and structures is assumed to be defined by processes of 
mutual interaction and influence within a particular social system. These processes are (i) the 
reproduction and transformation of structures through the (inter-)action of actors, and (ii) 
the distribution of resources and opportunities through the (inter-)action of structures. I 
start by outlining the assumptions of these processes within one country. I assume that the 
system boundaries coincide with the national boundaries. In reality this rarely happens 
because countries are seldom closed systems. But for the moment, this assumption helps to 
reduce the complexity and thereby one can get a better understanding of the basic processes 
between actors and structures. 
                                                          
20 Within social sciences, the agent-structure debate has long tried to settle opposing views over the 
relationship between agents and structures (Wight, 2006:62). This debate is rooted in two opposing 
views about society: one which claims that “society is people” (Dave, 1979 cited in Wight, 2006:62), 
and one which claims that “society is the circumstances within which people are formed” (Dave, 1979 
cited in Wight, 2006:62). 
21 Micro-explanations make migration solely depended on individual choice (Massey et al.,1993:434f.). 
22 Macro explanations make migration solely depended on structural determinants (Massey et al., 
1993:433f.) 
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The processes in this fictitious country are assumed to be constituted by a particular 
configuration of actors’ and structures’ meta-variables which vary across time and space. 
These meta-variables are ‘structural constraints’ and ‘structural opportunities’ for structures, 
and the meta-variables for actors are the ‘three types of agency’ (Wight, 2006:212), as well as 
‘material and non-material resources’. Structural constraints are those configurations which 
curtail the scope of action of individual actors or a group of actors. Structural opportunities 
are those configurations which provide possibilities to enlarge the scope of action of 
individual actors or a group of actors. The three types of agencies are: Agency 1, Agency 2 and 
Agency 3 (Wight, 2006:212). Agency 1 is actors’ “freedom of subjectivity” (Wight, 2006:212) 
which makes actors “a subject capable of reflecting upon, and constantly renegotiating, the 
forces of construction” (Wight, 2006:210). Agency 2 describes how actors, through the use of 
Agency 1, become part of some elements of the socio-cultural system into which the agent is 
born and develops (Wight, 2006:212). Agency 3 refers to the “positioned-practice places: 
structural properties that endure irrespective of the agents that occupy them” (Wight, 
2006:213). Material resources refer to tangible assets such as money, land and real-estate. 
Non-material resources are non-tangible assets such as cultural and social capital as well as 
ideas, information and rights. Building on these assumptions, Figure 1 provides a detailed 
overview of the basic processes and meta-variables. 
Figure 1 Basic relationship between actors and structures 
 
Structural constraints and opportunities are the result of a particular configuration of the 
economic, political and social context at a given time t, which in turn is reproduced or altered 
through actors’ actions. Structural opportunities and constraints distribute and curtail actors’ 
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their potential scope of action at a given time t. Actors’ potential scope of action is produced 
by the Agency 1, 2, 3 and material and non-material resources of individual actors. The extent 
to which actors are able to realize these actions depends on two factors. First, differences in 
Agency 1, 2 and 3, the resources at the disposal of actors, as well as the actions of one or a 
group of actors which—intentionally or unintentionally—influence the scope of action of 
other actors, both within the same and a different system, explain inequalities between 
different actors. Second, structures distribute and curtail the possibilities available to actors 
(Wight, 2006:176). 
2.2.2 Relationship between migrants and structures 
In addition to the above elaborated basic assumptions about the relationship between actors 
and structures, I propose the following assumptions about the specific relationship between 
migrants, other actors and structures in both country of origin (Country A) and destination 
(Country B). These assumptions are based on insights from the four key concepts in my thesis 
(i.e. the migration system, migration configuration, migrant economy and the new Chinese 
migration order). 
Figure 2 Relationship between migrants and structures 
 
From Figure 2 we can deduce the following assumptions about the relationship between 
migrants, other actors and structures in both country of origin (Country A) and destination 
(Country B). First, migration is a societal phenomenon, which involves actors, structures and 
takes place both within23 and between different states, i.e. different social systems. This 
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and non-migrants. Migrants are those actors whose potential scope of action would permit 
them to move from Country A to Country B (and back). Non-migrants are those actors which 
have less potential to migrate. Second, scope of action of potential migrants will be influenced 
by other potential migrants as well as non-migrants. Third, in Country B the interaction of 
Actors B and Structure B at time t―i.e. reproduction and transformation of the structure, and 
distribution of resources and opportunities―produces Structural constraints B and 
opportunities B. Fourth, the interactions of migrants and non-migrants from Country A 
reproduce or alter Structural constraints and opportunities in Country A. Finally, the 
interactions of actors from Country B reproduce and alter structural constraints and 
opportunities in Country B, which has a direct or indirect impact on Actors A. 
While Figure 2 does not suggest a static relationship between migrants and structures, 
insights from migration system and migration configuration can enhance our understanding 
of the dynamics of this relationship. Migration system and migration configuration both show 
that migration varies across time and space (Kritz and Zlotnik, 1992 cited in Jennissen, 
2007:415). This is not only reflected in terms of quantity, i.e. numbers of migrants, but also 
reflected in terms of quality of migration flows, i.e. different degrees of maturity of migration 
processes. Since migration is the result of a particular configuration of migrants, actors and 
structures in Country A and Country B, the relationship between migrants and structures is 
assumed to vary across time and space. 
The establishment of migration systems or configuration can be traced back to historical links 
between the countries. Depending on the time horizon24, the new Chinese migration order is 
assumed to be a particular important aspect in shaping historical links for Chinese migration 
after 1990. Since migration systems or configuration are not created at once but develop over 
time, it is assumed that not every configuration of a particular relationship between migrants 
and structures qualifies as a migration system or configuration. It is furthermore assumed 
that recognizable feedback mechanisms are good indicators for the existence of a fully-
developed migration system. These feedback mechanisms increasingly shape the relationship 
between migrants and structures and determine if flows of migrants, information, ideas and 
goods will continue between Country A and Country B. Despite the fact that these feedback 
mechanisms develop a self-sustaining dynamic, they are still assumed to be the result of 
interactions of migrants and other actors. It should be noted that with advancing maturity of 
these mechanisms, it becomes increasingly difficult to reverse the dynamics. The migrant 
economy is assumed to be an important (positive) feedback mechanism because it directly or 
indirectly influences flows of migrants, information, ideas and goods. 
                                                          
24 The new Chinese migration order applies primarily to all Chinese migration after 1990. 
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2.3 Five-stage-model of migration 
Building on the earlier works of Mabogunje (1970), Fawcett (1989) and Kritz et al. (1992) 
and De Haas (2010), as well as the above outlined key concepts and assumptions about the 
relationship between migrants and structures, I developed a five stage model of migration. 
With this model I am mainly trying to grasp the key dynamics of migration, i.e. pioneer 
migration, rise and fall of migration systems, and the development of self-sustaining 
structures (i.e. feedback mechanisms). Like similar models, it is based on a simplified picture 
of reality and presents an ideal type thereof. The model should therefore primarily be seen as 
a heuristic tool which helps simplifying and organizing the analysis of a particular migration 
(here: Chinese migration to Lesotho). In particular, it does not make any direct statements 
about causal relations between the key concepts. 
2.3.1 Stage 1: initiating pioneer migration 
The first stage (t1) describes the beginning of migration process, i.e. the production of 
potential migrants and non-migrants (see Figure 3). The emphasis is here on potential, since 
from an outside perspective many people could potentially qualify as migrants, but only a few 
pioneers decide to migrate. It is therefore important to stress that in t1 these potential 
migrants have two choices: to migrate or to stay. If they have opted for the first option, these 
Actors A’ become pioneer migrants. Pioneer migrants25 tend to be few in numbers and 
“relatively well-off, risk-prone and entrepreneurial community members” (De Haas, 2010:20), 
and typically come from a limited number of places from Country A (De Haas, 2010:20). 
Figure 3 Stage 1: initiating pioneer migration 
 
Their decision about the destination of migration is influenced by their Agencies 1, 2 and 3, 
material and non-material resources as well as the structural opportunities and constraints 
in country of origin and destination. Theoretically, pioneer migrants could potentially go to 
                                                          
25 Of course, people who have to leave their country involuntarily (i.e. refugees) might also be pioneer 
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any country. In reality, their choice is likely to be limited to countries with which historical 
links exist (here between Country A and Country B). In my view, historical links should not be 
defined according to historic periods (i.e. colonialism), but seen as a result of the sum of all 
past interaction and connectedness between the involved social systems (i.e. countries). This 
interaction can take place in the economic, political, social or cultural realm. For the sake of 
analytical clarity, I focus on pioneer migration to one country (i.e. Country B). But in reality 
the range of destination at point t1 is likely to include more than one country. 
2.3.2 Stage 2: developing contextual and endogenous feedback mechanisms 
Once the first pioneers (Actors A’) have migrated from Country A to Country B, they find 
themselves in situation t2, i.e. stage 2 (see Figure 4). Structure B in Country B defines the 
scope of action of Actors A’ and Actors B. Unlike subsequent stages (i.e. Stage 3-5), the 
availability of resources and opportunities of Actors A’ is almost exclusively influenced by 
Actors B, i.e. the local population. In this setting Actors A’ and B interact and are thereby 
reproducing and/or altering the Structure B at t2. Simultaneously, Actors A’ are sending 
information, goods and resources back to Country A. These interactions set in motion the 
development of two important feedback mechanisms. The first feedback mechanism is 
contextual, and refers to the reproduction or altering of the structure B. If the interaction of 
Actors A’ and B would reproduce Structure B, future migrants would face the same structural 
opportunities and constrains as their predecessors. However, also if they alter the Structure B 
they may ease or complicate further migration. This means that―depending on the context of 
Country A in t2―this contextual feedback mechanism can be positive or negative. 
Figure 4 Stage 2: developing contextual and endogenous feedback mechanisms 
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family and nucleolus kinship. At the same time, other members of the community, who have 
decided to migrate, might decide to migrate to Country B because of herd-behavior, i.e. 
because of thinking “if those people go there, then there must be something”. This can be an 
important step towards the development of a particular migration configuration, i.e. 
migration between one place in Country A and Country B. The nature and the interplay of 
endogenous and contextual feedback mechanism will determine whether migration in t2 
reaches the critical ‘herd-effect-threshold’ (De Haas, 2010:20), thus leading to large scale 
migration. If it fails to reach a critical threshold levels of migration are likely to remain low. 
2.3.3 Stage 3: building the structures for the migration system  
In t3, the interplay of endogenous and contextual feedback mechanisms from t2 has resulted 
in the passing of the critical threshold and the lowering of risks and costs of migration (see 
Figure 5). This paved the way for more migration, particularly from pioneer migrant areas 
that have established a migration configuration. In t3, some of Actors A’ and Actors A’’ decide 
to form different kinds of networks26 which make further migration easier. These migration 
networks are characterized by (i) the ability to “mobilize the necessary resources (or capitals) 
to facilitate migration” (De Hass, 2010:17), and (ii) the willingness of members “to help 
prospective migrants because of moral obligations, altruism, self-interest or a combination 
thereof.” (De Haas, 2010:17). The success of these networks rests on the number of 
participants and connections that can be activated (Granovetter, 1973). Intra-migrant 
community relations play an important role for the success of these networks, because 
“boundaries between groups are highly fluid, shifting over time” (Park, 2010:464). This 
applies particularly to the relations between pioneer migrants and newcomers: pioneer 
migrants have often some resentment against the new migrants27, because they might take 
away business opportunities, but they might also be an obstacle to a successful integration of 
pioneer or first generation migrants. 
In contrast to situation t2, new migrants (Actors A’’’) can now decide to either migrate 
individually or to join the newly established migration networks. This development is made 
possible because Actors A’ and A’’ did not only sent back information, goods and resources as 
in t2, but also formed networks. Once Actors A’, A’’ and A’’’ have migrated to Country B, their 
scope of action is influenced by the same factors as outlined in t2. The main difference 
between t2 and t3 is that the numbers of potential actors has increased and thus processes of 
interaction and mutual influence become more complex. In t3, the contextual feedback 
                                                          
26
 It should be noted that other networks, i.e. links and connections with other people, may have 
existed before. But, the formation of networks which exclusively serve the facilitation of migration 
between Country A and B is likely to occur only after pioneer migrants have arrived in Country B. 
27
 For example, in South Africa, “Chinese South Africans, Taiwanese and more settled Chinese from the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) seem to have formed some strong feelings about the newest migrants 
from Fujian province” (Park, 2010:464). 
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mechanisms are essentially the same as in t2. Yet, due to the increased numbers of actors, the 
influence, i.e. strength, of these feedbacks can be expected to be larger.  
Figure 5 Stage 3: building the structures for the migration system 
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compared to t3, thus contributing to the self-sustaining dynamics. In t4, contextual and 
endogenous feedback mechanisms are both more advanced and complex. Because of the 
growing interconnectedness of Country A and Country B, changes in structure of one country 
are likely to directly or indirectly affect changes in the structure of the other country. This 
means that it is becoming increasingly difficult to predict how a specific interaction of Actors 
A’, A’’, A’’’ and B reproduces or alters the structure of Country A and B. 
Figure 6 Stage 4: fostering the dynamics within the migration system 
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falling costs and risks of movement stemming from the growth of migrant networks over 
time.” (Massey et al., 1993:450). While it is important to note that absolute wage differentials 
may become less important once a migration system is established, it does not mean that 
wage differentials become completely redundant just because the risks and the cost for 
migration are low. Consequently, the overall opportunities for potential migrants, which 
include wages, still need to be taken into account to determine if migration will continue. 
Moreover, falling economic costs for migration does not mean that the social and cultural 
risks of migration are eliminated. In fact, in some contexts28, migrants might suddenly be the 
target for xenophobia, making their life in their host country more difficult and more risky. 
2.3.5 Stage 5: decline of migration system 
Time t5 describes the decline of the existing migration system (see Figure 7). This decline is 
commonly a long and slow process which is initiated when the system has passed the 
saturation point, i.e. it is no longer attractive to migrate to Country B because opportunities 
are becoming more and more marginal. 
Figure 7 Stage 5: decline of migration system 
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28 Examples include attacks on migrants in South Africa (Mail & Guardian, 2010; Mail & Guardian, 2012) 
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mechanisms. These can develop if a group of actors (commonly part of the Actors B, but 
possibly also Actors A’, A’’, and A’’’) successfully affects changes in the structure of Country B 
or even A which lead to an unfavorable distribution of opportunities and resources for new 
migrants. In the third scenario the decline of migration systems can be explained through a 
different kind of negative contextual feedback mechanisms. These are the result of two 
developments. First, at a certain point even marginal costs of new migrants outweigh the 
benefits (De Haas, 2010:18). As a result, actors already established in Country B are less 
willing or able to “provide migration assistance “(De Haas, 2010:18). Second, with increased 
numbers of migrants, competition for opportunities increases and may eventually make 
Country B less attractive. 
3. Sino-Basotho migration system: explaining the context of Chinese 
migration to Lesotho 
3.1 Defining historical links between China and Lesotho 
Historical links, i.e. past interactions between China and Lesotho, constitute the antecedent 
condition of the Sino-Basotho migration system and form an important aspect for 
understanding why this particular migrations system was created (see Chapter 2). The 
following sections will provide a detailed analysis of these past interactions. The timeline of 
my analysis will be from 1966 till 1996. I chose 1966 as a starting point because this is the 
year of Lesotho’s official independence. I chose 1996 because pioneer migration from China 
to Lesotho gained momentum only after 1996. Therefore, developments before 1996 seem to 
provide important indications for the historical links between China and Lesotho. Events 
after 1996 will be discussed in Chapter 3.2. My analysis starts with an outline of the historical 
context in which these interactions developed and took place. Believing that internal 
developments within China and Lesotho, as well as external developments, are important for 
explaining historical links between China and Lesotho, I included them in my analysis of the 
historical context. I continue with an account of how and why Taiwanese migrants, a group of 
non-state actors, played an important role for the creation of historical links between China 
and Lesotho, and for the Sino-Basotho migration system. The sum of these aspects then 
constitutes the historical links between China and Lesotho. 
3.1.1 Historical context of interactions 
Lesotho, formerly Basutoland under the direct mandate of the British, completed its first 
general elections in 1965. Three parties, the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), the 
Basutoland National Party (BNP) and the Marematlou Party (MTP), participated. The 
outcome of the elections assigned a marginal victory to the BNP (Makao, 2010:62). One year 
later, Lesotho gained official independence. After independence, Lesotho became a 
constitutional monarchy, with the BNP’s leader Chief Leabua Jonathan as its first prime 
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minister (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho, 2009:1). 
Although the other parties, in particularly the BCP, had won a considerable number of votes 
in the 1965 election, the BNP denied them largely the right to participate in government and 
was therefore effectively governing alone (Makao, 2010:62). 
Even though Lesotho was now formerly recognized as a new member of the international 
state system, its interactions with China as well as other countries were complicated by a 
number of factors. Despite independence, Lesotho maintained the image of a “homeland of 
South Africa” (Rosenberg, 2007:462). This can be partly attributed to Lesotho’s strong 
economic ‘dependence’ on South Africa. At the time of its independence, Lesotho was (and till 
today continues to be) a small, land-locked country that did not posses any significant natural 
resources 29 . Agriculture was an important factor for the creation of employment 
opportunities and economic growth (World Bank, 1965:5). But already at the end of the 
1960s, it became clear that soil erosion and population growth would damage the 
agricultural sector (World Bank, 1965:5; Rosenberg, 2007:461). With only “twelve 
establishments, three in the public sector and most of the rest printing shops or missions 
with total turnover of less than 1 million Rand and employing just 500 people” (World Bank, 
1971:68), the industrial and manufacturing base of Lesotho was relatively weak. 
Furthermore, “South African companies and individuals dominated insurance, foreign trade, 
domestic wholesale and retail businesses (Ferguson, 1990:38). As a result, employment 
opportunities within Lesotho were scarce, and substantial parts of Lesotho’s population had 
to migrate to South Africa to find employment in mines and on farms (Seidman, 2009:582). 
For instance, between 1967 and 1973, 35,000 new jobs for Basotho were created in South 
Africa (World Bank, 1971:18). In the same period, only 2,000 were created in Lesotho (World 
Bank, 1971:18).  
In the early post-independence years, the BNP pursued a cooperative policy towards the 
South African Apartheid regime (Taylor, 1997:84). This may stem from the fact that 
maintaining good economic and political relations with South Africa was essential for the 
economic development of Lesotho. But it may also stem from the fact that the BNP―even 
before independence―had gained substantial support from South African government and 
that after independence many of the “important government posts were given to white South 
Africans” (Ferguson, 1990:107; Taylor, 1997:84). The strong influence of South Africa was 
also reflected in the BNP’s decision in 1966 to establish diplomatic relations with the 
                                                          
29 While economic development is not a necessarily conditioned on the presence of natural resources, 
for a small-land-locked country like Lesotho, it is nevertheless a strong impediment. 
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Republic of China30 (Taiwan) and not with the People’s Republic of China (Taylor, 1997:84). 
With the Cold War at its peak, South Africa, similar to many other Western countries, was 
taking a strong stance towards the communist regimes and supported the non-communist 
Taiwan (Taylor, 1997:84). It was therefore―at least indirectly―implied that Lesotho, like 
other frontier states31 (e.g. Botswana and Swaziland), would choose to support Taiwan rather 
than China, too.  
Apart from the Cold War, the geopolitical competition between China and Taiwan for winning 
allies in supporting their respective claims as the “sole representative of China” was in full 
swing. Since China was primarily occupied with the Cultural Revolution at the time of 
Lesotho’s independence, a chance for Taiwan to win another ally on the African continent 
presented itself. Up to 1966, China had been more successful than Taiwan in gaining support 
from African countries (Brautigam, 2009:34). For example, by 1966, China had managed to 
establish diplomatic relations with almost 20 African countries. Between 1964 and 1971, 
China “started aid programs in thirteen additional African countries” (Brautigam, 2009:34). 
Realizing this, Taiwan was stepping up its interactions with African countries in general and 
Lesotho in particular. 
The first official state-to-state interaction between Lesotho and Taiwan took place at 
Lesotho’s independence ceremony on October 4, 1966 in Maseru. Taiwan’s Vice-Minister for 
Foreign Affairs (UNSC, 1966:8) congratulated Lesotho and expressed his country’s 
willingness to cooperate with Lesotho (UNSC, 1966:8). Only two months later, Chief Jonathan 
visited Taiwan (as well as Japan and South Korea), and found that these countries “were 
interested in Lesotho” (Andor et al., 1999:113). One year after the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan, Chief Jonathan paid another visit to Taiwan “for a six-day 
study of agricultural development projects” (Tseng, 2008:167). In 1967, the first basic 
agreement between the two countries was signed (Andor et al., 1999:114; Tseng, 2008:167). 
A special technical cooperation scheme and a friendship treaty followed in 1968 and 1969 
(Andor et al., 1999:116). 
Despite the revived engagement of Taiwan with African as well as non-African countries, it 
could not influence the 1971 UN General Assembly voting on the “Representation of Republic 
of China to the UN” in its favor. The vote showed that many countries were not satisfied with 
the status quo (i.e. total exclusion of China from UN institutions). 22 African countries voted 
for China (Pickels and Wood, 1989:5f.). In contrast, only 16 African countries (Lesotho 
                                                          
30 The Republic of China (Taiwan) was at that point the legitimate representative of China (including 
mainland China) in the United Nations. Many countries had therefore established diplomatic relations 
with the Republic of China. But many newly independent African countries established diplomatic 
relations with the People’s Republic of China. These included, for example, Egypt (1956), Ghana (1960), 
Mali (1960), Uganda (1962), and Zambia (1964). 
31 Namibia, then South-West-Africa, was a South African colony and was not considered an 
independent state. 
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included) voted for Taiwan. Taiwan rewarded Lesotho’s loyalty with the signing of a mutual 
visa fees waiver deal in 1974 (Andor et al., 1999:128), and a technical co-operation 
agreement on August 2, 1977 (Andor et al, 1999:133). Since Lesotho maintained diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan, China limited itself to “periodically quoting Chief Jonathan in its 
official press―a sign of approval from Beijing” (Taylor, 1997:85), and being critical about the 
unequal relationship between South Africa and Lesotho, which was perceived as “the big 
bullying the small”32 (Taylor, 1997:85) 
The 1970 general elections in Lesotho, in which the opposition party BCP achieved a 
landslide victory, likewise showed that Basotho were dissatisfied with the status-quo (i.e. the 
rule of the BNP). This dissatisfaction stemmed from two facts: first, the BNP “had done very 
little to improve the lot of the people” (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China to the 
Kingdom of Lesotho, 2009:1); second, the BNP’s uncritical cooperation with the South African 
Apartheid regime was generally resented among Basotho (Ferguson, 1990:106). 
Unfortunately, the BNP refused to accept the defeat. After violent clashes, Chief Jonathan 
unilaterally annulled the elections, declared a state of emergency and suspended politics for 
five years (Andor et al., 1999:117). This implicated that the BNP, from 1971 till 1976, was 
primarily concerned with securing its one party rule.33. During this time, Lesotho’s economic 
situation worsened. In 1971, GDP growth was –9.8% (World Bank Databank, 2012) and GNI 
per capita increased by only 144 USD from 1971 to 1975 (World Bank Databank, 2012). In 
addition, South Africa’s growing interference in Lesotho (including armed raids) created even 
stronger resentment among Basotho, threatened the sovereign rights of Lesotho and the 
BNP’s one-party rule (Ferguson, 1990:108). In light of these constrains, the BNP granted 
selected BCP members political participation rights (Ferguson, 1990:107) and changed its 
stance toward South Africa. After successfully portraying Lesotho as the little country fighting 
the big and unjust country (Taylor, 1997:85), the BNP achieved that substantial flows of 
international aid were channeled towards Lesotho (Ferguson, 1990:8). Yet, these flows had 
only limited effects for facilitating economic development and poverty reduction (Murray, 
1981:18; Ferguson, 1990:8). 
Between 1975 and 1980, the rapid growth of migrant workers’ remittances, increases in 
Customs Union34 payments, diamond production and inflow of external assistance helped to 
                                                          
32
 The big refers to South Africa, and the small refers to Lesotho. 
33
 Chief Jonathan justified these measures by claiming that he “agreed with many other African leaders 
that democracy was not suitable to deal with Africa’s problems” (Andor et al, 1999:118). The state of 
emergency, the suspension of politics for five years and the expulsion of the King were just three of 
many measures taken to secure the power of the BNP. 
34
 Refers to the South African Customs Union (SACU). Basutoland (under the directorate of British High 
Commission) became a member of SACU in 1910 (World Bank, 1987:2). In 1976, a new revenue 
sharing formula was introduced, which had the potential to stabilize revenues for smaller countries 
such as Lesotho (World Bank, 1987:2). 
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partially improve Lesotho’s economic situation (World Bank, 1987:8). However, only little 
improvements were made in terms of attracting foreign investment and developing an 
indigenous business sector (Tangri, 1993:258). This was not so much attributed to a lack of 
institutional support35, but to the fact that the BNP continued to back “foreign commerce in 
the 1970s and 1980s” (Tangri, 1993:228). Therefore, the economy of Lesotho remained 
under the influence of foreign investors (mainly South Africans, but also some Taiwanese 
traders) and continued to provide limited business and employment opportunities for 
Basotho. Consequently, the migration to South Africa continued (SAMP, 2010:11). 
Since the BNP pursued a less cooperative policy towards South Africa, relations with South 
Africa worsened from the mid-1970s onwards. South African troops repeatedly launched 
“military raids into Lesotho” (Taylor, 1997:86). Starting with an “economic blockade against 
Lesotho”36 initiated by the South African government (Taylor, 1997:86), and the invasion of 
Maseru by South African troops (Taylor, 1997:86; Andor et al, 1999:143) the situation 
escalated in 1986. These developments finally culminated in a bloodless military coup by 
Justin Lekhanya (Taylor, 1997:87). The military coup ended Chief Jonathan’s rule. His 
successor, Lekhanya, pursued a more cooperative policy towards South Africa. The 
supremacy of the South African army, the willingness of the South African government to 
launch military raids into Lesotho, as well as Lesotho’s economic dependency on South 
African investment and South Africa’s economy explain Lekhanya’s policy change (Taylor, 
1997:87). Especially, the economic aspect should not be underestimated. In the 1980s, 
Lesotho’s economic growth stagnated (World Bank, 1987:2). Since Lesotho’s “domestic 
formal sector provided only a limited number of jobs, currently employing 13 percent of the 
domestic workforce” (World Bank, 1987:35) and economic growth stagnated, Lesotho 
remained highly dependent on South Africa for creating employment and business 
opportunities for Basotho both within and outside of Lesotho. 
Towards the end of the 1980s, two important alternatives for creating employment 
opportunities and economic growth opened up. The first alternative was the Highlands Water 
Scheme, Lesotho’s “brightest investment opportunity” (World Bank, 1987:vi) 
which―again―was mainly financed by South Africa. While the Scheme was expected to 
contribute to the country’s export as well as government revenue, the prospects for providing 
significant employment opportunities were not so bright (Akokpari, 2011:81). The second 
alternative was the introduction of large-scale manufacturing by Taiwanese investors from 
                                                          
35
 Between 1967 and 1975, the BNP had set up a number of institutions which all aimed at attracting 
investment and developing an indigenous industry sector. These institutions included the Lesotho 
National Development Corporation (LNDC), the Basotho Traders Association (BTA), the Basotho 
Enterprise Development Corporation (BEDCO), and the Lesotho Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(LCCI) (Tangri, 1993:228f). 
36
 This blockade was the result of Chief Jonathan’s refusal to hand over ANC members who had fled to 
Lesotho (Taylor, 2010:86). 
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the textile and garment industry. Taiwanese investors were relocating their productions from 
South Africa37 to Lesotho to circumvent growing international sanctions placed on South 
Africa, to benefit from Lesotho’s access to preferential trade agreements and from Lesotho’s 
low wage levels (Lall, 2007:1004). 
Despite the growing economic relations with Taiwan, Lesotho established diplomatic 
relations with the People’s Republic of China in 198338 (Taylor, 1997:87). After the 
establishment of diplomatic relations more state-to-state interactions took place. This was 
reflected in the signing of an agreement on economic and technical cooperation in 1983 
(Taylor, 1997:86), as well as in emergency relief provided by the Chinese government in form 
of 75,000 USD aid to buy food during the 1984 drought (Taylor, 1997:87). Likewise, the 
number of official state visits between China to Lesotho increased. From the Chinese side, this 
included visits by the Minster of Metallurgical Industry Li Dongye in 1983, by the Vice 
Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Lu Xuejian in 1988, and by the Foreign 
Minister Qian Qichen in July 1989 (Peoples’ Daily, 2001:3). Visits from Lesotho to China 
included the 1983 “friendly visit” of Chief Jonathan to, amongst others, study the “socialist 
modernization” in Shanghai (Taylor, 1997:86), the visit of King Moshoeshoe II in the hope to 
gain support against South Africa’s inference in Lesotho’s affairs in 1985, and the visit of 
Queen Mamohato in 1987. However, during the 1980s, China’s engagement in Lesotho 
remained of a rather symbolic nature and did not translate into any meaningful trade or 
economic cooperation (Taylor, 1997:87f.). This, in conjunction with Taiwan’s “cheque book 
diplomacy” (Taylor, 2010:88), explains why, in 1990, Lesotho’s military rulers once again 
severed diplomatic relations with China. In fact, it was only in 1994 when military rule ended, 
and the BCP had won the second democratic elections of Lesotho’s post-independence, that 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan were severed for good (Taylor, 1997:89). 
Compared with other African countries, which in 1996 had established strong and diverse 
historical links with China, the historical links between China and Lesotho appear to have had 
                                                          
37 From the mid-1970s, Taiwan’s “strong economic performance led to demand for higher wages and 
better benefits, undercutting the low wage levels that have been part of the basis for the Taiwanese 
economic miracle” (Pickels and Wood, 1989:10). Faced with rising wage levels, many Taiwanese 
businesses from the “low technology, low productivity industries” (Pickels and Wood, 1989:11) moved 
their operations offshore. While investments were initially concentrated in Asia, Taiwanese investors 
from the textile and garment industry shifted parts of their operations to the South African periphery, 
i.e. the homelands (Pickels and and Woods, 1989:3; Hart, 2002:3) in the mid-1980s. The decision to 
move operations to South Africa was a result of a mix of an attractive incentive package offered by the 
Homelands and rising wage levels in Taiwan, which were threatening to undercut the competitive edge 
of Taiwanese textile and garment industries (Pickels and Wood, 1989:11; Hart, 2002:3). Moreover, 
both countries, albeit for different reasons, found themselves increasingly isolated and thus found a 
mutual interest in extending political and economic cooperation (Hart, 2002:2). 
38 Surprisingly, the signing of the agreement to establish diplomatic relations took place in Maputo, 
Mozambique on April 30, 1983, and was announced only during a subsequent visit of Chief Jonathan to 
Beijing in 1983 (Taylor, 2008:85).  
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a relative low profile39. Clearly, Lesotho violated the “One-China-Policy” by maintaining 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan from 1966 to 1982 and from 1990 to 1994, and, thus, 
complicated official state-to-state interaction between China and Lesotho. But the fact that a 
country’s government did officially recognize Taiwan alone did not keep China from 
establishing historical links with a particular country. For example, China was long 
supporting the ANC in South Africa, even before they were officially elected in 1994 (Ash, 
1986:585). Of course, Lesotho did not have classical liberation movements (as for example 
South Africa). However, Lesotho had a party (the BCP) which had won elections and was 
systematically denied any participation in governing the country. Still, neither Taiwan, nor 
China, nor in fact any other country, tried to effectively pressure Chief Jonathan. Generally 
speaking, it seems that China’s relative low engagement in Lesotho till 200140 stemmed from 
the fact that Lesotho held little “strategic value” for China (Taylor, 1997:85).  
3.1.2 The special role of Taiwanese migrants 
As the previous section highlighted, Taiwan’s relationship with Lesotho has been, historically 
speaking, much closer and deeper than China’s relationship with Lesotho. Therefore it is not 
surprising that the first “Chinese-looking” non-state-actors who arrived in Lesotho were from 
Taiwan and not from Mainland China. Using Mung’s (2008:95) categorization of Chinese 
migrants, these non-state-actors can be divided into (i) temporary migrants, i.e. Taiwanese 
aid workers who arrived as early as 1967 to conduct agricultural training, and (ii) 
entrepreneurial migrants, who were constituted of small-scale traders and investors from the 
textile and garment industry. I argue that it was particularly the latter group, i.e. 
entrepreneurial migrants, which played a crucial role for defining initial interactions between 
China and Lesotho as well as the subsequent creation of a Sino-Basotho migration system. 
Although several sources (i.e. Politzer, 2008:1; McNamee et al., 2012:33; Park, 2010:465; 
Akokpari, 2011:92) confirm that Taiwanese migrants arrived in the 1970s, no information on 
the background or motives of these migrants is provided. Therefore, it can be only speculated 
about how pioneer migration to Lesotho started. One plausible explanation would be that 
they, or some of their relatives or friends, came to Lesotho under one of the government-
initiated development cooperation projects (e.g. the technical cooperation scheme signed in 
                                                          
39For example, the relations between China and Zambia were much stronger (Brautigam, 2009:40). 
40
 Only two out of the 14 Economic and Technical Cooperation agreements between China and Lesotho 
up to 2006 were implemented or agreed upon before 2001 (Economic and Commercial Counselor’s 
Office , 2004:1). Only after 2002 did the cooperation between China and Lesotho gain momentum. The 
latest examples of this cooperation are the two Agreements of Economic and Technical Cooperation 
signed in December 2011. These Agreements encompass a “grant of 50 million Renminbi and an 
interest-free loan of 50 million Renminbi” (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom 
of Lesotho, 2011:1), and “both the grant and the loan will be used for the implementation of mutually 
agreed projects”. (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Kingdom of Lesotho, 2011:1). 
Therefore it seems safe to state that China’s engagement in Lesotho was of low profile until 2001. 
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1968) and decided to stay. Since they were mainly engaging in small-scale trade activities, 
they fit to some extent De Haas’s (2010:20) description of “relatively well-off, risk-prone and 
entrepreneurial community members”. Well off, because―after all―the opening of a small 
business in Lesotho required at least the financial resources for an air plane fare, the rent for 
a shop, as well as the purchase of goods to sell.  
It seems that migration from Taiwan to Lesotho was the result of a combination of structural 
opportunities and constraints in Taiwan and Lesotho. In Taiwan, structural opportunities 
stemmed mainly from the rapid economic development, which increased actors’ material and 
non-material resources. Theoretically this created ample structural opportunities within 
Taiwan. But, since the economic boom was accompanied by “unprecedented growth in 
income and asset inflation, […] increasing environmental pollution and social stress” (Yu, 
2006:556), structural constraints were imposed on actors’ potential to employ their 
resources fruitfully. Taken together, it seems that growing numbers of Taiwanese decided to 
seek their fortunes outside the country. Apart from migrating to developed countries41, small 
numbers of Taiwanese appear to have decided to migrate to developing countries, including 
Lesotho42. The reasons for coming to Lesotho might stem from the structural opportunities 
which Lesotho’s nascent private and industrial sector offered. Yet, given the structural 
constraints of Lesotho (i.e. the poor economic situation, the low income and the low demand) 
the numbers of Taiwanese migrants was rather relatively small.  
Through their actions Taiwanese migrants were essentially reproducing the foreign control 
in trade sector of Lesotho43. Yet, neither the ruling party nor the newly established 
organizations appeared to have been effectively limiting the engagement of foreigners in 
these business sectors (see 3.1.1). Since the signing of the mutual visa fee waiver in 1974 
further lowered the costs of migration to Lesotho, more migrants from Taiwan arrived in 
Lesotho. As a result, they had become a “formidable economic community”44 by the end of the 
1980s (Akokpari, 2011:92). Considering that the newly established textile and garment 
factories had a reputation for exploiting workers (Tangri, 1993:230), and Taiwanese traders 
had a reputation for taking away employment and businesses opportunities from Basotho 
(Moeshoeshoe, 2010:2), it was not surprising that the presence of Taiwanese created 
negative feelings among Lesotho. The first national outcry about the presence of the 
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 It seems that during this time Taiwanese migration focused mainly on developed countries. The 
migration of Taiwanese students to the United States is a case in point: in 1980 there were 
approximately 75,353 Taiwanese in the United States (Lin, 2010:1). 
42
 Unfortunately, no comprehensive data on outward migration from Taiwan to developing countries 
during the 1970s is available. It is therefore difficult to assess the attractiveness of Lesotho in 
comparison to other developing countries. 
43
 Clearly, during the early stage Taiwanese migrants’ involvement did not match the scale of the South 
Africans’ involvement. 
44 For example, Fisseha (1991:ix) states that Chinese businesses accounted “for roughly 60-80 of small-
scale enterprises” in 1990. 
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Taiwanese, wrongly termed the presence of the “Chinese” (Tangri, 1993:221), came already 
in 1987 (Moeshoeshoe, 2010:2). In 1991, the situation escalated when a Basotho was killed 
by one of the security guards of a Taiwanese-owned shop (Tangri, 1993:221). Angry Basotho 
attacked Taiwanese shops, and many Taiwanese fled to South Africa (Tangri, 1993:221). With 
this, at least temporarily, the inflow of new Taiwanese traders was stopped. 
While Taiwanese traders played a special role in creating and maintaining a structure 
conductive for further trade-related migration from China and Taiwan, Taiwanese investors 
from the textile and garment industry played a special role for bringing migrants from China 
to Lesotho. As mentioned earlier, Taiwanese investors started to expand their operations in 
Lesotho from the mid-1980s. Although they provided many jobs to Basotho, they tended to 
recruit non-Basotho for managerial positions (Tangri, 1993:230; Lall, 2007:1007). The 
majority of the managers came from Taiwan, but they also recruited personnel from China 
(Lall, 2007:1007). Unfortunately, the recruiting process of mainlanders is not well-
documented. In my opinion, mainlanders are likely to have been employed because they had 
the comparative advantage of being similarly qualified, but at presumably much lower labor 
costs, an important requisite for competitiveness of these companies (Hart, 2003:198). 
Connections between Chinese migrants on the one hand and Taiwanese textile and garment 
factory owners on the other hand, are likely to have been established through formal migrant 
brokers, informal kinship networks, Overseas Chinese Associations and Conventions (Liu, 
1998:587), and direct recruitment from Taiwanese textile and garment industries45 in Fujian, 
China (Hart, 2003:198).  
3.2 Establishment of the Sino-Basotho migration system 
The previous section demonstrated how past interaction and connectedness between 
Lesotho, Taiwan, and China led to the production of a particular set of historical links. These 
historical links in turn will be important for the subsequent description of the development of 
the Sino-Basotho migration system. Building on the assumptions and arguments made in 
Chapter 2, I will provide an account of the evolution of the Sino-Basotho-migration system.  
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 Due to rising production costs in Taiwan, Taiwanese textile and garment producers had shifted parts 
of their labor intensive production to Fujian and Zhejiang Province in China at the beginning of the 
1980s (Hart, 2009:198). The reasons why Taiwanese investors initially chose Fujian and Zhejiang are 
twofold: first of all, both Provinces are fairly close to Taiwan. Second, many Taiwanese came originally 
from these two Provinces and had still some relatives living there. 
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3.2.1 Stage 1: initiating pioneer migration to Lesotho 
Chinese pioneer migration46 to Lesotho was broadly speaking the result of (i) renewed 
production of Chinese migrants, and (ii) creation of employment opportunities in Lesotho’s 
textile and garment industry and Chinese government projects. When talking about the 
renewed production of Chinese migrants, it is important to distinguish between inner-
Chinese migration and outward Chinese migration. Both inner- and outward Chinese 
migration had been systematically curtailed47 by the Chinese authorities until 1978 (Liu, 
2009:314). Yet, the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s marked first and foremost 
the production of migrants destined to migrate within China48. At that time, outward 
migration, although not impossible, was still reserved for a small group of people who had 
either good connections with the Communist Party or overseas Chinese (Liu, 2009:316). 
Nevertheless, by the 1990s China’s rapid economic development and further easing of 
emigration restrictions made the structural opportunities created in other countries more 
accessible to potential migrants. Figure 8 on illustrate this point. 
Figure 8 Overview net migration China 1985-2005 
Year 1975-1980 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 
Net migration - 428,000 -236,000
49
 -824,000 - 677,000 -2,298,000 
Source: http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-Data/migration.htm (Accessed: 12-07-2012). 
This still begs the question of why Chinese migration to Lesotho started in the 1990s. After all, 
China had been developing rapidly and Lesotho remained to be one of the least-developed 
                                                          
46 It is difficult to find exact dates about the arrival of the first Chinese migrants in Lesotho. This is 
mainly due to the fact that the sources do not make an explicit distinction between Taiwanese and 
Chinese migrants and paucity of information on activities of Chinese or Taiwanese in the 1990s. 
Generally, the literature mentions two distinct events, which help for a crude estimation. The first is 
the arrival of the first Taiwanese migrants in 1970 (Politzer, 2008:1; McNamee et al., 2012:33; Park, 
2010:465). The second event is the successful establishment of a ‘Chinese’ economic community in the 
1980s (Akokpari, 2011:92; Moeshoeshoe, 2010:2). Taken into consideration that the recent study of 
McNamee et al. (2012) found that some Chinese migrants had been in Lesotho for 19 years, and that 
the events reported for the 1980s are most likely to refer to Taiwanese, it seems safe to assume that 
Chinese migration to Lesotho did not start before the 1990s. 
47
 For instance, between 1965 and 1970 only 12,073 migrants left China (UN Migration Database, 
2012). While this is not to say that no migration took place, it seems that there were drastic increases 
only after the initiation of the reform. Between 1949 and 1978, “China only approved about 7,000 
annual exits abroad for private affairs”. (Liu 2009:315). In contrast, between 1979 and 1985 “50,000 
individual applications to exit for private affairs were approved annually” (Liu, 2009:316). Also up to 
1978, migrants were potentially regarded as traitors and were only under special circumstances 
granted to leave the country (Louie, 2000:667).  
48
Inner-Chinese migration resulted from the initiation of economic reforms. At the early stages, China’s 
economic reforms were based on the re-opening of China’s borders for foreign trade and investment, 
and the introduction of household responsibility system in agriculture (Ahlstrom et al. 2010:342). The 
former targeted coastal regions (i.e. Zhuhai, Xiamen, Shenzhen, and Shantou in 1980, and 14 coastal 
cities in 1984), and the latter reintroduced market-incentives to the agricultural production (Ahlstrom 
et al. 2010:342). 
49 Since these numbers represent the net migration rate, the lower number for the period 1985-1990 
stems mainly from the fact that many Oversea Chinese were returning to China to benefit from the new 
possibilities in China. 
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countries, and was itself a source of outward migration (Seidman, 2009:582). The answer lies 
in the structural opportunities that had been created in Lesotho’s garment and textile 
industry and in Chinese government projects. Since the 1980s, more and more Taiwanese-
owned textile and garment factories had been opening up in Lesotho (Tangri, 1993:230; Lall, 
2007:1004). Due to a perceived lack of skilled Basotho, a lack of trust in local people, as well 
as cultural differences, Taiwanese factory owners were appointing mostly non-Basotho for 
higher management positions (Lall, 2007:1007). As already mentioned above, they were also 
employing people from Mainland China, mostly from Fujian Province (Lall, 2007:1007). 
Interestingly, today’s Chinese migrants in Lesotho seem to come largely from Fujian 
Province50, particularly Fuqing City (see Chapter 4).  
Apart from employment opportunities in the Taiwanese textile and garment industry in 
Lesotho, additional temporary employment opportunities for Chinese migrants were created 
by the Chinese government projects. In 1996, the governments of China and Lesotho signed 
an agreement on the construction of Lesotho’s first National Convention Center. Like many 
Chinese government projects, this project was a “full-set project”51, and included not only the 
planning and construction, but also the importing of materials and labor from China. Usually, 
government project workers were returning to China with the completion of the projects. But 
some workers have remained in Lesotho to set up small businesses (see 3.2.2). Despite 
working in different industry sectors, Chinese pioneer migrants (i.e. workers for textile 
industry and workers for government projects) presumably share some common 
characteristics: (i) the duration of their stay was fixed and, at least theoretically, known in 
advance; (ii) salaries were paid in China and they only had a small monthly allowance to 
finance their expenditures in Lesotho; (iii) accommodation and food was usually provided by 
the employer, such that living costs were low; (iv) travel from and to Lesotho was paid by the 
employer; (v) they were living in confined compounds and had little exposure to locals apart 
from work; (vi) they were not allowed, or at least not encouraged, to bring their family; and 
(vii) for those who stayed for longer periods in Lesotho frequently additional non-financial 
incentives52 were granted. However, since these positions were either time-wise (i.e. 
government projects) or number-wise (i.e. management positions in textile and garment 
factories) limited, they did not initiate mass migration to Lesotho. 
                                                          
50 Fujian Province is “China's second most important overseas province, overseas Chinese originated 
from Fujian amounted to over ten million.” (Kinglun, 2011:168). 
51 Full-set project: 全套项目 quantao xiangmu. 
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 For example, during my fieldwork in Lesotho in February 2012, I had the chance to talk to managers 
from the Taiwanese textile and garment factories. They told me that the company was paying for 
tickets to go home and visit families, for the laundry, and was organizing a private shuttle to work 
every day. 
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3.2.2 Stage 2: developing contextual and endogenous feedback mechanisms 
With the arrival of the first Chinese pioneers in Lesotho in the 1990s, initial contact and 
interactions among Chinese and Basotho took place. These interactions were first and 
foremost defined by the larger structures of Lesotho (i.e. political, economic and social 
context which created a set of structural opportunities and constraints). The political context 
was marked by occasional instability which was caused by the attempted overthrow of King 
Letsie III in 1996, and the post-elections violence in 1998 (Matlosa and Pule, 2010:64). Yet, 
unlike Taiwanese migrants in the 1980s, Chinese migrants did not experience significant 
clashes with Basotho. This is not to say that mutual suspicion and hostilities had ceded. 
Rather it is to say that no unusual degree of conflict emerged. Also, Lesotho’s new President 
Bethuel Pakalitha Mosisili took a very cooperative approach towards China (Redvers, 2012:2), 
which resulted in a number of state-level interactions. These included, for example, the 
sending of medical teams in 1997, the construction of the Botha Bothe Industrial Park in 
2002, and the forgiving of some parts of Lesotho’s debt (MOFCOM, 2006:1). 
The economic context was marked by positive macro-economic developments53. However, 
despite these positive macro-economic developments, “poverty had not declined and a large 
segment of the population appeared not to have shared the benefits of economic growth” 
(IMF, 2004:8). Moreover, the social context was marked by a gradual shift in the employment 
patterns of Basotho. Up to the beginning of the 1990s, large parts of the male labor force had 
been working in South African mines. However, vacant positions in the mines were 
increasingly awarded to South Africans (SAMP, 2010:12). Thus, the number of male Basotho 
being able to work in the mines was declining (IMF, 2004:5). Simultaneously, larger parts of 
Lesotho’s female labor force were seeking employment in one of the newly established 
Taiwanese textile or garment factories (Rosenberg, 2007:465). Not only the textile and 
garment industry, but also the small-scale wholesale and retail sector offered alternative 
employment opportunities (SAMP, 2010:69f.). Since the wages in these two sectors were 
significantly lower than the wages in the South African mines, many families had a smaller 
disposable income (SAMP, 2010:69). Moreover, the small-scale wholesale and retail sector 
had been experiencing an influx of individual traders from Taiwan during the 1980s and from 
Chinese during the 1990s and 2000s. These traders, building on networks and actions of 
early pioneer migrants from Taiwan, appear to have been highly successful in establishing 
themselves and out-competing locals (Tangri, 1993:223). Thus, they were curtailing business 
opportunities of Basotho. 
Assuming that the Chinese migrants working in the textile and garment factories or in the 
Chinese government projects were on hierarchical and functionally higher levels than their 
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 Between 1996 and 2001, Lesotho’s economy was growing on average 3.55% per year. GNI per capita 
had increased from 1,070 USD in 1990 to 1,310 USD in 2002 (World Bank Databank, 2012). 
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Basotho counterparts, it is difficult to imagine the two sides establishing profound 
friendships outside the working place. Language and cultural differences might have been a 
further obstacle in overcoming differences. In other words, the early interactions between 
Chinese migrants and Basotho were probably confined to the workplace. Despite this limited 
interactions, and despite a―in comparison to China―relatively challenging economic and 
political environment, like coolie migrants in South Africa, a small number of workers from 
the Chinese government projects stayed in Lesotho to open up small businesses. In Maseru I 
met a Chinese shop owner who had first come to Lesotho under the framework of the 1996 
government project. After the project was finished in 1999, he decided to stay and now runs a 
successful Computer shop in a big shopping mall in Maseru. This shop owner is not an 
exception. Unfortunately, we lack official data about the exact numbers of people. 
Interactions between Chinese migrants, Taiwanese migrants and Basotho set in motion a 
contextual feedback mechanism. This contextual feedback mechanism was reproducing 
Lesotho’s structure in the sense that the dominant role of foreign non-state actors in the 
textile and garment industry, and to a lesser extent, in the small-scale industry sector was 
fostered. The occasional protests of Basotho were an attempt to alter this structure54. Since 
Lesotho’s top leadership was not responding to the demand of its population, these attempts 
failed. Therefore, the structural opportunities for Chinese migrants remained intact. 
Endogenous feedback mechanisms which were creating awareness about the opportunities 
for migrating to Lesotho are likely to have been initiated by Chinese pioneer migrants, 
particularly by those who opened up small shops. As a result of the interplay of these two 
feedback mechanisms55 a critical ‘herd-effect-threshold’ (De Haas, 2010:20) was passed and 
migration from China to Lesotho gained momentum. 
3.2.3 Stage 3: building the structures for the Sino-Basotho migration system 
With migration from China reaching a critical threshold by the end of the 1990s, more and 
more Chinese migrants came to Lesotho to open up small businesses. The overall more 
positive environment was clearly one factor. Yet, this factor alone does not provide a 
satisfying explanation. After all, Chinese migrants had been in Lesotho for some time, and 
political and economic conditions, albeit not staying completely the same, did not improve 
dramatically. I would argue that the explanation for this development is linked to changes in 
China’s structural constraints and in the full development of endogenous and contextual 
                                                          
54 For example anti-Chinese protests were reported in 2008 (Wilson, 2008). 
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 While there are some rumors that the Chinese migration to Africa is part of a larger government 
strategy, Mohan (2009:5) argued that “many of the migrants in Africa are there independently of any 
state direction” (Mohan, 2009:5). Moreover, in her study on Chinese small-and medium enterprises in 
Africa, Gu (2009) found that many are not aware of the central government’s strategies. However, one 
could argue that the relaxation of “state policy towards emigration” (Mohan, 2009:5) is itself an 
indirect measure to encourage outward migration. To my knowledge, in the context of Lesotho, there 
are no particular indications that migrants have come under some state direction. 
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feedback mechanisms. Changes in China’s structural constraints were related to the reform of 
China’s emigration law and regulation. While the process of easing restrictions on emigration 
had already been initiated in 1986, major changes came only after 2001 (Liu, 2009:319). 
Previously, outward migration from China had been complicated by the fact that the 
obtaining of passports entailed complicated procedures. For example, till 1994 people 
needed to have the “approval from their work unit and producing household registration 
documents, an invitation letter from overseas, and a financial guarantee for the duration of 
the visit.” (Liu, 2009:319). From 2000, the possession of a foreign exchange deposit replaced 
the approval of their work units (Liu, 2009:318). The 2001 Exit- and Entry Reform also 
introduced the “passport on demand” policy (Liu, 2009:319). This gave potential migrants 
from “193 large- and medium-sized cities” the possibility to get a passport “merely by 
presenting their ID and the household registration documents” (Liu, 2009:319). In other 
words, structural constraints in China limiting broad-based migration to Lesotho as well as 
potentially other countries56 were altered. 
While structural constraints in China were altered, and structural opportunities in Lesotho’s 
small-scale wholesale and retail sector remained, a number of laws complicated the setting 
up of small businesses in Lesotho. There were around 200 types of trading licenses and any 
person that wished to do business in Lesotho had to apply and obtain the appropriate one 
(US State Department, Bureau of Economic Affairs, 2012). However, many of these early 
migrants were not fluent in English, and even local business owners claimed that they were 
not aware of all the relevant regulation and polices (MTICM, 2008:114). Therefore, Chinese 
migrants often applied, intentionally or unintentionally, for the wrong license (MTICM, 
2009:6). Moreover, since major segments of the small-scale business sector were reserved for 
Basotho, the scope of possible business ventures was essentially restricted to two options: 
opening up of supermarkets or wholesale businesses. For these early migrants supermarkets 
often did not constitute a viable option because the Trading Enterprise Regulation 1999 and 
the Enterprise Act 1999 stipulated that foreigners are only allowed to operate supermarkets 
with a shop floor size of at least 1000m2. This stipulation meant that initial start-up costs, 
particularly the rent, were significantly higher. Things were complicated by the fact that the 
majority of the large-scale supermarkets in the urban centers of Lesotho was and remains in 
the hands of well-known, long-established South African retail chains such as Shoprite, Pick ’n’ 
Pay and Checkers. Therefore, the initial entrance barrier into this business sector was simply 
too high for early Chinese migrants. Establishing a wholesale business was a more viable 
option for Chinese migrants because the law did not stipulate the size of the business in terms 
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 That is not to say that Chinese migration before this time was nonexistent. My point is that migration 
became available to more people because the bureaucratic barriers were significantly lower and due to 
increases in the disposable income, more people could afford to migrate.  
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of square meters. Nonetheless, the operation of wholesale businesses restricted the scope of 
potential customers to licensed traders (i.e. not private consumers). Since demand was 
generally not too strong and the number of potential, legal costumers was relatively small, 
Chinese migrants were often found to sell to private costumers, too (MTICM, 2009:6f.). 
In the light of these complications, it seems that Chinese migrants were increasingly relying 
on family and kinship networks as a way to secure access to information, goods and people. 
For instance, Chinese shops needed cheap and reliable workers, but also goods from China. 
From accounts of Chinese migration to Europe (Pieke et al., 2004), we know that Chinese 
migrants frequently established transnational networks for securing the supply of goods and 
workers from China. This is not to say that transnational networks connecting China and 
Lesotho evolved only towards the end of the 1990s. My point is that the integration in and 
therefore the importance of these networks in the activities of Chinese migrants in Lesotho 
gained momentum only towards the end of the 1990s. Since the migrants had not unlimited 
start-up capital, they brought family members to help them set up the business and keep 
labor costs low. The frequently cited example of the Chen family, who has now allegedly 172 
family members in Lesotho, is a good example (The Economist, 2010:1). Since these 
interactions are never one-way exchanges, information about the possibilities to migrate to 
Lesotho were spread among the involved families and their communities. This brought new 
members into the transnational networks. 
Activities of transnational networks and individual migrants in turn further developed the 
contextual and endogenous feedback mechanisms. On the one hand, they were fostering the 
presence of Chinese migrants in the small-scale industry sector and were thereby 
reproducing the dominant role of foreign non-state actors. On the other hand, by informing 
friends, family and others about the opportunities in Lesotho, they fostered endogenous 
feedback mechanisms. A crude indicator for the effectiveness of these feedback mechanisms 
in stimulating further migration from China are the number of work permit applications. 
Already in 2000, 1,146 out of 2,743 total applications for work permits were filed by Chinese 
(Akokpari, 2011:92). Out of these, 923 permits were for the manufacturing sector, and 627 
for the wholesale and retail trade sector (Akokpari, 2011:98). The differences in the numbers 
of applicants between the manufacturing and the wholesale and retail sector can be explained 
by the fact that Lesotho had just become part of the US Africa Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA) in 2000. AGOA offered the textiles and garments produced in Lesotho preferential 
access to the US market. Since the US had imposed high tariffs on textiles produced in Taiwan 
or China, Taiwanese textile and garment producers in Lesotho were expanding their 
production and were ) additional managers for their expanded operations (Lall, 2007:999. 
Again, it should be noted that this type of employment-based migration was just one factor 
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that explains why Chinese migration to Lesotho gained momentum from the late 1990s, early 
2000s onwards. Another factor which might have played a role is China’s “Going-Out-/Going-
Global-Strategy”57 (Brautigam, 2009:74). 
3.2.4 Stage 4: fostering the dynamics within the Sino-Basotho migration system 
According to one interviewee, Chinese migration to Lesotho had become highly visible by the 
year 2002. This is in line with McNamee’s (2012) recent survey among Chinese migrants in 
Lesotho, which found that 85% of the interviewed migrants had stayed in Lesotho between 0-
9 years and only 15% had been in Lesotho for 10-19 years. In other words, it seems plausible 
that the Sino-Basotho migration system was fully established shortly after 2002. When 
talking about the Sino-Basotho migration system it should be noted that this system is 
characterized by a strong migration configuration. McNamee’s (2012) as well as my own 
survey both reveal Fujian Province in general and Fuqing City as the main sending areas of 
Chinese migrants. This in turn has created special dynamics with the migration system. 
For a start, flows of migrants/returnees, goods, resources, information and investments 
between China and Lesotho are mainly sustained by networks and individuals from Fuqing. 
Member of these networks are therefore likely to benefit proportionally more from potential 
network effects, e.g. by decreases in the overall costs and risks of migrating to Lesotho due to 
better information provided by other Fuqingnese migrants. This in turn makes it more 
difficult for migrants from other parts of China to establish themselves in Lesotho, and to get 
to know about the possibility to go there in the first place. Since Fujian Province and Fuqing 
City can look back on a long history of migration to South-East-Asia, America and Europe 
(Pieke et al. 2004), Fujianese and Fuqingnese migrants have a comparative advantage in 
terms of migration industry and creating a migrant economy58. The Fujianese migration 
industry, i.e. brokers and networks, has developed highly sophisticated ways of legally or 
illegally helping migrants to obtain the necessary documents and information for almost any 
possible migration destination (Pieke et al., 2004:96ff.). It seems that illegal practices are also 
common for the Sino-Basotho migration system. In July 2011, 26 Chinese migrants59., who 
arrived at the Airport in Maseru, were detained because they did not possess the right papers 
(The Lesotho Times, 2012:1). All of them had proper visas, which had been issued at the 
embassy of Lesotho in Beijing, but did not have the required return tickets. More strikingly, 
                                                          
57 The strategy was formulated in 2001 and has since then become closely associated with the growing 
presence of Chinese businesses across the world. While this strategy is clearly important, it seems that 
in the context of Africa, the majority of the smaller players (i.e. Chinese migrants and small-scale 
business owners) are not particularly aware of this strategy. For example, one interviewee of Gu’s 
study (2009) said: “we have learned about central government policies about China-Africa from the 
media, television news or newspapers. We do not know the policies or exactly how they operate in 
reality” (Gu, 2009:18).  
58 For example, in my survey Fuqingnese migrants had more businesses than non-Fuqingnese migrants. 
59 Please note that the sources did not reveal the particular origin of the Chinese nationals, i.e. which 
Province they came from. 
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these migrants arrived on a chartered plane from Mozambique. Investigations into the case 
revealed that a syndicate of four Mosotho senior government officials and two Chinese 
nationals based in Lesotho, as well as members of the embassy of Lesotho in China, were 
involved in systematically organizing illegal migration from China to Lesotho (The Lesotho 
Times, 2012:1). 
Access to these services is often costly. For example, the Lesotho Times reported in April, 
2012 that a Chinese national, found to illegally organize migration to Lesotho, received 
“58,000 Maloti60 (around 6,900 USD) for every Chinese national he delivered to Lesotho” 
(The Lesotho Times, 2012:1). This sum is considerably lower than the 10,000 to 20,000 USD 
migrants had to pay in 1999 to get to Eastern Europe (Pieke et al. 2004:97). Nonetheless, it 
still surpasses the annual income of many potential migrants. Therefore, Fujianese, but also 
migrants from other parts of China, often have to rely on family members and official or semi-
official money lenders. Many Fujianese enjoy an advantage over migrants from other parts of 
China, particularly the more Western Provinces, because their families have frequently 
managed to establish transnational networks of businesses that allow them to pay these sums. 
Even for potential migrants that cannot rely on family access to credit, acquiring these sums 
is often not a big obstacle. Banks or individuals, whose families have acquired wealth through 
migration, often readily lend to new migrants. In some Chinese counties and prefectures the 
local governments encourage and support migration, because they view it as a way to 
develop the Home County or Prefecture (Pieke et al., 2004). This applies particularly to 
counties and prefectures that traditionally did not have any overseas connections and whose 
economic situation deteriorated after the reform era. Mingxi County is a case in point (Pieke 
et al., 2004:58f.). 
In terms of creating a migrant economy in Lesotho, Chinese migrants in general, and 
Fujianese and Fuqingnese in particular appear to be engaged in different types of economic 
activities. The most visible economic activities include the involvement in the textile and 
garment industry, small-scale manufacturing (for example, Chinese migrants are running a 
sandstone factory in Berea District), and operating of small-retail shops, supermarkets and 
other wholesale business in urban and rural areas. This is also reflected in the statistics of the 
Lesotho’s OSBFC in Maseru. Their statistics show that the number of applications for work 
permits increased from 546 in 2008 to 897 in 2011 (OSBFC, 2012). Out of these, 80% are 
from Chinese and only 15% from South Africans (OSBFC, 2012). The majority of the 
applications was for supervisors in the textile and garment industry, followed by managers 
for import and exports, ware house, workshop, dispatch, shipping, packing, and sales (OSBFC, 
2012). These activities are catering both the special demand of Chinese as well as the broader 
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 Maloti is the official currency of Lesotho. 
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local demand. Frequently, Chinese migrants are entering deals with Basotho to use their 
business licenses, especially for the business sectors that are reserved for Basotho (MTICM, 
20009:14). Furthermore, Chinese migrants destined to work for other Chinese migrants in 
Lesotho are supplied through the migration industry. Unfortunately, in rare cases this also 
includes the provision of forced labor, particularly prostitution. In January 2012, three 
Chinese women were freed after they had been forced to work as prostitutes in a local hotel 
(Lesotho Times, 2012:1). The women had been brought to Lesotho on the pretext that they 
would work for some respectable company and were then forced to sell their services for M 
1,500 (around 180 USD) (Lesotho Times, 2012:1). 
Looking at the described dynamics, we note that the Sino-Basotho migration system is not 
only shaped by the Chinese, but also by the interactions between Chinese and Basotho. So far, 
I have described some extreme forms of interaction such as the cooperation in illegal human 
trafficking and illegal licensing. But interactions between Chinese and Basotho include a 
whole array of other forms, for example: interactions between Chinese migrants and local 
authorities, Chinese migrants and the local communities, and Chinese employers and Basotho 
employees. Some of these more common interactions will be described in more detail in the 
next chapter. 
4. Non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migration configuration: highlighting 
intra-Sino-Basotho migration system similarities and differences 
Despite the fact that Chinese migration to Lesotho is not a new, albeit important, 
phenomenon, only few systematic studies on Chinese migrants in Lesotho have been 
conducted (see e.g. Park, 2009, Park, 2010; McNamee et al., 2012). Moreover, to my 
knowledge no studies on particular migration configurations within the Sino-Basotho-
migration-system exist. As a result, we know relatively little about Chinese migrants and 
intra-migration system migration configurations. Identifying this knowledge gap, I decided to 
conduct a survey among Chinese migrants in Lesotho (i) to find out more about Chinese 
migrants’ demographic characteristics, their migration pattern, their image of Lesotho, and 
their problem solving strategies; and (ii) to discover intra-Sino-Basotho migration system 
differences and similarities. Building on findings from my survey, this chapter provides a 
detailed account of the profile of migrants from two migration configurations within the Sino-
Basotho migration system: the Fuqingnese and the non-Fuqingnese migration configurations. 
Note that―when using a conservative definition of migration configurations―it might be 
questioned to what extent the non-Fuqingnese migration configuration qualifies as a full-
fledged migration configuration, since it is composed of Chinese migrants originating from 
several different of cities. However, since the amount of questionnaires from migrants from 
specific cities other than Fuqing is not sufficient to derive statistical relevant results, I 
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decided to apply the concept of migration configuration also to the non-Fuqingnese case. This 
allows me to derive differences between the specific migration configuration of Fuqingnese 
migrants, and a meta-configuration which might be interpreted as the average of all other 
migration configurations, i.e. the non-Fuqing migration configuration. I start with a few 
introductory remarks about the survey, and continue with my definition of the two migration 
configurations within the Sino-Basotho migration system. This is followed by a detailed 
description of the profile of migrants from these two migration configurations. Finally, I 
discuss intra-migration system similarities and differences. 
4.1. Survey sample: introductory remarks  
Before analyzing migrants from the two particular migration configurations, it is useful to 
briefly describe some aspects of my survey. I conducted the survey myself in seven towns in 
Lesotho during two research trips in November 2011 and February 2012. I identified 
potential participants for the survey by going to Chinese shops and supermarkets in the 
central areas of the seven towns, informing the Chinese migrants inside these shops about my 
survey and asking them whether they would be willing to participate. In some cases, they 
referred me to another person in the shop or to a neighboring shop, and this information was 
used to increase the number of participants. In total 86 Chinese migrants took part in the 
survey. 
With the exception of Roma, Lesotho’s university town in Maseru District, the survey was 
carried out in central areas of larger towns of Lesotho’s administrative districts: Butha Buthe 
(capital of Butha Buthe District), Mafeteng (capital of Mafeteng District), Maseru (capital of 
Lesotho and Maseru District), Maputsoe (second largest town in Leribe District), Mokhotlong 
(capital of Mokhotlong District), and Teyateyaneng (capital of Berea District). These towns 
are located in three different livelihood zones61: Maseru, Mafeteng and Roma are located in 
the Southern Lowlands, Butha-Buthe, Maputsoe and Teyateyaneng in the Northern Lowlands, 
and Mokhotlong in the Mountain Zone. Together, these three zones comprise 80% of 
Lesotho’s population. Moreover, all towns, except for Mokhotlong, are close to the South 
African border and can therefore be assumed to have comparably good access to the South 
African market. 
Figure 9 shows that the three places with the highest number of migrants participating in the 
survey were in descending order: Maseru, Maputsoe, and Mafeteng. Variations in the number 
of migrants participating are partly explainable by structural differences between the 
“developed” Southern and Northern Lowlands, and the remote mountain areas, i.e. by 
different absolute numbers of Chinese migrants living and working in the respective cities. 
                                                          
61 Lesotho’s livelihood zones are „six geographical regions, differentiated according to factors such as 
population density, agricultural productivity, primary economic activities and sources of cash in the 
area, average levels of income, access to markets and infrastructure” (MTICM, 2008:76f.). 
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However, these variations are also a reflection of other constraints: in some towns, a smaller 
percentage of Chinese migrants was willing to participate in the survey. This applied 
especially to Teyateyaneng. There, some local migrants, who disapproved the survey, 
appeared to have a fast communication network which informed and “warned” other 
migrants about my presence and therefore made it more difficult for me to win participants. 
Furthermore, due to practical constraints at several stages of the research trip (i.e. little time 
until next bus connection, accommodation in a different city, and similar), the relative 
coverage of some towns was lower than that of other towns. Therefore, variations across the 
different towns cannot be assumed to be in all cases a direct reflection of a stronger or 
weaker presence of Chinese migrants. 
Figure 9 Distribution of migrants across the seven towns Lesotho 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, I used two sets of questionnaires62. In the subsequent analysis of 
my results, I will use the terms “Category 1 migrant” and “Category 2 migrant” to indicate the 
type of questionnaire. The survey sample consisted of 54 Category 1 migrants, and 32 
Category 2 migrants. The higher rate of collected Category 1 questionnaires can be partly 
attributed to the fact that potential migrants for Category 2 questionnaires were frequently 
more cautious and often not sure if they were allowed to participate in such a survey. For 
example, in one instance a Chinese employee first called her boss in China to find out if she 
was allowed to participate. 
4.2. Non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants: defining migration configurations 
within the Sino-Basotho migration system 
In Section 2.1.2 I pointed out that migration configuration, by focusing on connections 
between particular areas of origin and destination, is a useful concept for highlighting intra-
migration system differences. My study showed that migrants were mainly divided along two 
lines: non- Fujianese and Fujianese, and non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants. In the 
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 The first set (Category 1) was given to all those migrants who considered themselves as the boss of a 
business, or at least did not consider themselves as “simply” working there The second set (Category 2) 
was given to all those migrants who considered themselves as working in the businesses, or those who 
directly affirmed that they were personnel or staff. 
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survey, non-Fujianese migrants constituted 22% and Fujianese migrants 68%. Non-
Fuqingnese migrants on the other hand comprised 45% and Fuqingnese migrants 55% of the 
survey. Taking into consideration (i) the small share of non-Fujianese migrants, (ii) the low 
intra-Fujianese diversity (i.e. 70% of the Fujianese migrants were from Fuqing), and (iii) the 
tendency of migration configurations to be manifested in connections between particular 
local places that are embedded into larger structures (i.e. migration systems), I decided to 
divided the survey sample into non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants. Fuqingnese 
migrants were defined as all migrants whose place of origin is Fuqing63 and non-Fuqingnese 
migrants in turn comprised all migrants whose place of origin is not Fuqing. 
The Fuqingnese migration configuration was constituted of Fuqingnese migrants. Since 
migrants in this configuration are from the same place of origin, they face a similar set of 
structural opportunities and constraints. This means that intra-migration configuration 
variances are mainly deriving from actor-level differences, i.e. differences in material and 
non-material resources, and personal attributes of migrants. The non-Fuqingnese migration 
configuration was constituted of non-Fuqingnese migrants from various Chinese towns (see 
Section 4.3). Unlike the Fuqingnese migration configuration, the non-Fuqingnese migration 
configuration has higher intra-migration configuration variances because migrants from this 
configuration can be considered to face, depending on the place of origin, different structural 
opportunities and constraints. In other words, intra-migration configuration variations of 
Fuqingnese migrants are a result of both actor-level and structural differences. 
Generally speaking, differences in structural opportunities and constraints at the places of 
origin are important for explaining the “why so many out of so few places” phenomenon 
(Faist, 2000:43), because the structural setting directly or indirectly determines the 
percentage of people who are able to migrate to a particular place. In the context of my 
survey, the fact that participants were already in Lesotho shows that they had successfully 
overcome structural constraints. The overcoming of structural constraints is closely linked to 
actor-level characteristics (demographic characteristics, migration patterns, image of Lesotho, 
problem solving strategies). By comparing Fuqingnese and non-Fuqingnese migrants’ actor-
level characteristics, I am able to identify similarities and differences between the two 
migration configurations, and to highlight intra-Sino-Basotho-migration system variations. 
Both of these results are important for better understanding the nature of Chinese migration 
to Lesotho. 
                                                          
63 Fuqing is a coastal city in Fujian Province which has traditionally good overseas links and a long 
tradition of outward migration. 
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4.3 Non-Fuqingnese migration configuration: a profile of non-Fuqingnese migrants 
The non-Fuqingnese migration configuration consisted of migrants from Chongqing (n=2), 
Danshan (n=5), Fuzhou (n=14), Guangzhou (n=1), Jiangyi (n=1), Shanghai (n=1), Tianjin 
(n=1), Wuhan (n=1), Yuqi (n=1), Zhenjiang (n=1), five undisclosed64 cities in Fujian Province, 
and one undisclosed city in Jiangsu and Hubei Province. Non-Fuqingnese migrants have 
established connections between their place of origin and all seven towns of Lesotho. 
However, the strength of these connections, as reflected in their presence in particular towns, 
differs. The towns with the highest number of non-Fuqingnese migrants taking part in the 
survey were in descending order: Maseru (n=18), Maputsoe (n=7), Mafeteng (n=7). In Butha 
Buthe and Mokhotlong, one non-Fuqingnese migrant participated, each. In absolute terms, 
non-Fuqingnese migrants constituted 58% of all migrants in Maseru, half of those in 
Teyateyaneng and Mafeteng, 40% of those in Maputsoe, only a quarter of all migrants in 
Butha-Buthe and Mokhotlong. This in turn indicates that non-Fuqingnese migrants have 
established stronger connections than Fuqingnese migrants between their place of origin and 
Maseru, Teyateyaneng and Mafeteng, respectively weaker connections to the other cities. 
4.3.1 Selected demographic characteristics 
Out of 39 non-Fuqingnese migrants, 23 were Category 1 migrants and 16 were Category 2 
migrants. With 18 male and 21 female migrants, the non-Fuqingnese sample, unlike the total 
sample, had a slightly higher female rate. In the survey, the age of non-Fuqingnese migrants 
ranged from 20 years to 62 years (see Figure 10). Nearly two thirds (n=23) of surveyed non-
Fuqingnese migrants were between 20 and 39 years old. Further analysis showed important 
differences in the mean age of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants: whereas 
the former had a mean age of 37, the latter had a mean age of 31 years. Differences in the 
mean age of male and female non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants were marginal. In other 
words, it seems that non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants are on average older than non-
Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants. 
  
                                                          
64
 These migrants only disclosed their Province, but not their city of origin. 
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Figure 10 Age of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants 
 
Looking at the marital status of the non-Fuqingnese migrants (Figure 11), it can be noted that 
74% of Category 1 migrants (n=17) and 56% of Category 2 migrants (n=9) were married. The 
different proportions of married and single migrants can be traced to gender and age 
differences: three out of four married male non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants were older 
than 40, and three out of five married female non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants were older 
than 35 (i.e. beyond age still considered acceptable to be single). The large proportion of 
singles among non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants derived likewise from age and gender 
differences. Many single non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants had not yet reached the 
“typical age” for marriage (i.e. 67% of them were between 20 and 25 years old). Moreover, 
since more than 83% of them were males at an average age of 30, it is possible that they had 
not yet accumulated enough wealth for being in the social position to marry. 
Figure 11 Martial status of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants 
 
For the previous occupational status of non-Fuqingnese migrants it could be noted that 56% 
had been a “businessperson”. Moreover, a great overlap between the Categories and migrants’ 
previous occupational status was found: 87% of the non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants 
(n=20) had previously been “businesspersons or merchants” 65; and 81% of non-Fuqingnese 
Category 2 migrants (n=15) had previously been “staff” 66(Figure 12). 
                                                          
65 Businessperson or merchant: 商人 shangren. 
66 Staff: 职工 zhigong. 
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Figure 12 Previous occupational status of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 
migrants 
 
Figure 13 shows that there were significant differences between the present occupational 
status of non-Fuqingnese migrants and belonging to a certain category and having a 
particular present occupational status (see Figure 13). For Category 2 non-Fuqingnese 
migrants the answers to both questions were relatively consistent: 81% stated that they were 
presently “staff” (n=13), and only one migrant stated that he was presently a “businessperson 
or merchant”. Yet, only 43% of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=8) stated that they 
were presently “businesspersons or merchants”, and 34% (n=6) stated that they were 
presently “staff”. This puzzle will be further discussed in Section 4.5. 
Figure 13 Present occupational status of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 
migrants 
 
When moving away from simply comparing changes in the absolute numbers and separately 
analyzing particular occupational statuses, it can be noted that 62% of the non-Fuqingnese 
migrants (n=24) did not experience any change between their previous and present 
occupational status. This was most evident among non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants. Here, 
81% (n=13) had previously been and continued to be “staff”. Among non-Fuqingnese 
Category 1 migrants the number of those who did not experience any changes was smaller. 
Only ten migrants did not experience any changes. Out of these ten, eight were and continued 
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to be “businesspersons or merchants”. Among the total survey sample, the share of 
Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants who had previously been and continued to be 
“businesspersons or merchants” was only 35%. 
4.3.2 Migration patterns 
To better understand the migration pattern of non-Fuqingnese migrants, they were asked 
about their motivations to come to Lesotho, the people that accompanied them, earlier 
outward migration experiences, the duration of their stay in Lesotho and their future plans. 
The motivations of non-Fuqingnese migrants highly matched those of their respective 
categories (see Figure 14): 74% of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=17) had come to 
Lesotho “to start a business”, and 50% of non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants (n=8) had 
come to Lesotho “to seek employment”. Only three non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants 
indicated that they had come to Lesotho to “seek employment”. 
Figure 14 Motivation of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants to come to 
Lesotho 
Motivation Category 1 Category 2 Total 
Accompany family members 0 1 1 
Start a business 20 1 21 
Seek employment 3 8 11 
While there were larger differences between motivations of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and 
Category 2 migrants, only small differences existed when it came to the purpose of making 
money (see Figure 1567). Out of 36 non-Fuqingnese migrants, 50% (n=18) said that the main 
purpose of making money was to “support the family” and 25% (n=9) said that it was to 
“support oneself”. Interestingly, only one person stated that he wanted to “buy a house”. 
These findings back up the view that Chinese migration is highly a family decision which 
serves to secure the wealth and prosperity of the family. 
Figure 15 Selected purpose of making money of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 
migrants 
Purpose  Category 1 Category 2 Total 
Support oneself 6 3 9 
Support family 11 7 18 
Buy a house 1 0 1 
Looking at the people who accompanied non-Fuqingnese migrants, we find further support 
for the claim that their decision to migrate to Lesotho is mainly part of a larger family risk-
diversification strategy. As Figure 16 shows, 76% of the non-Fuqingnese migrants (n= 28) 
came together with some part of their family and only 13% came alone (n=9). Moreover, 88% 
                                                          
67 The total number is here 28 (instead of 37). 
62 
 
(n=15) of the married non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants and 88% (n=8) of the married 
Category 2 migrants had brought some part of their family. Out of the nine migrants who had 
come alone, two thirds were from Category 2 (n=6). Among the six non-Fuqingnese Category 
2 migrants, five were single and younger than 30, and four claimed to have come to Lesotho 
to seek employment. 
Figure 16 Persons that accompanied non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants 
Person Category 1 Category 2 Total 
Alone 3 6 9 
Husband/wife 12 7 19 
Husband/wife + Child 1 3 4 
Husband/wife + parents 3 1 4 
Parents 0 0 0 
Others 0 1 1 
When it came to previous outward migration experiences of non-Fuqingnese migrants, 
surprisingly 82% of non-Fuqingnese migrants (n=32) did not have any outward migration 
experience (see Figure 17). Only a small group of seven non-Fuqingnese migrants (five from 
Category 1 and two from Category 2), stated that they had been to another country before 
coming to Lesotho. The majority had stayed in their previous migration destination for three 
years and only one person had stayed for more than nine years. Among all non-Fuqingnese 
migrants with previous migration experience, male migrants (n=4) had a slightly higher 
share than their female counterparts (n=3). 
Figure 17 Previous migration experience of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 
migrants 
 
Turning to the duration of the stay in Lesotho, almost 60% of non-Fuqingnese migrants 
(n=23) had been in Lesotho for at least five years. For example, out of 36 non-Fuqingnese 
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migrants68, 31% (n=11) had been in Lesotho for more than nine years and 25% between five 
to seven years (n=9). A clear difference in the duration of the stay existed between non-
Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants: 50% of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 
migrants (n=18) had been in Lesotho for more than five years (see Figure 18). For non-
Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants the reverse applied: 62% (n=13) 69 had been in Lesotho for 
less than five years. Only two non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants had been in Lesotho for 
more than nine years. 
Figure 18 Duration of the stay in Lesotho of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 
migrants 
 
Regarding the answers of non-Fuqingnese migrants to the question of how long they were 
intending to stay in Lesotho, it could be observed that 41% of non-Fuqingnese migrants 
(n=16) indicated that they were intending to stay in Lesotho between one to five years. 
Moreover, 26% of all non-Fuqingnese migrants “did not know” how long they would stay. 
Only one migrant indicated to intend to leave Lesotho after more than nine years (see Figure 
19). Leaving those aside who said they would not know, it could be noted that Category 1 
migrants had a slightly higher share among those migrants who were indenting to stay in 
Lesotho for more than three years. Likewise, Category 2 migrants had a higher share among 
those who were intending to stay in Lesotho for less than three years. 
  
                                                          
68 The first version of the survey did not include this question. Therefore total number of respondents 
is 36. 
69 The question was not included in the first round therefore three Category 2 migrants were not asked 
this question. 
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Figure 19 Intended duration of the stay in Lesotho of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and 
Category 2 migrants 
 
While the answers of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants diverged with 
regard to the duration of their past and future stay, their answers to the question of where 
they intend to go afterwards were very similar: 90% of all non-Fuqingnese migrants (n=35) 
wanted to go to “China”, and only 2% (n=2) intended to go to America or Oceania, each 
(Figure 20). Tellingly all of the non-Fuqingnese migrants (five Category 1 migrants and two 
Category 2 migrants) who had previous outward migration experience wanted to go back to 
China. Furthermore, none of migrants who had migration experiences with other African 
countries (n=2) wanted to migrate to another African country. 
Figure 20 Next migration destination of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 
migrants 
 
4.3.3 Image of Lesotho 
An important aspect for understanding Chinese interactions with the local population (see 
Chapter 5) is to try to capture some aspects of the image that Chinese migrants about Lesotho, 
and the relations with Basotho and the local Chinese. In the first question in this regard 
migrants were asked about their image of Lesotho before they came to the country (see 
Figure 21). The majorities of both, non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants, had 
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an “average impression” of Lesotho. Furthermore, it could be noted that non-Fuqingnese 
Category 1 migrants tended to have a slightly better impression of Lesotho than Category 2 
migrants. However, in both cases migrants with a “non-average” impression constituted the 
minority. 
Figure 21 Impression of Lesotho (before) of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 
migrants 
 
When comparing the present impressions of non-Fuqingnese migrants to their impression 
prior to migration, a slight shift from a positive to a negative impression can be observed. 
While Category 1 migrants still tended to have a more positive impression of Lesotho than 
their Category 2 counterparts, those with a bad or not so good impression increased among 
both Categories (see Figure 22). 
Figure 22 Impression of Lesotho (after) of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 
migrants 
 
One possible explanation for these changes can be found when analyzing the impressions of 
non-Fuqingnese migrants of the attitude of Basotho towards Chinese (see Figure 23). Here, 
Category 1 migrants assessed the attitude of Basotho towards Chinese more positive than 
their Category 2 migrants, too. But unlike earlier, non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 
migrants had almost equal share among those who thought that Basotho displayed a “bad” or 
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a “not so good” attitude towards Chinese. Interestingly, non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants 
constituted 60% of those who stated that Basotho had a “bad attitude” and non-Fuqingnese 
Category 2 migrants constituted 67% of those who said Basotho had a “not so good attitude” 
towards Chinese. In other words, Category 2 migrants were grading the attitude slightly 
better than their Category 1 counterparts. A point worth noting here is that the share of 
migrants felt that Basotho had an “average attitude” towards Chinese was significantly lower 
than the 64% who had an “average impression” of Lesotho before migration and the 54% 
who had an “average impression” afterwards. 
Figure 23 Impression of the attitude of Basotho towards Chinese of non-Fuqingnese 
Category 1 and Category 2 migrants 
 
Although non-Fuqingnese migrants tended to have a rather negative impression of Basotho’s 
attitude towards Chinese, the opposite was found for the relations with Basotho (see Figure 
24). Non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants who thought relations with 
Basotho were “average” represented the largest group (n=20). But those who thought that 
relations were “good” or “very good” represented the second largest group (n=19). Only a 
small minority thought relations were “bad”. Again, Category 1 migrants had a higher share 
among those who gave a positive assessment.  
Figure 24 Relations with Basotho of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants 
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In stark contrast to the answers about the relations with Basotho, the answers of non-
Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants revealed an overall positive assessment of 
the relations with the local Chinese (see Figure 25). The majorities of both groups thought 
that relations were good. Only a small group of Category 1 and Category 2 migrants stated 
that relations were “average”. More importantly not a single participant thought relations 
were bad. This somewhat questions the extent to which non-Fuqingnese migrants are less 
integrated into the local Chinese community (discussed later). 
Figure 25 Relations with local Chinese of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 
migrants 
 
4.3.4 Problem solving strategies 
To find out more about the problem solving strategies of non-Fuqingnese migrants, the 
survey asked migrants about their advance preparations, and the people that would help 
them in times of difficulties. Starting with the preparations of non-Fuqingnese migrants (see 
Figure 26), the survey showed that 39% “did not prepare” (n=15). They were followed by 28% 
of migrants who “asked their friends for advice” (n=11). Interestingly, “learning English” and 
“looking at experiences of others online” were not important preparation strategies among 
non-Fuqingnese migrants. 
Figure 26 Preparation of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants 
Preparation Category 1 Category 2 Total 
Ask friends for advice 8 3 11 
Learn English 3 2 5 
Did not prepare 9 7 16 
Look at experiences of others online  1 0 1 
The next important aspect of non-Fuqingnese migrants’ problem solving strategies could be 
derived from their answers to the questions of who would help them when they had 
problems (see Figure 27).  
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Figure 27 Sources of help for non-Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants 
Source of help Category 1 Category 2 Total 
Family 9 6 15 
Colleagues 2 2 4 
Local Chinese 6 7 13 
Basotho 0 0 0 
Myself 0 2 2 
In the survey, the family (n=13), local Chinese (n=11) and colleagues (n=4) were the three 
most common sources of help. Not a single non-Fuqingnese migrant indicated that he or she 
would turn to “Basotho”. For 60% of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=9) the “family” 
was the most important source of help. Among them, all migrants had brought some part of 
their family. This in turn could indicate that they were part of a family business. For non-
Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants, local Chinese were the most important source. Here, 83% 
(n=7) had been previously and were presently “staff”. Interestingly, only two had come alone 
and more than half had brought their husband or wife. 
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4.4 Fuqingnese migration configuration: a profile of Fuqingnese migrants 
Having described the profile of non-Fuqingnese migrants, I now continue with the 
description of the Fuqingnese migrants and the Fuqingnese migration configuration. The 
Fuqingnese migration configuration included 47 Fuqingnese migrants who had established 
connections between Fuqing and all surveyed towns in Lesotho. However, the strength of 
these connections, as reflected in their presence in particular towns, differs. The largest 
groups of Fuqingnese migrants were found in Maseru (n=13), Maputsoe (n=11) and Mafeteng 
(n=7). Moreover, compared to the non-Fuqingnese migration configuration, the connections 
between Fuqing and the surveyed towns were stronger in six out of seven towns. The sample 
of Fuqingnese migrants included 31 Category 1 and 16 Category 2 migrants. With 19 female 
and 28 male migrants, males had a higher share among Fuqingnese migrants. 
4.4.1 Selected demographic characteristics 
The demographic characteristics of Fuqingnese migrants covered by my survey include age, 
marital status, place of origin, as well as the previous and present occupational status. The 
age of Fuqingnese migrants ranged from 19 years to 48 years and 82% of them were between 
19 and 39 years old. As earlier, difference in the mean age of Fuqingnese Category 1 and 
Category 2 migrants can be observed (see Figure 28). Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants had a 
mean age of 36 years, whereas Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants had a mean age of only 30 
years. Moreover, the share of migrants older than 40 years was lower. This means that 
Fuqingnese migrants confirmed the trend that Category 1 migrants are on average older than 
Category 2 migrants. 
Figure 28 Age of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants 
 
 
Figure 29 shows that 85% of Category 1 migrants (n=28) and 60% of Category 2 migrants 
(n=10) were married. These shares were slightly higher than the shares of married non-
Fuqingnese migrants. Again, Category 2 migrants formed the largest group among single 
Fuqingnese migrants (n=5). The fact that the mean age of single Fuqingnese Category 2 
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migrants was 21 years may explain their marital status. The large proportions of married 
Fuqingnese migrants can be likewise traced to age.  
Figure 29 Marital status of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants 
 
An analysis of the previous occupation status of Fuqingnese migrants revealed that more 
than half of them had been previously a “businessperson or merchant” (see Figure 30), and 
less than 40% said they had been “staff”. As earlier, an overlap between the Categories and 
migrants’ previous occupational status existed: 78% of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants 
(n=24) had previously been a “businessperson or merchant”; 81% Fuqingnese Category 2 
(n=13) migrants had previously been “staff” (see Figure 30). 
Figure 30 Previous occupational status of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants 
 
When asked about their present occupational status, 48% of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants 
stated that they were “staff” (n=23), and only 17% (n=8) stated that they were at present a 
“businessperson or merchant” (see Figure 31). Compared to the 34% of non-Fuqingnese 
migrants who considered their present occupational status as that of a “businessperson or 
merchant”, the share of Fuqingnese migrants with a present occupational status of 
“businesspersons or merchants” was lower. When individually analyzing changes for each 
occupational status, I discovered that only 18 out of 47 Fuqingnese migrants did not 
experience any changes between their previous and their present occupational status (i.e. 
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staff-staff or businessperson-businessperson). Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 
migrants had an equal share among those 18 migrants who did not experience any changes. 
This differed from findings for non-Fuqingnese migrants where Category 2 migrants 
constituted 67% of all non-Fuqingnese migrants that did not experience any changes in their 
occupational status. Moreover, 30% of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=10) changed from 
“businessperson” to “staff”. 
Figure 31 Present occupational status of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants 
 
4.4.2 Migration patterns 
Like non-Fuqingnese migrants, Fuqingnese migrants were asked about their motivations to 
come to Lesotho, the people that accompanied them, earlier outward migration experiences, 
the duration of their stay in Lesotho and their future plans. Again, the motivations of 
Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants highly matched the motivations of a “businessperson or 
merchant”: 90% (n=28) had come to Lesotho “to start a business” (see Figure 32). Only three 
Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants indicated that they had come to Lesotho to “seek 
employment”. A similar trend applied to Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants: 47% (n=8) had 
come to Lesotho to “seek employment”. 
Figure 32 Motivation to migrate to Lesotho of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 
migrants 
Motivation Category 1 Category 2 Total 
Accompany family members 1 1 2 
Start a business 27 3 30 
Seek employment 3 8 11 
Despite differences in the motivations to migrate to Lesotho of Fuqingnese Category 1 and 
Category 2 migrants, no larger differences were observed when it came to the purpose of 
making money: 44% of all Fuqingnese migrants (n=21) wanted to “support the family” and 
19% wanted to “support oneself” (see Figure 33). The shares of Fuqingnese migrants who 
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wanted to support themselves or their families were each 6% lower than that of non-
Fuqingnese migrants. This shows that Fuqingnese migration is also part of a larger risk-
diversification strategy that serves to secure the wealth and prosperity of the family (Haugen 
and Carling, 2006:643). 
Figure 33 Selected purpose of making money in Lesotho of Fuqingnese Category 1 and 
Category 2 migrants 
Purpose  Category 1 Category 2 Total 
Support oneself 8 1 9 
Support family 17 4 21 
Buy a house 1 1 2 
The answers of Fuqingnese migrants to who accompanied them to Lesotho further support 
the claim that their decision to migrate to Lesotho is part of a larger family risk-
diversification strategy. The majorities of Category 1 and Category 2 migrants brought some 
part of their family. In contrast to the 23% of non-Fuqingnese migrants who came alone, only 
9% of Fuqingnese migrants came alone (Figure 34). Moreover, all the Fuqingnese migrants 
who came alone were male, but only one of them was single. 
Figure 34 Persons that accompanied Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants 
Person Category 1 Category 2 Total 
Alone 2 2 4 
Husband/wife 18 8 26 
Husband/wife + Child 7 0 7 
Husband/wife + parents 1 1 2 
Parents 1 1 2 
Others 0 3 3 
The survey revealed that Fuqingnese migrants had even less outward migration experience 
than non-Fuqingnese migrants. Here, 87% of all Fuqingnese migrants (n=41) had not gone to 
any other country before (see Figure 35). From the 17% of Fuqingnese migrants (n=6) with 
previous outward migration experience, 83% were Category 1 migrants (n=5) and only 17% 
Category 2 migrants (n=1). The previous migration destination of Fuqingnese migrants were 
in descending order: Asia (n=3), Europe (n=1), America (n=1) and Africa (n=1). Half of them 
had stayed there for less than one year. All Fuqingnese migrants with previous migration 
experience were male. 
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Figure 35 Previous migration experience of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants 
 
Among the surveyed Fuqingnese migrants70 (see Figure 36), 52% had been in Lesotho for at 
least five years. In contrast, only one Fuqingnese migrant stated that he had been in the 
country for less than one year. Again, a clear difference in the duration of the stay between 
Category 1 and Category 2 migrants could be identified: 58% of Fuqingnese Category 1 
migrants71 (n=14) had been in Lesotho for more than five years, and 67% Fuqingnese 
Category 2 migrants72 (n=6) had been in Lesotho for less than five years. Only 11% 
Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants had been in Lesotho for more than nine years. In contrast 
those who had been in Lesotho for more than nine years comprised 25% of the Fuqingnese 
Category 1 migrants. However, in relation to the total sample of all migrants (i.e. Fuqingnese 
and non-Fuqingnese migrants) who had been in Lesotho for more than nine years (n=17), 
Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants constituted only 36%.  
Figure 36 Duration of the stay in Lesotho of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 
migrants 
 
                                                          
70 The first survey did not include that question therefore total number of respondents is 36.  
71
 For this question the number of surveyed Category 1 migrants was 24. 
72 The question was not included in the first round therefore three Category 2 migrants were not asked 
this question. The number of persons not asked this question was 7 migrants. 
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Looking at the answers of Fuqingnese migrants about how long they were intending to stay in 
Lesotho, it could be observed that 25% (n=12) intended to leave Lesotho between “one to 
three years” and 21% (n=10) “did not know”. Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants 
displayed important differences (see Figure 37). 44% of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants 
(n=21) wanted to stay in Lesotho for additional one to five years, and 31% wanted to stay for 
more than five additional years (n=15). Furthermore, 50% of Category 2 migrants (n=8) 
wanted to stay in Lesotho for additional one to five years, and 25% (n=4) wanted to stay for 
more than five additional years. 
Figure 37 Intended duration of the stay of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants 
 
As earlier, no larger differences existed when it came to the next migration destination. Here, 
76% of all Fuqingnese migrants (n=36) stated that they intend to go back to “China”. Among 
the small minority of 11 migrants who stated that they were intending to go to some other 
country, Category 1 migrants constituted the largest group (n=8) (see Figure 38). Moreover, 
only one migrant wanted to migrate to another African country and the majority of migrants 
(n=5) with previous migration experience wanted to go back to China. 
Figure 38 Next migration destination of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants 
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4.4.3 Image of Lesotho 
To understand Chinese interactions with the local population (see Chapter 5) participants 
were asked about their impressions of Lesotho, and the relations with Basotho and the local 
Chinese. Starting with Fuqingnese migrants’ impression of Lesotho before coming to the 
country, it could be noted that 70% of Fuqingnese Category 1 and 44% of Fuqingnese 
Category 2 migrants had an “average” impression of Lesotho (see Figure 39). Moreover, 29% 
of Fuqingnese Category 1 and 50% of Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants had either a “bad” or a 
“not so good” impression. Only a minority of 4% had had a “good” impression of Lesotho. In 
other words, Fuqingnese migrants tended to have a rather negative impression of Lesotho 
beforehand. Therefore, they differ from non-Fuqingnese migrants who tended to have a 
rather average impression of Lesotho. 
Figure 39 Impression of Lesotho (before) of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 
migrants 
 
A comparison of Fuqingnese migrants’ impressions of Lesotho before and after migrating 
revealed decreases in the number of migrants with a “not so good” impression and increases 
in the number of migrants with a “good” impression. The numbers for Fuqingnese migrants 
with either a “bad” or a “very good” impression did not change. Fuqingnese Category 1 
migrants tended to have a more positive impression than Category 2 migrants (see Figure 40). 
Figure 40 Impression of Lesotho (after) of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants 
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Similar to non-Fuqingnese migrants, the share of Fuqingnese migrants who felt that Basotho 
had a “bad attitude” or a “not so good attitude” towards Chinese was 46%. Fuqingnese 
Category 1 migrants constituted only 33% of those who thought Basotho had a “bad attitude” 
towards Chinese (i.e. 27% less than non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants). Again, Category 2 
migrants tended to have a more negative impression of the attitude of Basotho towards 
Chinese (see Figure 41). Moreover, Fuqingnese migrants who thought that Basotho displayed 
an “average attitude” were only 31%. Again, this was significantly lower than the 53% who 
had an “average impression” of Lesotho before (see Figure 39) and the 48% who had an 
“average impression” afterwards (see Figure 40). 
Figure 41 Impression of the attitude of Basotho towards Chinese of Fuqingnese Category 1 
and Category 2 migrants 
 
As Figure 42 shows, that both Category 1 and Category 2 migrants gave a rather positive 
assessment of their relation with Basotho. Category 1 and Category 2 migrants who thought 
relations with Basotho were “average” represented the largest group (n=28). But those who 
thought that relations were “good” or “very good” represented the second largest group 
(n=16). Only a small minority though relations were “bad” (n=1).  
Figure 42 Relations with Basotho of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants 
 
77 
 
The assessment of the relations with local Chinese confirmed the trend that the relations with 
local Chinese are better than those with Basotho (see Figure 43). The majorities of 
Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 had “good”, “very good” or “excellent” relations with 
local Chinese. Only one Category 2 migrant thought relations with local Chinese were “bad”. 
This in turn confirms that Fuqingnese migrants are rather well integrated into the local 
Chinese community. 
Figure 43 Relations with local Chinese of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants 
 
4.4.4 Problem solving strategies 
Figure 44 summarizes the advance preparations of Fuqingnese migrants. Fuqingnese 
migrants who “asked their friends for advice” formed the largest group (n=20). They were 
followed by migrants who “did no prepare” (n=10). Among Fuqingnese migrants, more 
Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants “asked their friends for advice”, and relatively more 
Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants “did not prepare”. As earlier, “learning English” and “looking 
at experiences of others online” were not important preparation strategies. 
Figure 44 Preparation of Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrants 
Preparation Category 1 Category 2 Total 
Ask friends for advice 14 6 20 
Learn English 6 0 6 
Did not prepare 6 4 10 
Look at experiences of others online 0 2 2 
For 45% of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=14) and 60% of Category 2 migrants (n=6), 
“local Chinese” were the most important source of help (see Figure 45). Among them, 85% 
were presently “staff” (n=12). In contrast, those Fuqingnese migrants who turned to their 
“family” or their “colleagues” comprised only 27% of the Fuqingnese migrants. For the 13% 
of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants who turned to their “family” all had brought some parts of 
their family. Again, not a single migrant indicated that he or she would turn to “Basotho”. 
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Figure 45 Sources of help for Fuqingnese Category 1 and Category 2 migrant 
Source of help Category 1 Category 2 Total 
Family 4 3 7 
Colleagues 5 1 6 
Local Chinese  14 6 20 
Basotho 0 0 0 
Myself 2 1 3 
4.5 Discussion of intra-Sino-Basotho migration system similarities and differences 
Having described the profile of migrants from the non-Fuqingnese and the Fuqingnese 
migration configuration, I will now discuss some intra-Sino-Basotho-migration system 
similarities and differences characteristics, as well as some puzzles emerging from my 
findings for the two migration configurations. I start with a discussion of some common 
characteristics of the two migration configurations, i.e. qualitative differences between 
Category 1 and Category 2 participants, migration as a risk-diversification strategy, and 
limited support for the African dream thesis. I then continue with an analysis of some 
important intra-migration system differences i.e. higher share of singles among non-
Fuqingnese migrants, and differences in the problem solving strategies. Finally, I discuss 
three puzzling findings from the survey among migrants from both groups, i.e. the divergence 
between belonging to a Category (i.e. considering oneself as being a “boss”) and present 
occupational status, the negative assessment of Basotho’s attitude towards Chinese, but 
positive assessment of relations with Basotho, and low propensity of migrants to have 
previous outward migration experience and to engage in further migration. 
Qualitative differences between Category 1 and Category 2 participants manifested 
themselves first and foremost in differences in the knowledge about the business operations. 
Personal conversation with the migrants revealed that Category 1 migrants appeared to be 
more familiar with the respective businesses than Category 2 migrants. Qualitative 
differences were also reflected in the motivations of Category 1 and Category 2 participants: 
whereas the majority of Category 1 migrants had come to Lesotho to open up a business, the 
majority of Category 2 migrants had come to seek employment. Finally, qualitative 
differences were also reflected in the tendency of Category 1 migrants to adopt a medium 
timeframe for their stay in Lesotho (i.e. three to five additional years) and in the tendency of 
Category 2 participants to adopt a short timeframe (i.e. one to three years). These qualitative 
differences indicate a high involvement of Category 1 migrants and a low involvement of 
Category 2 migrants. This seems plausible if one assumes that starting a business (the main 
motivation of the majority of Category 1 migrants) requires more time and resources than 
the seeking of employment (Category 2 migrants’ main motivation). This in turn set Category 
1 migrants, regardless of their present occupational status, apart from Category 2 migrants. 
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The description of the migration patterns of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants 
indicated that for the majority migration is part of a larger family risk-diversification strategy 
that serves to secure the wealth and prosperity of the family. This indication was supported 
by migrants’ answers about their purpose of making money in Lesotho: 45% of all migrants 
stated that the main purpose for making money was to “support the family”. Moreover, 76% 
of all migrants had brought some part of their family to Lesotho. At first sight, the 20% who 
wanted to “support themselves”, seems to undermine the family risk-diversification strategy 
argument. But, when taking into account that even among these 20%, 83% had brought some 
parts of their family; it seems less plausible to assume that that their decision was not directly 
or indirectly liked to larger family risk-diversification strategies. 
Earlier studies on Chinese migration to Africa were pointing out that the motivation of 
Chinese migrants to migrate to African countries is related to the desire to make enough 
money in Africa to be able to buy a house in China or simply to make easy money (McNamee, 
2012:14). Park (2009) argued that many Chinese migrants are dreaming about returning 
“home to build a three-level home or monument’ to their success overseas” (Park, 2009:469). 
However, in the survey migrants did not neatly confirm this “African dream”. After all, only 
few migrants stated that their main purpose was to buy a house. Against this backdrop, it 
seems safe to assume that migrants’ motivations to come to Lesotho were complex and 
presumably more likely to be related to larger family risk diversification strategies. 
Coming to the differences between non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants, the first 
important difference is the higher share of singles among non-Fuqingnese migrants (i.e. 23% 
compared to 15%). As argued earlier the large proportion of singles derived in both cases 
from their occupational status (i.e. staff), age (younger than 30) and gender (i.e. mostly 
males). Despite these similarities, a clear difference between single non-Fuqingnese and 
Fuqingnese migrants existed. Out of seven Fuqingnese migrants who were single, only one 
person had come alone. In contrast, more than half of non-Fuqingnese migrants had come 
alone. 
Differences in the problem solving strategies manifested themselves in the different 
preparation strategies of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants. Whereas 43% of 
Fuqingnese migrants “asked their friends for advice”, only 28% of non-Fuqingnese migrants 
did the same. In fact, 38% of non-Fuqingnese migrants “did not prepare”. They are 
significantly more than the 21% of Fuqingnese migrants who “did not prepare”. The 
relatively high share of those who “did not prepare” among non-Fuqingnese migrants is 
inevitably linked to their current occupational status: 67% of them were “staff”, out of which 
73% had come with some parts of their family. In other words, they are likely to have been a 
part of some collective or family business and in some kind of employment. This in turn 
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means that, when they decided to migrate to Lesotho, it is likely that their partners or family 
had already a clear idea of what they wanted to do, or some parts of the businesses had 
already been established. Therefore, they probably had a much clearer idea about their salary 
and other necessities, and with this knowledge, they did not need to indulge in any major 
preparations. This in turn could indicate that they were part of some transnational network. 
Likewise, the high share of Fuqingnese migrants whose preparation strategy consisted of 
“asking friends for advice” could―at least theoretically―indicate that they had contact with 
persons involved in transnational activities with Lesotho and/or other countries. Of course, 
not every friend is automatically engaged in transnational activities. But ultimately, it seems 
rather likely that the friends which were asked would have to have some knowledge about 
and/or experience in Lesotho, in order to be considered useful as a preparation strategy. 
Finally, differences in the problem strategies also expressed themselves in the persons non-
Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants would turn to for help. For instance, for 33% of non-
Fuqingnese migrants and only for 15% of Fuqingnese migrants, the “family” was the most 
important source of help. In contrast, 43% of Fuqingnese migrants and only 28% of non-
Fuqingnese migrants would turn to “local Chinese”. This could indicate three things: first, 
connections between Fuqingnese migrants and the local Chinese community are stronger. 
Second, because Fuqingnese migrants have a stronger presence in Lesotho, non-Fuqingnese 
migrants find it more difficult to integrate into the local Fuqingnese dominated Chinese 
communities. Third, local networks within the Fuqingnese migration configuration are more 
advanced than those of non-Fuqingnese migration configuration. 
After describing the similarities and differences of the two migrant groups, I move on to a 
discussion of the three puzzles. The first puzzle was the divergence between belonging to a 
category (i.e. considering oneself being or not being a “boss”) and present occupational status: 
only 25% of Category 1 migrants were presently “businesspersons or merchants”. This puzzle 
could relate to complex ownership and management structures of these businesses (mainly 
family businesses), which allow for flexible definitions of “boss” and “owner”, in both 
directions. But it could also relate to the fact that the Mandarin word for businessperson or 
merchant73, does not automatically imply ownership of the business or self-employment. 
Depending on the context, a businessperson can be an owner and/or a manager of a 
particular business. Likewise, the Mandarin word for staff74, denotes all people of the 
businesses, ranging from the cleaning lady to the store manager. But unlike the 
businessperson, staff implies that persons are in some form of employment. This could mean 
that the large share of “staff” simply reflects the fact that migrants were in some form of 
                                                          
73 Businessperson: 商人 shangren. 
74 Staff: 职工 zhigong. 
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employment, presumably also at the managerial level. Considering that many of these 
businesses were probably family businesses with complex ownership structures, it could be 
that Category 1 migrants said they were “staff” because they were less involved in the 
decision making processes associated with the status of a businessperson or merchant. 
The second puzzle stems from the negative assessment of Basotho’s attitude towards Chinese 
on the one hand, and the positive assessment of relations with Basotho, on the other hand. 
This puzzle could relate to the fact that migrants had witnessed changes over time in the 
attitude of Basotho towards Chinese. During personal conversations, many migrants said that 
they had observed negative changes in the attitude of Basotho during the last years. For 
example, one migrant said that when they first came to Lesotho, Basotho had a very friendly 
attitude towards Chinese, sometimes even greeting them in Mandarin. Yet, with more and 
more Chinese coming to the country, resentments among Basotho seem to have grown and 
nowadays it was said to happen that Basotho will insult them in Sesotho. Furthermore, the 
rather positive assessment of relations with Basotho could also derive from positive 
encounters in their daily interaction with their Basotho employees, co-workers and 
costumers, as compared to possibly more negative interactions with Basotho outside of their 
working environment.  
Two interesting cases can further help to illustrate the situation. The first case was a robbery 
of a Chinese-owned supermarket in Pitseng, Leribe on January 19, 2012 (The Lesotho Times, 
2012a:1). After two men had successfully robbed the supermarket they were “were 
apprehended by some villagers on the same day” and beaten severely before they were 
handed over to the police (The Lesotho Times, 2012a:1). A similar incident had occurred 
already in 2010 when a Chinese-owned supermarket in Maseru was robbed. Again, the local 
people “managed to catch the two robbers and beat them thoroughly” (The Lesotho Times, 
2012b:2). The fact that the local police officer “advised villagers not to take the law into their 
own hands and instead report the crimes to the police” (The Lesotho Times, 2012b:2), 
indicates that these were not isolated incidents. These two cases furthermore show that, 
while Chinese businesses are frequently the target of robberies or other assaults, the majority 
of the local population does not support these. In other words, although many Basotho might 
display a negative attitude towards Chinese, they are not indifferent to what happens to the 
Chinese and oftentimes are even willing to help them75. 
The third puzzle was the low propensity of migrants to have previous outward migration 
experience and/or to engage in further migration. This was demonstrated by the high 
proportion of migrants who had never migrated to any other country before Lesotho, and the 
high proportion of migrants who were intending to return to China and not to further migrate 
                                                          
75
 But it could also be that Basotho are generally against theft. For example a friend told me that in 
Kenya it does not matter who people rob, if they are caught they are beaten by the masses. 
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to other countries. Only few migrants with previous outward migration experience wanted to 
continue to another country. Tellingly, all migrants with previous migration experience in 
Africa wanted to go back to China. Since only one of them was older than 40, it seems that this 
was not related to age. These findings in turn question to what extent Chinese migrants use 
Lesotho as a springboard for future business ventures in other countries in general, and 
African countries in particular. For example, Mung (2008:92) states that “migrants intending 
to go to the western countries […] wait in Africa or Eastern European countries seeking a 
passage to Western Europe or the Latin American countries, with a view to getting to the 
United States or Canada eventually”. Yet for Chinese migrants in Lesotho, it seems that this is 
often not the case and that the propensity to engage in further migration is not directly linked 
to previous migration experience, but is more likely to be linked to age and personal 
considerations (i.e. larger family risk-diversification strategies). 
5. Chinese migrant economy in Lesotho: explaining the reproduction and 
altering of business and employment opportunities in Lesotho 
The Chinese migrant economy in Lesotho comprises mainly the economic activities of 
Chinese migrants in the textile and garment sector, the small-scale manufacturing sector, and 
the wholesale and retail sector. In my survey I focused on Chinese migrants from the 
wholesale and retail sector. The reasons for this are twofold: first, Chinese migrants’ 
economic activities in the retail and wholesale sector are the most visible aspect of the 
Chinese migrant economy in Lesotho (MTICM, 2008; Park, 2009; SAMP, 2010; McNamee, 
2012). Second, since the wholesale and retail sector is vital for creating employment and 
business opportunities for Basotho, it is important to explore how the presence of Chinese 
migrants affects these opportunities for the local population. The remainder of this chapter is 
structured as followed: I start by outlining the context in which these economic activities take 
place. This is followed by a detailed description of the economic activities of non-Fuqingnese 
and Fuqingnese migrants. Building on this I indicate how the activities of Chinese migrants 
reproduce and transform employment and businesses opportunities in Lesotho. 
5.1 The context: Lesotho’s micro- and small-scale business sector 
To better understand the setting in which the surveyed Chinese migrants are operating, it is 
useful to analyze some of the recent structural constraints and opportunities as well as 
specific constraints emanating from the Chinese migrant economy in Lesotho. The general 
constraints and opportunities stem mainly from the overall political and economic context. 
Regarding the political context, it can be observed that Lesotho has not experienced any 
major outbreaks of violence since 1998, and it seems that a higher degree of political stability 
has developed ever since. The peaceful transition after this year’s elections is a case in point 
(Jordan, 2012:2). Since then, there were no signs that the government or administration was 
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actively changing its policy towards Chinese. Thus, the structural opportunities which existed 
at the time of the creation of the Sino-Basotho migration system were not subject to any 
significant negative inference by political actors.  
The 2008 global financial crisis affected Lesotho in general (OECD, 2011:3), and the Chinese 
migrant economy in particular. The crisis was felt primarily among Chinese migrants from 
the textile and garment industry, because this industry is more vulnerable to changes in the 
global demand (especially the USA76). The declining demand imposed―at least temporarily― 
constraints on the production and profits of Lesotho’s textile and garment industry. 
Responding to these (temporal) constraints, the textile and garment industry retrenched 
“more than 19,000 workers” (MoL, 2009:9). As a result, the overall national unemployment 
rate increased to over 40% in 2010 (OECD, 2011:17). This was 17% more than in 2008 (MoL, 
2009:7). Increases in unemployment, combined with a “15% reduction in employment in the 
South African mines77 from 2007 to 2009” (MoL, 2009:27), meant that the overall economic 
position of many Basotho worsened. This also had ramifications for the economic activities of 
Chinese migrants in the wholesale and retail sector. My personal conversations with non-
Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants revealed that business had been bad for the last three 
years because Basotho were buying fewer goods, which resulted in fewer profits on part of 
the Chinese migrants. 
When moving away from the macro-economic context, a number of sector specific 
characteristics can be identified. The wholesale and retail sector is embedded in Lesotho’s 
private sector in general and the service sector in particular. Lesotho’s private sector 
comprises around “100,000 SMEs, most of them informal” (MTICM, 2008:13). Among the 
more formal SMES, the majority were “retailers, followed by businesses in the service sector, 
and much smaller numbers in the industry and agro-processing sectors.” (MTICM, 2008:6). 
The formal and the informal small-scale enterprise sector provided roughly 200,00078 
persons with employment in 2008 (MTICM, 2008:13). In 2008, Lesotho’s service sector was 
estimated to contribute at least 85% to Lesotho’s private sector (MTICM, 2008:13). According 
to the Central Bank of Lesotho, “the greater part of the services sector is controlled or 
managed by the private individuals and organizations” (Lesotho Central Bank, 2009:2). 
Despite these impressive numbers it should be kept in mind that the “majority of SMEs are 
survivalists, and have limited potential for growth” (MTICM, 2008:6). Ironically, it is the 
survivalist nature of the retail and wholesale sector that provides the most important 
                                                          
76
 The textile industry is mainly producing for the US market because of African Growth and 
Opportunities Act (AGOA). 
77 Mine workers accounted for 95% of all licensed Basotho migrant workers in South-Africa in 2009 
(Ministry of Labor and Employment, 2009:27). 
78 In comparison to 1991, the number of small-scale enterprises decreased by 2,968, but 38,719 more 
persons found employment in this sector (Amstader and Eriksen, 1994:7). 
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structural opportunities for Chinese migrants as well as other foreigners operating in this 
sector. 
Apart from Lesotho’s general structural constraints and opportunities, Chinese migrant 
economy in Lesotho forms an important aspect of the context of Chinese migrants’ economic 
activities. The presence of many Chinese, often from the same hometown, allows Chinese 
migrants to build on existing intra-Chinese economy infrastructure such as formal and 
informal networks of suppliers and mutual support and advice (see 4.3.4). This makes the 
economic activities of those migrants who have access to these networks presumably easier. 
However, with more and more Chinese arriving to Lesotho, the “one Chinese is a dragon, 
three Chinese are bugs”79 (Haugen and Carling, 2006:651) phenomenon can be observed. 
This phenomenon not only increases inner-Chinese migrant economy competition, but also 
increases the likelihood of monopoly building. For example, certain segments of the Chinese 
migrant economy are believed to be in the hands of a few powerful families (Personal 
Interview, Maseru, February 2012). As a result, entrance barriers into Lesotho’s wholesale 
and retail market are higher and the exit barriers lower. 
5.2 Economic activities: a profile of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants 
My description of the economic activities of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants is 
based on findings from the third section of my survey questionnaire. Unlike the first two 
sections, which contained almost identical questions for Category 1 and Category 2 migrants, 
the third section asked Category 1 and Category 2 migrants different questions. For example, 
Category 1 included questions about the salary paid to Basotho and the sources of the goods 
the shops were selling. Category 2, on the other hand, included questions about the living 
costs and where the boss of the interviewee is currently staying. Although both categories 
provided important insights, I will primarily discuss the answers of Category 1 migrants to 
indicate how Chinese migrants’ economic activities reproduce or alter business opportunities 
(see Section 5.4). The answers of both categories are used to indicate how Chinese migrants’ 
economic activities reproduce and alter employment opportunities in Lesotho (see Section 
5.5). Since my analysis (see Chapter 4) showed significant differences between non-
Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants, I will also apply this distinction to my subsequent 
analysis. However, unlike earlier (i.e. in the section about migration configuration), this 
distinction is not a reflection of two separate migrant economies, but rather a reflection of 
two different types of actors, who have different material and non-material resources and 
different economic strategies. The distinction will make it possible to highlight potential 
differences between the economic activities of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants. 
                                                          
79 This saying describes in a metaphorical way the fact that individual profit margins will decrease with 
rising numbers of Chinese in one place.  
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5.2.1 Nature and scope 
To identify the nature and scope of the economic activities of non-Fuqingnese and 
Fuqingnese migrants, my survey asked participants about the type of businesses, and the 
number of years they had been running the particular business, respectively working in it. In 
addition, Category 1 migrants were asked about the number of businesses they owned, and 
Category 2 migrants about where their boss was located. Starting with the type of business, 
the majority of both, non-Fuqingnese (n=18) and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=20), 
stated that they were running80 a small-retail shop (see Figure 46). Likewise, the majority of 
non-Fuqingnese (n=16) and Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants (n=15) was working in small-
retail shops. Differences between non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants 
existed for wholesale businesses and supermarkets. In the survey, wholesale businesses were 
exclusively run by Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants. Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants 
constituted 78% of all Category 1 migrants running a supermarket. Interestingly, Fuqingnese 
Category 2 migrants were only slightly more often working in supermarkets than non-
Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants. Since I selected the shops randomly, i.e. I did not 
systematically exclude or include certain types of businesses, it seems safe to conclude that 
the fact that 71% of all surveyed migrants (n=30) were either running or working in small 
retail shops indicates that this type of business could be the most popular type of businesses 
in the central-urban areas. Likewise, the finding that 18% of all surveyed migrants were 
running a supermarket could indicate that a small group of migrants prefers this type of 
business in the central-urban areas.  
Figure 46 Type of business by non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants 
 
Having outlined the most common types of business, it is insightful to look at the number of 
businesses Category 1 migrants owned (see Figure 47). Around 50% of Category 1 migrants 
(n=27) stated that they owned only one business, 35% indicated that they owned two (n=19), 
                                                          
80 This does not necessarily mean that they owned the shop, but they were still in a higher hierarchal 
and responsibility level than Category 2 migrants. 
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9% said that they had three (n=5), and only one migrant said she had more than five 
businesses. Again, differences between non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants 
existed. For example, 65% of the non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=15), but only 39% 
of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=12), owned only one business. Moreover, 58% of 
Fuqingnese (n=13), but only 30% of non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=6) owned at 
least two businesses. For non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants the number of businesses 
seemed to be related to the duration of their stay in Lesotho: 86% of non-Fuqingnese 
Category 1 migrants who had more than one businesses had been in Lesotho for more than 
five years. This did not apply to Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants: here, only 33% (n=6) of 
Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants owning more than one business had been in the country for 
more than five years. 
Figure 47 Number of businesses owned by non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 
migrants 
 
Looking at the time non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants have been running 
their businesses, larger differences persisted (see Figure 48). 35% of non-Fuqingnese 
Category 1 migrants had been operating their business between five to seven years (n=8) and 
22% (n=5) for more than nine years. Among Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants, 29% (n=9) had 
been running the business for one to three years, 26% (n=8) for three to five years and only 
13% had been running the business for more than nine years (n=4). The tendency of non-
Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants to have been in a particular business for a longer time than 
Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants applied also partially to non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese 
Category 2 migrants. For instance, only 38% of Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants (n=6) had 
been working between five to nine years for a particular business. 
What is interesting is that the number of years Category 1 migrants have been running the 
business is rarely exactly the same as the number of years they claimed to have spent in 
Lesotho. This observation was especially striking for Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants who 
had been running a particular business for five to seven years (n=8). Here, 50% had been in 
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the country for more than seven years. Likewise, 75% of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants 
(n=6), who had been running the business for one to three years (n=9), had been in Lesotho 
for more than three years. The contrast among Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants who had 
been running the business for three to five years (n=8) was even greater. Here, only 25% 
(n=2) had been in Lesotho for only three to five years. Interestingly, for Category 2 migrants 
no larger divergences between the number of years stayed in Lesotho and the number of 
years worked in a particular business were found. This in turn could indicate that Category 1 
migrants, unlike Category 2 migrants, engage in different economic activities over the course 
of their stay and require more time to set up a business. 
Figure 48 Number of years of operating the business by non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese 
Category 1 migrants 
 
Finally, the survey showed that 55% of Category 2 migrants (n=12) stated that their boss was 
in China (see Figure 49). The rest stated their boss was in Lesotho (45%, n=8). Out of those 
stating that their boss was in China, two thirds were non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants 
(67%, n=8) and only one third Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants (33%, n=3). The respective 
differences between non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants whose boss was in 
Lesotho were smaller. Interestingly, all five Category 2 migrants, who named Maseru, 
Maputsoe or Mafeteng as the present location of their boss, were in the same city as their 
boss. This points towards two important aspects: first, it seems that the bosses of the 
surveyed non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants follow a similar pattern as Chinese migrants 
in Cape Verde, who return to China and “let Chinese employees and relatives run these 
businesses” (Haugen and Carling, 2006:456). Second, it seems that the bosses of Category 2 
migrants tend to have one or more businesses in the same town rather than at different 
locations in Lesotho. 
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Figure 49 Location of the boss of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants 
(n=22) 
 
5.3.2 Working and employment patterns 
Having outlined the scope and nature of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants’ economic 
activities, in this section I will look at the working and employment patterns of non-
Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants. Regarding the working patterns, the survey asked 
participants about their weekly and daily working times. Interestingly, both, non-Fuqingnese 
and Fuqingnese migrants had similar working patterns. Beginning with the weekly working 
days of Category 1 and Category 2 migrants, the following was observed: 97% of Category 2 
migrants (n=17) and 78% of Category 1 migrants (n=33) were working six to seven days a 
week. In contrast, 18% of Category 1 migrants (n=10), but only one Category 2 migrant 
worked five days a week. Moreover, Category 1 and Category 2 migrants who worked seven 
days a week constituted 35% of the total sample. 50% of Category 1 migrants (n=27) worked 
between six to eight hours per day and 40% between eight to ten hours (n=22) (see Figure 
50). For Category 2 migrants the shares differed: here 28% of Category 2 migrants (n=9) 
worked between six to eight hours per day, 47% between eight to ten hours (n=15) and 22% 
for more than ten hours per day (n=7). It is worth noting here that a “normal” working week 
in Lesotho consists of six days, which in turn means that the 35% of migrants who worked 
seven days a week were not only having a longer working week than the average Chinese, but 
also than the average Mosotho in Lesotho. However, considering that small businesses in 
China have long businesses hours and are often open seven days a week (personal experience 
of the author who lived for several years in different towns in China), it seems that it is not 
the 35% who work 7 days a week, but rather the 65% who work six days a week or less that 
actually deviate from the Chinese norm. 
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Figure 50 Daily working hours per day Category 1 and Category 2 migrants 
  
Regarding the employment patterns, participants were asked about the number of employees, 
both Basotho and Chinese, in a particular business (see Figure 51). In terms of the total 
number of employees, 74% of Category 1 migrants (n=40) and 65% of Category 2 migrants 
(n=21) stated that there are more than four employees in their business. Out of these, 58% of 
the Category 1 (n=23) and 74% of Category 2 migrants (n=17) were working with more than 
six people. Among all surveyed migrants only four stated that they were the only person 
working in that particular business. Moreover, 85% of the Fuqingnese migrants (n=40), but 
only 58% of the non-Fuqingnese migrants (n=23) were employing or working with at least 
four people. In contrast, 41% of the non-Fuqingnese migrants (n=16), but only 15% of the 
Fuqingnese migrants (n=7) were employing or working with equal or less than three people. 
In other words, it seems that Fuqingnese migrants provided on average more employment 
opportunities than non-Fuqingnese migrants. 
Figure 51 Number of persons working in the business non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese 
Category 1 migrants 
Persons 
Fuqingnese 
Category 1 
Fuqingnese 
Category 2 
Non-Fuqingnese 
Category 1 
Non-Fuqingnese 
Category 2 
0 0 0 0 4 
1-2 3 1 6 1 
2-3 2 1 1 4 
4-5 11 4 6 2 
6-7 6 4 2 3 
>6 5 2 0 1 
>7 5 3 5 4 
The tendency to employ more than four persons continued for the number of Basotho 
employed in the businesses (see Figure 52). However, as expected, the differences between 
those working with more than four and those working with less than four persons were 
smaller (the number of employed Basotho cannot be higher than the number of total 
employees). Earlier 74% (n=63) had stated that they were working with more than four 
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persons, now only 51% (n=44) stated that that they were working with more than four 
Basotho. Almost 50% of the Category 2 migrants (n=15), but less than 40% of the Category 1 
migrants (n=20), were working with less than four Basotho. Since differences between non-
Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants were smaller81, it seems that non-Fuqingnese and 
Fuqingnese migrants did not differ significantly when it comes to providing employment 
opportunities for Basotho. 
Figure 52 Number of Basotho working in the business Category 1 and Category 2 migrants 
 
While the previous paragraph confirmed the tendency to have more than four persons 
working in a particular business, the reverse was found for the answers of migrants about the 
number of Chinese working in a particular business (see Figure 53). 48%82 (n=33) stated that 
no other Chinese was working with them. Only two participants (both were Fuqingnese 
Category 1 migrants) stated that there were between six and seven Chinese employees in 
their business. Interestingly, 49% of the non-Fuqingnese (n=7), but only 39% of the 
Fuqingnese migrants (n=5), stated that no other Chinese was working in that particular 
business. These differences might be attributed to the fact that Fuqingnese were on average 
working with more persons. But it could also indicate that Fuqingnese migrants are more 
likely to employ a higher percentage of Chinese, which could be related to the size of the 
business. However, one can also speculate if the stronger developed migration configuration 
of the Fuqingnese (see Chapter 4) contributed to this difference. 
  
                                                          
81
 Here, 20 out of 39 non-Fuqingnese (51%) and 29 out of 47 Fuqingnese migrants (62%) were 
working with more than four people. 17 out of 39 non-Fuqingnese migrants (44%) and 16 out of 47 
Fuqingnese migrants (34%) were working with less than four people. 
82 This question was not included in the first round. Therefore the total number is 69. 
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Figure 53 Number of Chinese working in the business Category 1 and Category 2 migrants 
 
5.3.3 Wage and income structure 
The wage structure of the businesses non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants 
were running was quite similar (see Figure 54). 88% of Category 1 migrants (n=32) paid a 
salary of 1,000 to 1,500 Maloti (120-180 USD) to their Basotho employees. Still, 22% of the 
non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=5) and 32% of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants 
(n=10) paid their Basotho employees a salary of 1,500 to 2,000 Maloti (180-240 USD). Only 
two non-Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants stated that they would pay between 2,000 to 2,500 
Maloti (240-300 USD).  
Figure 54 Wages paid to Basotho by non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 in Maloti 
 
A different wage structure was found for Chinese Category 2 migrants (see Figure 55): only 
16% Category 2 migrants (n=5) said that they were having a monthly salary of less than 
2,000 Maloti. Likewise, 84% of the Category 2 migrants (n=27) stated that they had a 
monthly salary above 2,500 Maloti. This in turn indicates that Chinese employees tend to 
have higher salaries than their Basotho counterparts and that Chinese migrants are on 
average more expensive. Moreover, considering that the minimum wage for an Basotho 
employee in a wholesale and retail shop was 1,170 in 2008 (Lesotho Statistical Yearbook, 
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2010:66), the survey found that 60% of the Category 1 migrants were paying their Basotho 
employees at least the minimum wage and almost 40% were paying them more than the 
minimum wage. This in turn confirms Haugen and Carling’s (2009) and Giese and Thiele’s 
(2012) findings that some Chinese pay their local employees above the minimum wage, and 
questions, at least partially, the image of the low paying Chinese businesses. 
Figure 55 Monthly salary non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 2 in Maloti 
 
Looking at the monthly income of Category 1 migrants, it can be noted that 24% (n=13) 
earned between 1,000 to 3,000 Maloti (120-360 USD), and 41% (n=22) earned between 
3,000 to 6,000 Maloti (360-724 USD) (see Figure 56). Only a small minority of four Category 1 
migrants was earning more than 12,000 Maloti (1448 USD) per month. While it is difficult to 
assess if the surveyed migrants were indicating their profit or the disposable income, the 
large number of migrants stating to have less than 6,000 Maloti (360 USD) was surprising. 
Especially when considering that these businesses tend to employ on average 4 Basotho and 
2 Chinese which alone would amount to approximately 9,000 Maloti (1020 USD) per month 
in labor costs83. A possible explanation could be that these migrants were not the owner, but 
the manager of the business. This seems plausible, when considering the high share of 
Category 1 migrants who stated to be presently “staff”. Common wisdom to the contrary, the 
monthly income of Category 1 migrants did not automatically increase with the number of 
businesses. In fact, among the 16 Category 1 migrants who earned more than 6,000 Maloti 
(360 USD) per month, only one migrant had three businesses and only one more than five. 
Out of the remaining 14, eight had two businesses (six Fuqingnese and two non-Fuqingnese 
Category 1 migrants) and five had only one business. Here, non-Fuqingnese Category 1 
migrants had a slightly higher share. 
  
                                                          
83 Theoretically, the low income could also be an indication of the low profits. However, considering 
the relatively large number of employees per business, this seems less plausible. 
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Figure 56 Monthly income of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants in Maloti 
 
Having outlined income and wage structure, it is insightful to look at respective assessments 
of Category 1 and Category 2 migrants (see Figure 57). Non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese 
Category 1 migrants arrived at different assessments of the local wage level: 50% non-
Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=12) stated that the wage level was lower than the wage 
level in China. 45% of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (n=14) thought levels were the same 
and still 29% thought they were higher than in China (n=9). Category 2 migrants’ assessment 
of their salary in turn did not show major differences between non-Fuqingnese and 
Fuqingnese migrants. 14 Category 2 migrants thought their salary was the same as in China. 
They were followed by 13 Category 2 migrants who thought their salary was higher than in 
China. Only five Category 2 migrants stated that their salary was lower than in China.  
Figure 57 Assessment of own salary levels by non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 
migrants 
 
Figure 58 gives an overview of Category 1 migrants’ assessment of their own income. Here, 
37% of the Category 1 migrants (n=20) thought their income was higher, and 35% thought it 
was approximately the same (n=19). Only one participant thought it was twice as high as his 
income in China. The share of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants who 
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thought that their income was higher than in China was roughly equal. Differences between 
non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants prevailed when it came to the shares of those who 
thought income levels were the same or lower. Among Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants 42% 
thought the income level was the same and only 10% thought they were lower. Among non-
Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants on the other hand, those who thought the income level was 
the same and those who thought they were lower constituted each 26%. The more positive 
assessment of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants could stem from the fact that Fuqingnese 
Category 1 migrants had a higher share among Category 1 migrants with an income higher 
than 6,000 Maloti per month, i.e. the self-assessment of the migrants is consistent with their 
absolute incomes. 
Two things are worth noticing here. First, recalling that 45% Fuqingnese and 21% non-
Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants thought the local wage level was the same, and that 52% 
non-Fuqingnese and only 16% of Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants thought local wage levels 
were lower, it is surprising that there is no direct relationship between the assessment of the 
wage level and Category 1 migrants’ assessment of their own income. For instance, out of 20 
Category 1 migrants who thought incomes were higher than in China, only three thought the 
local wage level was lower. Likewise, five out of nine Category 1 migrants, who thought the 
income levels were lower than in China, stated that the local wage level was lower than in 
China. On the one hand, this could indicate that migrants were simply not sure about the 
current wage level. On the other hand, it could indicate that the success of Category 1 
migrants is not a direct result of low wages. 
Figure 58 Assessment of income levels by non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 
migrants 
 
Finally, the answers of Category 2 migrants showed that their living costs were relatively low 
(see Figure 59). Only few migrants stated that their living costs were more than 1,500 Maloti 
(180 USD). For the majority, especially for Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants, living costs 
tended to be below 1,000 Maloti (120 USD). This means that migrants tend to spend less than 
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half of their salary on living costs. Moreover, assuming that the employer of these migrants 
often provide them with accommodation and food, it seems plausible that living costs of 
Category 2 migrants are relatively low, in some cases even below 500 Maloti (60 USD).  
Figure 59 Monthly living costs of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants in 
Maloti 
 
5.3.4 Sourcing strategies 
The business success of Chinese migrants is frequently related to their (transnational) 
sourcing strategies (Haugen and Carling, 2006:643). Believing that this would also be 
important for Chinese migrants in Lesotho, I asked Category 1 migrants about their supply 
channels. The share of those who were sourcing nothing from China was higher among Non-
Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants (see Figure 60). In terms of the share of goods made in China, 
only five Category 1 migrants said that all of their goods were produced in China. 30% of the 
Category 1 migrants said that 80% of all their goods were produced in China (n=16), and 20% 
said that less than 20% of their goods were produced in China (n=11). Out of the 20%, 81% 
were from Fuqing (n=9). This could indicate that among Fuqingnese businesses the share of 
local goods sold in these businesses is much higher than often alleged. These results contrast 
the common view that China is the key sourcing country for Chinese migrants (McNamee et 
al., 2012:25). 
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Figure 60 Share of goods bought or ordered in China by non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese 
Category 1 migrants 
 
A fuzzy picture existed when it came to the importance of local Chinese wholesalers for 
sourcing goods: 28 Category 1 migrants indicated that they were sourcing more than 60% of 
their goods from local Chinese wholesalers, and 22 Category 1 migrants indicated that they 
were sourcing less than 60% from local Chinese wholesalers (see Figure 61). With a few 
exceptions, no larger differences between non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants were 
found. It seems that the decision to source from local Chinese wholesalers was directly not 
related to a particular migration configuration. Interestingly, the decision was also not 
related to differences in the relations with local Chinese. Among both groups (i.e. non-
Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants) the majority had good, very good or even 
excellent relations with local Chinese. For instance, out of the 22 who were sourcing less than 
60% from local Chinese wholesalers, 16 had good, very good or excellent relations with local 
Chinese. In other words, the decision to source from local Chinese was not related to better 
relations with them, for neither category. 
Figure 61 Share of goods bought or ordered at local Chinese wholesalers by non-
Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants 
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To find out about potential connections with South Africa, Category 1 migrants were asked 
about the share of goods they sourced from South Africa as well as the share of goods they 
sourced from Chinese wholesalers in South Africa (see Figure 62). 72% of 84 Category 1 
migrants (n=34) were sourcing less than 60% from South Africa. In fact out of these, the vast 
majority (88%) were sourcing less than 20% from South Africa (n=30). The number for those 
who were sourcing less than 60% from Chinese wholesalers in South Africa was even higher: 
37 out of 47 were sourcing less than 20% from Chinese wholesalers in South Africa. Only six 
Category 1 migrants were sourcing between 60% and 80% from Chinese wholesalers in 
South Africa. These six participants were all located closely to the South African border, 
which could explain their decision to source from South Africa. 
This being said, the proximity to South Africa did not appear to be a key aspect for the 
majority of the Category 1 participants, possibly because their type of businesses (i.e. small 
retail shop) did not require specific goods from South Africa. Moreover, the fact that 28 
Category 1 participants were sourcing from local Chinese wholesalers, but only 11 from 
China and six from Chinese wholesalers in South Africa, questions the extent to which these 
migrants are directly using transnational sourcing strategies. This in turn could indicate that 
they are more integrated in Lesotho’s economy and the Chinese migrant economy than 
initially thought. Moreover, it could indicate for Chinese migrants in Lesotho, like migrants in 
other parts in Africa, local Chinese networks are crucial (Song, 20011). 
Figure 62 Share of goods bought or ordered at local Chinese wholesalers in South Africa by 
non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants 
 
5.4 Reproducing and altering business opportunities in Lesotho 
The survey as well as personal interviews, which I conducted with key figures from different 
ministries in Lesotho, showed that the economic activities of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese 
migrants impacted business opportunities in Lesotho in a number of ways. At first sight, 
                                                          
84 The first round of the survey did not include this question. Therefore the total number is 47. 
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Chinese migrants’ economic activities in Lesotho’s wholesale and retail sector appear to fit 
the description of an “entrepreneurial niche” (Logan et al., 2003:349) because Chinese 
migrants predominate as “owners and self-employed, but without relying particularly on co-
ethnic workers” (Logan et al., 2003:349). However, the term “entrepreneurial niche” is 
misleading because, first of all, Basotho still own considerable numbers of the wholesale and 
retail businesses. Second, the economic activities of Chinese migrants did not create a whole 
new sub-sector, but were built into existing structures. The fact that Chinese migrants are 
mainly engaging in the same type of businesses as Basotho (i.e. small retail shops) underlines 
this point. The prevalence of small wholesale and retail shops appears to be a reflection of the 
structural constraints in Lesotho, i.e. a weak demand and, at the same time, a strong presence 
of established South African retailers in the large-scale retail and wholesale sector. The weak 
demand stems from decreases in the disposable income of Basotho, as well as decreases in 
employment opportunities for Basotho in South Africa. Taken together this translates into a 
low and infrequent customer base, which tends to buy mainly necessities, and thus makes it 
more difficult to run a business profitably, which explains the many survivalist businesses in 
Lesotho.  
The presence of established South African retailers means that entrance barriers into this 
large-scale retail and wholesale sector are comparatively higher because these already 
established retailers have more capital, better supply chains and more leverage. When taking 
into account that opening up a business in Lesotho entails a number of risks, it seems logical 
that Chinese migrants would keep investment to a minimum and concentrate on small shops. 
But not only general structural constraints, but also inner-Chinese migrant economy 
constraints influence the economic activities of Chinese migrants. For instance, Chinese 
migrants’ decision to focus on small-scale businesses appears to be also influenced by the fact 
that the “Chinese niche” is dominated by a few powerful actors (i.e. long-established Chinese 
families), which create strong entrance barriers for newcomers. The fact that 27 out of 54 
Category 1 migrants had only one business could further support this claim. By establishing 
mainly small retail shops and supermarkets, the economic activities of the surveyed Chinese 
migrants appear to give in to these structural constraints. Thereby, they are reproducing the 
existing business opportunity structure in the small-scale wholesale and retail business 
sector (MTICM, 2008). 
Through the establishment of small businesses in almost all of the major towns and villages 
of Lesotho 85 (MTICM, 2008; MTICM, 2009; Park, 2009; SAMP, 2010; McNamee, 2012), 
Chinese migrants have created a (perceived) strong presence. The strong presence indicates 
                                                          
85
 For example, on my way to Roma, a small town which hosts the only University in Lesotho, I saw 
many Chinese shops. In fact, a Chinese shop sometimes constituted the only shop in small villages. 
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that Chinese migrants are not only reproducing, but also altering the business opportunities 
in Lesotho. To understand how Chinese migrants alter business opportunities, it is useful to 
look at some of the strategies they developed to deal with the above mentioned structural 
constraints. For instance, because of the overall weak demand and the presence of well 
established South African retailers and the few large-scale Chinese supermarkets, many 
Chinese migrants appear to have chosen to shift their operations to various locations in 
Lesotho rather than competing in terms of business size. Moreover, given the constraints of 
Chinese migrant economy, Chinese migrants seem to have directly or indirectly chosen the 
location of their business based on the logic that “one Chinese is a dragon, three Chinese are 
bugs” (Haugen and Carling, 2006:651), i.e. the more Chinese shops there are in one location, 
the more difficult it becomes for existing and new businesses to remain profitable. Since the 
number of potential towns was limited, they decided to expand into the rural areas. In 2010 
for instance, among 167 Chinese applications for work permits in the wholesale and retail 
sector, 70 were for small villages (unpublished data from Ministry of Labor, 2012). But, in 
order to succeed in these parts of Lesotho, they had to rely on local support and existing 
businesses infrastructures. To achieve this, Chinese migrants appear to have struck deals 
with existing local shop owners, who are said to rent out their shops and business licenses to 
Chinese in exchange for a fixed monthly “rent”. This kind of practice appears to have been 
rather successful, since the number of Chinese migrants who moved into remote areas has 
risen. As a side effect of this practice and cooperation, selected Basotho gained more 
resources, but this left existing local businesses exposed to the (fierce) competition from 
Chinese migrants. For example, in already in 1999 a woman from Mokhotlong was 
successfully suing a Mosotho and his Chinese business partner for “illegally” operating a 
supermarket and a gas station in Mokhotlong (High Court of Lesotho, 1999). The case 
revealed that the shop was officially owned by the Mosotho, but practically run by the 
Chinese, who did not hold the appropriate licenses to be engaged in this kind of activity (High 
Court of Lesotho, 1999). The women had been suing these two mainly because she felt that 
she had been put in a disadvantageous position: she was adhering to the law and legally 
operating a gas station and a supermarket, but could not compete with the prices and 
practices from the “Mosotho-Chinese” shop (High Court of Lesotho, 1999). But the fact that a 
similar story was told to me indicates that this practice still continues. When I was in 
Mokhotlong in November 2011, I talked to a Mosotho shop owner who told me that ever 
since the Chinese had arrived, it has become more and more difficult to do business because 
she could not compete with the low prices of the Chinese. Moreover, unlike the Chinese who 
she said had preferential deals with big South African wholesalers, she did not have access to 
such deals. Furthermore, the high gas prices meant that she had to sell her goods at a higher 
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price than the Chinese because otherwise she could not keep her business86. In other words, 
it seems that the cooperation practices of Chinese migrants both within and outside of 
Lesotho are altering existing businesses opportunities in the sense that they are providing 
more resources to some Basotho and, at the same time, are increasing the pressure on “non-
cooperative” Basotho shops. 
Another interesting aspect of Chinese migrants’ economic activities is their influence on local 
business practices, which in turn also alters business opportunities. Chinese business 
practices differ in two aspects from those of their Basotho counterparts: i.e. the setup of the 
business and the sourcing strategies. In terms of setup, my visits to Chinese businesses 
showed that their design is very similar to that of shops or supermarkets in China: they make 
maximum use of whatever space they have, put up bright signs which announce discounts, 
play loud music to attract customers, and sell a broad range of products. My survey 
highlighted that Chinese migrants are frequently sourcing from a number of different 
locations, but mostly from local Chinese wholesalers. Moreover, several interview partners 
indicated that the Chinese tend to “buy in bulk”, i.e. to pool together orders, and have 
therefore (partially) better deals with both Chinese and South African wholesalers, which in 
turn allows them to sell at lower prices. Since more and more Basotho are appearing to copy 
these two business practices from Chinese migrants, business practices in Lesotho’s small-
scale wholesale and retail sector are gradually changing and thus altering businesses 
opportunities. 
Finally, although Chinese migrants do not dominate Lesotho’s wholesale and retail sector in 
absolute terms, they appear to be a dominant group among successful micro- and small-scale 
wholesale and retail businesses (i.e. unlike Basotho, they are mainly not survivalists). There 
are many possible explanations for this. However, as the result of my survey showed, one 
important aspect is certainly the fact that Chinese migrants, as well as other foreigners, have 
often previous experience in running small scale business, presumably in a competitive 
environment, and have better access to a (global) network of suppliers. Because of this 
comparative advantage, they are in the position to outcompete survivalist Basotho businesses 
(SAMP, 2010:67f.).  
Another factor which weakens the position of Basotho is HIV/AIDS. With 31% Lesotho has 
one of the highest infection rates and the endemic disease is changing the social and therefore 
also the economic context (Makoa, 2004:72). Since approximately 25,000 people have died 
from HIV/AIDS since 1986 (Makoa, 2004:72), the number of single-headed households with 
little income has increased dramatically (SAMP, 2010:26). But, with the number of single-
headed households increasing, it becomes also more difficult for Mosotho to take up 
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 Due to its geographic location (i.e. in the mountains relatively far away from the South African 
border and other towns) Mokhotlong might be a bit of a special case. 
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employment outside their hometowns (SAMP, 2010:25), because they do not have someone 
who can take care of their children. Considering that the majority of jobs these persons could 
take up provide only a wage which allows them to satisfy their most basic needs, but not to 
build up savings which would allow them to open up a small business, it seems that the 
number of Basotho-owned small businesses is not likely to increase in the future. This in turn 
could mean that over time an increasing percentage of small wholesale and retail shops will 
be in the hands of Chinese, and the already smaller business opportunities for Basotho will 
further decrease. However, since Basotho are also adapting to the altering of the business 
opportunities by the Chinese, it remains to be seen to what extent Chinese migrants will come 
to exclusively dominate the small wholesale and retail sector. 
5.5 Reproducing and altering employment opportunities in Lesotho 
The three most important sources for providing employment opportunities in Lesotho, apart 
from agriculture, are the public sector, the textile and garment sector, and the service sector 
(especially the wholesale and retail sector). The public sector is mainly reserved for Basotho 
with higher education and qualifications. This makes the garment and textile sector, and the 
wholesale and retail sector the most important sources for providing employment 
opportunities for less qualified Basotho and businesses opportunities for qualified Basotho 
(hence, the reserved business). Although the garment and textile sector is an important 
employer, it is mainly employing female Basotho (Gibbs, 2005:99) and it is restricted to a few 
urban centers in Lesotho (i.e. mainly to Maseru and Maputsoe) (BoS, 2012). This means that 
Basotho in the rural and mountainous areas of Lesotho are either relying on agriculture or 
the small-scale service sector (particularly, the wholesale and retail sector) for employment 
opportunities and income.  
Since there is no centralized unit87 which records all enterprises, it is difficult to get reliable 
statistics about the employment created by this particular sector. Believing that is 
nevertheless useful to have some data, I visited the MTICM in February 2012, which kindly 
provided me access to their electronic database of the Registrar of Companies, the district 
business licensing as well as an unpublished survey among foreign owned businesses. The 
below presented numbers are the result of my analysis of these databases as well officially 
published reports. My analysis of the MTICM’s 2010 Registrar of Companies showed that in 
2010 there were 2,518 registered companies which employed 66,737 Basotho and 3,501 
expats (including Chinese)88 (MTICM, 2010a). The MTICM’s database on the distinct licensing 
                                                          
87 For example, the Bureau of Statistics records only employment for the manufacturing sector. The 
Ministry of Trade, Industry, Cooperatives and Marketing has the “Registrar of Companies, and handles 
a trading or manufacturing licenses” (MTICM, 2008:99). The One Stop Business Facilitating Center 
deals with work permits and businesses licensees, but has not yet established an electronic register. 
88
 For example, the Bureau of Statistics records only employment for the manufacturing sector. The 
Ministry of Trade, Industry, Cooperatives and Marketing has the “Registrar of Companies, and handles 
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showed that in April 2010 there were 4,161 businesses in the nine districts. Out of these 
4,161 businesses, 3,591 were wholesalers, supermarkets, general dealers, household articles, 
and footwear and textiles businesses (MTICM, 2010b). However, considering that another 
survey conducted by the MTICM showed that only “ten percent of surveyed businesses said 
they were registered with the Registrar of Companies” (MTICM, 2008:99), and that the 
number of small-scale businesses is believed to be around 100,00089 (MTICM, 2008:13), it 
seems that the actual number of businesses is likely to be much higher than the 4,000 
enterprises in the MTICM’s database.  
While it was already difficult for me to obtain annual data on the number of enterprises and 
the number of people employed there, it was even more difficult to obtain reliable data on the 
absolute number of Chinese enterprises and the number of Basotho and Chinese employed 
there. The few sources to which I gained access to allow only for a very crude estimation of 
the absolute number of Chinese enterprises in Lesotho, and the number of people employ 
there. These sources include the data on the number of applications for work permits as 
recorded by the OSBFC and the MoL, the 2010 Register of Companies and a survey conducted 
among primarily Chinese businesses by the MTICM in 2009. Unfortunately in all cases the 
data was not available for different time periods, so that they are at most a snapshot of a 
particular situation, which nevertheless makes it possible to deduce some general trends (see 
Figure 63). 
Figure 63 Overview data on Chinese enterprises and employment opportunities in the 
service sector 
Source 
Chinese 
businesses 
Basotho 
employees 
Chinese 
employees 
Ratio 
MoL (2010) 449 4,986 745 11.1 : 1.7 
MTICM Registrar of 
Companies (2010) 
313 1,749 561 5.6 : 1.8 
MTICM Survey (2009) 289 1,274 555 4.4 : 1.9 
Own Survey (2012) 86 
67% more than 
4 Basotho 
81% less than 
3 Chinese 
-- 
Source: Author’s own depiction. 
Starting with the work permits, from 2008 to January 2012 the OSBFC issued a total of 3,300 
out of which 1,528 were first time applications and 1,768 renewals (OSBFC, 2012). Moreover, 
80% of these applications came from Chinese nationals (OSBFC, 2012). This means between 
2008 and January 2012 around 1,222 Chinese were first time applicants and around 1,414 
                                                                                                                                                                                
a trading or manufacturing licenses” (MTICM, 2008:99). The One Stop Business Facilitating Center 
deals with work permits and businesses licensees, but has not yet established an electronic register. 
89 This number should be treated with caution since it includes basically any kind of economic activity 
that people (including brewing beer). Therefore, one should not assume that there are in fact 100,000 
shops or businesses. 
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Chinese renewed their license. According to the OFBC, the majority of them worked as 
supervisors (cutting line, weaving, ring spinning, and quality controller), followed by 
managers (import and exports, ware house, workshop, dispatch, shipping, packing, purchases, 
sales). The database on work permits of the MoL recorded a total of 524 applications by 
Chinese nationals in 2010 (MoL, 2012). Out 449 applications for businesses in the service 
sector, 427 applications were for wholesale and retail businesses. In terms of type of business, 
178 were supermarkets and 50 wholesalers (MoL, 2012). At the time of the application these 
427 businesses were intending to employ 2,533 male and 2,453 female Basotho, and 493 
male and 252 female Chinese (MoL, 2012). This means that these businesses were on average 
intending to employ 11 Basotho and 2 Chinese. A slightly lower number was found in the 
2010 Register of Companies. Here, approximately 313 Chinese companies were employing 
1,749 Basotho and 561 Chinese (MTICM, 2010a). This translates into an average of six 
Basotho and two Chinese per enterprise. This means that, compared to the Ministry of 
Labor’s database, only half as many Basotho, but the same number of Chinese were employed 
as officially intended. Finally, the MITC survey from 2009 found that in 414 foreign 
enterprises there were 1,662 Basotho and 662 expats (MTICM, 2009). Among these 414 
enterprises, 289 were owned by Chinese, which employed 555 Chinese and 1,274 Basotho 
(MTICM, 2009). This would mean that on average Chinese enterprises were employing only 4 
Basotho and 2 Chinese. In the same survey, there were 54 Indian/Pakistani businesses which 
employed 59 foreigners and 187 Basotho (MTICM, 2009). This means that they were on 
average employing 3 Basotho and 1 foreigner. My survey among 86 Chinese migrants in 
Lesotho showed that 52 out of 86 surveyed Chinese migrants (67%) were employing more 
than four Basotho, which is consistent to the range of employed Basotho in the different 
public statistics. Likewise 30 out of 37 surveyed Chinese migrants stated that less than three 
Chinese were employed in a particular business. 
Given the qualitatively different sources the numbers are derived from (i.e. intended versus 
actual employment, only registered shops versus shops visited during surveys), as well as the 
above stated uncertainties, the different sources as well as my survey are in relatively good 
agreement, (except of the comparatively high number of average employed Basotho per shop 
in the database of the MoL which however recorded the intended employment). All sources 
confirm my results that Chinese businesses create on average more employment 
opportunities for Basotho than for Chinese. Considering that many non-Chinese owned shops 
tend to employ fewer persons, it seems that Chinese are at least partially altering existing 
employment opportunities because they provide more employment to Basotho. Apart from 
the fact that the businesses of Chinese migrants have presumably more financial resources 
than Basotho, which allow them to employ more people and have a bigger business, there are 
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potentially three additional reasons which could explain why Chinese employ (more) 
Basotho. First of all, as demonstrated above, the labor costs of Chinese employees are in 
average higher than of Basotho. Second, businesses that employ expats have to at least 
theoretically employ Basotho. Third, since many Chinese are not able to communicate 
fluently in Sesotho, it could also be that they need Basotho to have someone who is able to 
communicate fluently with the costumers. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that 
the majority of the Basotho working in Chinese shops is doing “menial work”, i.e. cleaning, 
working in the storage room, or guarding the shop. Only few of them fulfill managerial tasks. 
This means that despite the creation of employment opportunities, there are presumably 
limited skills development opportunities. 
In fact, during my interviews, this was a reoccurring theme: “yes the Chinese create jobs for 
Basotho, but they do not provide them with any meaningful new skills”. It seems that 
policymakers had been hoping that the presence of Chinese shops would create spillover 
effects which would in the long run boost the indigenous wholesale and retail sector. 
However, with more and more Chinese entering the country and fewer Basotho operating 
shops in the wholesale and retail sector, the potential for spillover effects appears to be 
diminishing. While this is obviously a sensitive topic, it is still worth asking to what extent 
this behavior is a reflection of a divergence from already existing pattern before the Chinese 
arrived, i.e. whether the presumably little skill transfer is a reproduction or a deviation from 
aspects of existing employment opportunities for Basotho. To provide an answer to this 
question it is useful to consider if and how Chinese shops differ from other foreign-owned 
shops. In my opinion, there is not so much difference between the skills transferred to 
Basotho in an Indian or Pakistani shop as compared to a Chinese shop: in both cases the 
decisions are taken by the foreigner, and Basotho are rarely in “managerial positions”. 
Moreover, considering that the majority of Basotho-owned micro- and small-scale 
enterprises appears to be survivalists with limited potential of providing employment 
opportunities and/or skills development, it seems that the potential for skills development of 
an employee in this sector are, independent of the nationality of the owner, limited. In other 
words, I suppose that in this aspect, Chinese migrants are rather reproducing the existing 
skills development patterns than deviating from them. 
Finally, the relationship between Chinese migrants’ economic activities and employment 
opportunities has to be seen in the wider context of the general structure of employment 
opportunities for Basotho. Large parts of employment opportunities for Basotho are created 
in Lesotho’s textile and garment industry sector. Here, both wages and skills transfers are 
lower than in the wholesale and retail sector. For example, in 2009, the minimum wage of an 
untrained person in the textile and garment industry was 763 Maloti (MoL, 2009:20). On the 
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other hand, in the wholesale and retail sector it was 1,107 Maloti. In addition, it is well 
documented that employees in the textile and garment factories are assigned to low-skill and 
labor-intensive jobs (Rosenberg, 2007:466). This means that in these sectors there is also 
virtually no skills transfer. Likewise, for Basotho working in the South African mines or on 
the farms, there are also limited skills development opportunities. In other words, there are 
in general limited skills development opportunities for unskilled Basotho. Therefore it is 
seems less surprising that many of the Chinese wholesale and retail shops are providing 
limited skills development opportunities for Basotho, too. With this comparison I neither 
intend to defend the presumably little skill development possibilities for Basotho in shops 
run by Chinese, nor do I want to state that these possibilities could or should not be increased. 
However, if Chinese migrants rather reproduce existing skill transfer patterns, it might be 
questioned to what extent it is legitimate to hold this fact against them. 
6. Conclusion & Discussion 
In my thesis I analyzed Chinese migration to Lesotho―an interesting, yet relatively 
unexplored, example of South-South migration. More specifically, I was asking how economic 
activities of Chinese migrants in Lesotho reproduce and alter businesses and employment 
opportunities in Lesotho. Since this question cannot be answered in a void, I employed 
insights from four key concepts from migration studies (i.e. migration system, migration 
configuration, migrant economy and the new Chinese migration order), and developed a five 
stage model of migration, which combined actor-level and structural factors (see Chapter 2). 
The model was mainly seen as a heuristic device, which provides a theoretical foundation for 
understanding some of the key dynamics underlying migration in general and Chinese 
migration to Lesotho in particular. 
Building on these considerations, I then set out to analyze historical links between China and 
Lesotho and to provide an explanation for the formation of the Sino-Basotho migration 
system (see Chapter 3). My analysis showed that past and present interactions between 
Chinese, Taiwanese and Basotho actors as well as the structures of China, Taiwan and 
Lesotho created sets of structural opportunities and constraints which varied across time and 
space (i.e. China, Taiwan, and Lesotho). A surprising feature of the historical links as well as 
the Sino-Basotho migration system was that Taiwanese and Chinese non-state actors 
appeared to have played and still play a far more important role than state actors for 
facilitating migration. Given the historical circumstances (Lesotho maintained diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan from 1966 to 1983 and from 1990 to 1994), the room for maneuvering 
of Chinese state actors in Lesotho was severely limited throughout the first 30 years after 
Lesotho’s independence. But even after the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with 
Lesotho in 1983, Chinese state actors kept their interactions with Lesotho to a rather 
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symbolic level. The first signs of a scaling-up of interactions between Chinese and Basotho 
state actors could only be observed in 1996, 13 years after the first establishment of 
diplomatic relations with Lesotho. 
In fact, my account of the development of the Sino-Basotho migration system demonstrated 
that Taiwanese non-state actors, who were the first “Chinese looking” to arrive in Lesotho in 
1970, were essentially paving the way for migration from China to Lesotho by creating both 
employment and, to a lesser extent, business opportunities for Chinese migrants. These 
employment opportunities were generated by Taiwanese non-state actors who started to 
shift their textile and garment factories from South Africa to Lesotho in the mid-1980s. 
Moreover, by the time the first Chinese government project workers arrived in Lesotho in 
1996, Taiwanese migrants had already established successful micro- and small-sale 
wholesale and retail businesses. Interestingly, the economic activities of Chinese pioneer 
migrants and subsequent migrants concentrate in the same business sector. In this thesis I 
proposed that this development can be explained with the development of endogenous and 
contextual feedback mechanisms, as well as the transnational networks and a migration 
industry. 
After the outline of the broader context of Chinese migration to Lesotho (i.e. the Sino-Basotho 
migration system), I presented two specific migration configurations within the Sino-Basotho 
migration system: the Fuqingnese and non-Fuqingnese migration configuration (see Chapter 
4). My analysis of the answers of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants revealed several 
similarities in terms of demographic characteristics, of which the most important were (i) 
Category 2 migrants tended to be younger than Category 1 migrants; and (ii) the majority of 
Category 1 migrants had been previously businesspersons, and likewise the majority of 
Category 2 migrants had been staff. Regarding similarities in the migration pattern of non-
Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants, my survey showed: (i) Category 1 migrants came to 
Lesotho because they wanted to start a business, and Category 2 migrants came to Lesotho to 
seek employment; (ii) for the majority of the surveyed migrants’ the main purpose of making 
money was to support the family; (iii) only few migrants had come alone to Lesotho and most 
participants had brought some part of their family; (vi) only few migrants had previous 
outward migration experience; (v) almost all migrants indicated that they would return to 
China again; and (vi) on average Category 1 migrants have stayed in Lesotho for a longer time 
than Category 2 migrants, and they were also planning to return later to China (Category 1: in 
3-5 years; Category 2: in 1-3 years). Finally, with a few exceptions, migrants’ impression of 
Lesotho, before and after migrating, tended to be slightly negative. Surprisingly, although 
they tended to assess the attitude of Basotho towards Chinese negatively, they describe their 
personal relations with Basotho rather positively.  
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Apart from these similarities, I pointed out two important intra-Sino-Basotho migration 
system differences: (i) a higher share of males among single non-Fuqingnese migrants, and (ii) 
differences in the problem solving strategies (i.e. Fuqingnese migrants tended to ask their 
friends for advice and turn to local Chinese in Lesotho for help, and non-Fuqingnese migrants 
relied on their family both for preparation and for help;). Based on the answers to several of 
my questions regarding the migration pattern, I argued that although Fuqingnese and non-
Fuqingnese migrants have different preparation strategies, most migrants from both 
migration configurations had direct or indirect contact with transnational networks engaged 
in organizing migration to Lesotho (for employment or businesses purposes). On the other 
hand, the high share of Category 2 migrants whose boss was in China shows that some 
Chinese migrants are more actively engaging in transnational activities. Regarding the 
strength of these networks, I indicated that it would be misleading to conclude that non-
Fuqingnese migrants had better developed networks just because they tend to not prepare 
their migration. In fact, I concluded the fact that Fuqingnese migrants could more often rely 
on friends for advice was an indicator for potentially stronger and more developed links 
between Lesotho and Fuqing. 
In Chapter 5, I continued with a description of the Chinese migrant economy in Lesotho and 
the implications of Chinese migrants’ economic activities for reproducing and altering 
business and employment structures in Lesotho. The economic activities were analyzed along 
three lines: nature and scope, working and employment patterns, and sourcing strategies. 
Regarding the nature and scope I noted that the majority of Chinese migrants was operating 
small retail shops. In terms of the working and employment patterns, my findings suggest 
that (i) a typical working week of Chinese migrants consisted of six days, and (ii) that 
Category 1 migrants worked on average 6-8 hours per day, whereas Category 2 migrants 
worked 8-10 hours per day; (iii) that a typical Chinese business in Lesotho employed more 
than four people, out of which the majority was Basotho and only few are Chinese; (iv) that 
the wage of Basotho employees of Chinese businesses was approximately 1,000 Maloti lower 
than the wage of their Chinese Category 2 counterparts; (v) that the income of Category 1 
migrants was at least 1,000 Maloti higher than that of Category 2 migrants; and (vi) that most 
Category 1 migrants considered the local wage level as being either lower or the same as in 
China. Finally, in terms of the sourcing strategies I showed that the survey had a high share of 
(i) migrants who did not buy or order goods directly in China; (ii) migrants who did buy or 
order their goods from local Chinese wholesalers; and (iii) migrants who did not buy or order 
their goods at local Chinese wholesalers in South Africa.  
While the economic activities of the members of the two migration configurations had a high 
degree of similarity, I could still identify important differences between the economic 
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activities of non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants. These differences manifested 
themselves in the tendency of (i) Fuqingnese Category 1 migrants to have more businesses 
than non-Fuqingnese migrants; (ii) Fuqingnese migrants to have operated a particular 
business for fewer years than their non-Fuqingnese counterparts; and (iii) Fuqingnese 
Category 2 migrants to have lower wages than non-Fuqingnese Category 2 migrants. This 
confirmed that non-Fuqingnese and Fuqingnese migrants also differ in important aspects of 
their economic activities. However, I concluded that unlike my earlier results about the 
differences of the two migration configurations, this distinction is not a reflection of two 
separate migrant economies, but rather a reflection of two different types of actors, who have 
different resources and strategies. 
Building on these findings as well as the description of these economic activities context (i.e. 
the small-scale wholesale and retail sector of Lesotho), I argued that Chinese migrants in 
Lesotho, by establishing mainly small retail shops and supermarkets, appear to give in to 
structural constraints (i.e. low demand and high entrance barriers into the large-scale 
wholesale and retail sector) and are thereby rather reproducing than altering the existing 
business opportunity structure in the micro-and small-scale business sector. However, 
considering that Chinese migrants have managed to establish a strong presence, and that they 
have different business practices than their Basotho counterparts (i.e. different the setup of 
the business and the sourcing strategies), they are also altering the business opportunities in 
Lesotho. I showed that there are both negative and positive aspects in the altering of business 
opportunities in Lesotho. The negative aspects were the exposure of Basotho to the (fierce) 
competition from Chinese migrants, and the cooperation between local shop owners with 
Chinese migrants, through which ‘cooperative’ Basotho gained more resources, but left 
existing local businesses exposed to more competition. The positive aspects were that 
Basotho are responding to the fierce competition by adapting several aspects of Chinese 
business practices (i.e. sourcing strategies and setup of the business) to be able to at least 
partially compete with the Chinese.  
My account of the relationship between the economic activities of Chinese migrants and 
employment opportunities in Lesotho demonstrated that Chinese migrants are at least 
partially altering existing employment opportunities because Chinese migrants provide more 
employment opportunities to Basotho. But, as I pointed out, the creation of employment 
opportunities did not translate into significant skills development and transfer opportunities 
for Basotho. From the perspective of the interviewed policymakers this was perceived as a 
huge problem, because they had hoped that Basotho could obtain important managerial skills 
from the Chinese migrants and thus be able to start their own businesses. While I do not 
intend to defend the presumably little skill development possibilities for Basotho in shops 
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run by Chinese, I nevertheless argued that Chinese migrants are not altering but rather 
reproducing existing skill transfer patterns and concluded that it might therefore be 
questioned to what extent it is legitimate to hold this fact specifically against them. 
When relating my findings to earlier research on Chinese migrants in general and Chinese 
migrants in Lesotho in particular, a number of factors are worth noting. First of all, I 
demonstrated that the presence of foreigners in Lesotho’s wholesale and retail sector is not a 
new phenomenon and could in fact be traced back to the early independence years. This 
somewhat contradicts the widely held picture of an exclusive Chinese presence and the 
recentness of ‘Chinese invasion’. Second, common wisdom to the contrary, the case of Chinese 
migration to Lesotho suggests that Chinese state actors played a far less important and rather 
indirect role in facilitating migration to Lesotho than commonly thought. From conversations 
with Chinese migrants, I gathered that many of them do not have any contact with the local 
embassy, and their sometimes bitter complaints that nobody cares what happens to them 
further underline this. Nevertheless, considering that China’s ‘relaxed’ emigration policy has 
facilitated large-scale legal and illegal migration, and that policy makers are clearly aware of 
this, one cannot help but suspect that this is at least a sign of indirect state-involvement. 
When I was in Lusaka (Zambia) in December 2012, I had the opportunity to interview the 
Charge d’ Affairs for Political Activities of the Chinese embassy, and when asked about China’s 
emigration management he told me that “China has never controlled [emigration]”90. While 
this statement confirms the relaxed policy stance, the resoluteness of it indicates that Chinese 
migration policy is a sensitive topic. It seems that Chinese authorities could potentially and 
do indeed control emigration (particularly of political dissidents). The current situation can 
be better understood when taking into consideration that if Chinese policy makers would in 
any way admit that they in one or the other way encourage or even facilitate migration to 
selected countries, the image of their engagement in Africa would become even worse than it 
already is91. 
Third, my findings in Chapter 4 are in line with what is generally known about Chinese 
migrants: i.e. the role of migration as a risk-diversification strategy. Those setting up 
businesses abroad are in average older than those coming to work in the shop of a relative or 
fellow countryman, i.e. sojourners or trade migrants (Poston et al., 1994:632f). Since 
migration is part of a larger-family risk diversification strategy, Chinese migrants prefer to 
bring some parts of their family. Chinese people are treated with suspicion by local people 
                                                          
90 China has never controlled: 中国从来不控制 zhonguo conglai bu kongzhi. 
91 That is not to say that everybody thinks that Chinese engagement in Africa is negative, but the 
majority of the articles as well as the local policymakers appear to have a critical if not negative image 
of the Chinese engagement in Africa. 
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(particularly in African countries), but through continuous interactions they manage to 
establish relatively good relations with some parts of the local community.  
Fourth, I found only limited support for the “transnational Chinese” and “African dream” 
theses. To shortly recapture, the transnational Chinese thesis claims that Chinese migrants 
are flexible and constantly on the move in the pursuit of even better business and 
employment opportunities (Mckeown, 2009:317). The African dream thesis on the other 
hand, holds that Chinese migrants in Africa want to make fast and easy money to be able to 
buy a house in their home city (Park, 2009:469). Moreover, the African dream thesis directly 
or indirectly implies that Chinese migrants in Africa are “an exceptional case”. In my survey, 
only few migrants had previous outward migration experience, and similarly only few 
wanted to continue to migrate to another country. Tellingly, all migrants with previous 
migration experience in Africa wanted to go back to China. The fact that many Chinese 
migrants did not have previous migration experience could mean that Chinese migrants can 
rely on both personal and professional (transnational) networks (i.e. migration industry) to 
organize their migration to Lesotho. Through the commercialization of migration (Pieke, 
2006:85), Lesotho might have become an attractive and relative easy reachable migration 
destination. But the fact that many Chinese migrants stated that they want to and will return 
to China indicates that at least they were not as mobile as the image of the flexible 
transnational Chinese suggests. The reasons for this could relate to the fact that they either 
had already made enough money and therefore did not need to engage in further migration, 
or that their (negative) experiences in Lesotho made them reconsider the benefits of further 
migration. In my opinion, the low propensity to engage in further migration on the African 
continent relates to changes in the local and macro-economic environment. From personal 
conversation with Chinese migrants in Lesotho, I gathered that many feel that their 
environment is becoming more and more uncertain and that the risks and costs for staying in 
Lesotho or even moving to another African country are simply too high. Moreover, the 2008 
global economic crisis has meant that the already small income of many Basotho has become 
even smaller. Consequently, the number of potential costumers decreased, making it more 
and more difficult for Chinese migrants to remain profitable. China, on the other hand, has 
managed to retain high economic growth and the increases in demand are less severe, 
therefore making China itself a more and more attractive business destination. 
Coming to the African dream thesis, it could be noted that only three out of 86 migrants 
explicitly stated that their main purpose of making money in Lesotho was to buy a house. In 
fact, the majority of the surveyed migrants stated that they wanted to support the family. Of 
course, supporting the family may include buying a house, which no doubt has a high 
symbolic value in China. But still, I would argue that the reasons for Chinese to come to Africa 
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or Lesotho are more complex than the simple desire to “build a three-level home or 
monument to their success overseas” (Park, 2009:469). This brings me to the second claim of 
the African dream thesis, i.e. that Chinese migration to Africa is an exceptional case because 
Chinese migrants come to the remotest areas of Africa to make money. Speaking for Lesotho, 
I can say that many people, both from other African countries as well as from India and 
Pakistan, view Lesotho as a relatively attractive destination for opening up small shops. For 
example, apart from Chinese owned or run shops, there are also many shops owned and run 
by Indians, South Africans, Pakistani and Bangladeshi. Second, the motivation of most people 
(including Basotho, Indians and other foreigners) who operate or work in a business in 
Lesotho can be considered to do this primarily to make money. Together, it seems 
questionable to what extent the stated exceptionality of Chinese can be deduced from their 
motives or business operations. 
Fifth, my findings for the economic activities of Chinese migrants in Lesotho in Chapter 5 
somewhat deviate from findings for the economic activities of Chinese migrants in other 
parts of the world. This is particularly evident when it came to the sourcing strategies of 
Chinese migrants. Here, the local Chinese wholesaler in Lesotho had a far more prominent 
role than wholesalers in China. It might also be attributed to the fact that Lesotho is a land-
locked country with no access to the sea, and that it is too costly for individual shops to order 
goods from China. Moreover, the shops did not concentrate in China Towns or other 
designated areas (as for example in South Africa). It would be interesting to see to which 
extent this pattern is also prevalent in other African countries. Finally, Chapter 5 showed that 
the economic activities of Chinese migrants are both reproducing and altering existing 
business and employment opportunities in Lesotho. It was interesting to see that Chinese 
migrants tended to employ more Basotho than Chinese. Even more importantly, the success 
of Chinese migrants in the remote areas of Lesotho appeared to be stemming from successful 
cooperation with some Basotho. In fact, it seemed that Chinese migrants’ success was 
strongly relying on support from Basotho and official institutions. Nevertheless, it is still too 
early to judge to what extent the economic activities of Chinese migrants in Lesotho will 
benefit or harm Basotho. 
Despite providing some interesting insights into Chinese migration to Lesotho, my thesis had 
a number of limitations which future research could address. First of all, due to practical 
concerns I concentrated my survey mainly on the central areas of the urban towns in Lesotho. 
Since Chinese migrants are also in rural parts of Lesotho, future research could explore to 
what extent their economic activities differ from those in urban areas. Second, despite several 
attempts, I did not manage to interview many Basotho shop owners, particularly those which 
cooperated with Chinese. This was partly due to language barriers (i.e. many of them speak 
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only Sesotho), but also due to a lack of trust. Future research could try to incorporate 
extensive research on the motivations and opinions of Basotho. Third, although I asked 
Chinese migrants about their sourcing strategies, I did not have the time or resources to 
conduct follow up research on this particular aspect. Since local Chinese wholesalers 
appeared to be highly important for supplying goods to other Chinese shops, it would be 
interesting to explore this aspect further. Finally, while I indicated that the success of Chinese 
migrants in Lesotho is likely to be related to legal and illegal collaboration of Basotho non-
state and state actors, I could not provide extensive evidence for this, and future research 
should confirm or reject this. 
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Appendix 1: Category 1 questionnaire 
1 
个人信息  
性别 与年龄   男  女                                  岁  
当前职业  商人  职工  其他:________ 
以前职业  商人  职工  其他:________ 
出生地点                                 国                               省                                  市 
婚姻状况  未婚  已婚  离婚   丧偶  
陪你去莱索托的主要家庭
成员 
 只有
我 
 父亲  母亲 妻子  丈夫  孩子  其他 
个人经验和看法 
来莱索托主要原因  创业  就业  上学  陪家人  其他:___ 
来莱索托挣钱主要原因  支持自
己 
 支持家人  结婚  买房  其他:___ 
在莱索托居留或停留的时
间 
 不到 1
年 
 1-3 年  3-5 年  5-7 年  7-9 年  9 年以
上 
去莱索托之前,去过其它国
家 
 不  欧洲  美洲  非洲  澳洲  亚洲 
在那边留或停留的时间  不到 1
年 
 1-3 年  3-5 年  5-7 年  7-9 年  9 年以
上 
准备什么时候离开莱索托  不到 1
年 
 1-3 年  3-5 年  5-7 年  7-9 年  退休
时 
离开莱索托之后准备去  中国  欧洲  美洲  非洲  澳洲  亚洲 
来莱索托之前,对莱索托有
过的印象 
 不好  不太好  一般  好  很好  非常
好 
来莱索托之前,您个人认为
以下那个方面可能带来困
难 
 文化  语言  安全  法律  生活
费 
 其
他:__ 
来莱索托之后,对莱索托的
印象 
 不好  不太好  一般  好  很好  非常
好 
来莱索托之后,与莱索托人
的关系 
 不好  不太好  一般  好  很好  非常
好 
来莱索托之后,莱索托人对
中国人的态度 
 不好  不太好  一般  好  很好  非常
好 
来莱索托之后,与本地的中
国人的关系 
 不好  不太好  一般  好  很好  非常
好 
来莱索托之后,本地的中国
人对你的态度 
 不好  不太好  一般  好  很好  非常
好 
来莱索托之后,遇到困难  没有  不多  不太多  一般  多  很多 
来莱索托之前,做了什么准
备 
 没准备 
 学英文 
 看关于莱索托的书 
 上网与看其他人的经验 
 听取朋友的意见 
 其他 
来莱索托之前,您个人认为
以下那个方面可能带来困
难 
 文化 
 语言 
 
 法律 
 安全 
 生活费 
 其他:___ 
124 
 
 
 
  
来莱索托之后,遇到的困难
的原因 
 文化不同 
 沟通不顺利 
 不安全 
 法律很严格 
生活费太高 
 
遇到困难时,谁会帮助你  我自己 
 家人 
 同事 
 本地的中国人 
 莱索托人 
关于业务  
业务性质   批发商  零售  超市  饭店  中医  其他:__ 
营业业务的长短   不到 1
年 
 1-3 年  3-5 年  5-7 年  7-9 年  9 年以
上 
职工人数   0 位  1-2 位  2-3 位  4-5 位  6-7 位  7 位以
上 
职工其中多少个是莱索
托人 
 0 位  1-2 位  2-3 位  4-5 位  6-7 位  7 位以
上 
职工其中多少个是中国
人 
 0 位  1-2 位  2-3 位  4-5 位  6-7 位  7 位以
上 
莱索托员工的专业技术
水平 
 很低  低  一般  高  很高  非常高 
莱索托员工的工作态度  不认真  有点认
真 
 一般  认真  很认真  非常认
真 
每天平均工作时间  0-2 小
时 
2-4 小时  4-6 小
时 
 6-8 小
时 
 8-10 小
时 
 10 小时
以上 
每周工作几天  2 天  3 天  4 天  5 天  6 天  7 天 
职工平均的月收入(M)  1500-
2500 
 2500-
3500 
 3500-
4500 
 4500-
5500 
 5500-
6500 
 6500 以
上 
莱索托职工平均月收入
与比中国比较 
 低  一样  高  高一倍  高两倍 
总共拥有的业务  1 家  2 家  3 家  4 家  6 家  6 家以
上 
大概的月收入 (M)  1000- 
3000 
 3000-
6000 
 6000-
9000 
 9000-
12000 
 12000-
15000 
 15000
以上 
你的月收入与中国比较  低  一样  高  高一倍  高两倍 
业务所需要的货物百分之多少是… 
…中国制造  100%  80%  60%  40%  20%以下 
…在中国买或定的  100%  80%  60%  40%  20%以下 
…在本地的中国批发商买
或定的 
 100%  80%  60%  40%  20%以下 
…在南非买或定的  100%  80%  60%  40%  20%以下 
…在南非的中国批发商买
或定的 
 100%  80%  60%  40%  20%以下 
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Appendix 2: Category 2 questionnaire  
 
个人信息  
性别 与年龄   男  女                                     岁  
当前职业  商人  职工  其他:___________ 
以前职业  商人  职工  其他:__________  
出生地点                                    国                                     省                                     市 
婚姻状况  未婚  已婚  离婚   丧偶  
陪你去莱索托的主要
家庭成员 
 只有
我 
 父亲  母亲 妻子  丈夫  孩子 其他:__ 
个人经验和看法 
来莱索托主要原因  创业  就业  上学  陪家人  其他: 
___ 
来莱索托挣钱主要原因  支持自己  支持家人  结婚  买房  其他: 
___ 
在莱索托居留或停留的时
间 
 不到 1
年 
 1-3 年  3-5 年  5-7 年  7-9 年  9 年以
上 
去莱索托之前,去过其它国
家 
 不  欧洲  美洲  非洲  澳洲  亚洲 
在那边留或停留的时间  不到 1
年 
 1-3 年  3-5 年  5-7 年  7-9 年  9 年以
上 
准备什么时候离开莱索托  不到 1
年 
 1-3 年  3-5 年  5-7 年  7-9 年  退休
时 
离开莱索托之后准备去  中国  欧洲  美洲  非洲  澳洲  亚洲 
来莱索托之前,对莱索托有
过的印象 
 不好  不太好  一般  好  很好  非常
好 
来莱索托之前,您个人认为
以下那个方面可能带来困
难 
 文化  语言  安全  法律  生活
费 
 其
他:__ 
来莱索托之后,对莱索托的
印象 
 不好  不太好  一般  好  很好  非常
好 
来莱索托之后,与莱索托人
的关系 
 不好  不太好  一般  好  很好  非常
好 
来莱索托之后,莱索托人对
中国人的态度 
 不好  不太好  一般  好  很好  非常
好 
来莱索托之后,与本地的中
国人的关系 
 不好  不太好  一般  好  很好  非常
好 
来莱索托之后,本地的中国
人对你的态度 
 不好  不太好  一般  好  很好  非常
好 
来莱索托之后,遇到困难  没有  不多  不太多  一般  多  很多 
来莱索托之前,做了什么准
备 
 没准备 
 学英文 
 看关于莱索托的书 
 上网与看其他人的经验 
 听取朋友的意见 
 其他:__________________________ 
来莱索托之前,您个人认为
以下那个方面可能带来困
 文化 
 语言 
 法律 
 安全 
 生活费 
 其他:__________ 
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难  
来莱索托之后,遇到的困难
的原因 
 文化不同 
 沟通不顺利 
 不安全 
 法律很严格 
 生活费太高 
 其他:___________ 
遇到困难时,谁会帮助你  我自己 
 家人 
 同事 
 本地的中国人 
 莱索托人 
 其他:___________ 
关于工作  
工作业务性质   批发商  零售  超市  饭店  中医  其他:__ 
工作的长短   不到 1
年 
1-3 年  3-5 年  5-7 年  7-9 年  9 年以
上 
同事人数   0 位  1-2 位  2-3 位  4-5 位  6-7 位  7 位以
上 
同事门其中多少个是莱
索托人 
 0 位  1-2 位  2-3 位  4-5 位  6-7 位  7 位以
上 
同事门其中多少个是中
国人 
 0 位  1-2 位  2-3 位  4-5 位  6-7 位  7 位以
上 
你的老板在哪儿?  中国  莱索托 (请写城市) ____________________________ 
每天平均工作时间  0-2 小
时 
2-4 小时  4-6 小
时 
 6-8 小
时 
 8-10 小
时 
 10 小时
以上 
每周工作几天  2 天  3 天  4 天  5 天  6 天  7 天 
莱索托员工的专业技术
水平 
 很低  低  一般  高  很高  非常高 
莱索托员工的工作态度  不认真  有点认
真 
 一般  认真  很认真  非常认
真 
平均的月收入(M)  1000-
1500 
 1500-
2000 
 2000-
2500 
 2500-
3000 
 3000-
4500 
 4500 以
上 
每月的生活费  0- 
500 
 500- 
1000 
 1000-
1500 
 1500-
2000 
 2000-
2500 
 2500 
以上 
这边的月收入比你在中
国时拿到的收入 
 低  一样  高  高一倍  高两倍  
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